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1CHAPTER 1
COALITION GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION AND DURATION
This study examines the reasons responsible for the various formations and 
durations of Israeli governments.1 What makes certain Israeli coalition governments 
large, with many participating parties while others are established small? Why do 
particular coalition governments last longer in office than others? The significance of 
these questions becomes apparent when we recognize that a coalition government’s 
formation reflects various national and international political developments. Economic 
circumstances, foreign policy, and immigration influx are among the various factors that 
impact coalition politics and determine the extent of government partnerships. Coalition 
government formation also expresses the structural constraints of the electoral institution. 
The number of parties and their relative electoral strength may also determine the level of 
cooperation, opposition, or parliamentary competition that can alter the formation of 
governments.
Understanding the factors shaping governments’ formations can further help us 
understand why particular ruling coalitions last longer in office than others. This study 
addresses the institutional and political factors that shape the particular formation of a 
coalition and explores the types of circumstances that contribute to coalition 
governments’ early breakups or prolonged duration. The examination of coalition 
government formation and duration helps political strategists design enduring coalitions
1 By coalition duration is meant the number of days the alliance lasts in pow er before being dismantled and 
replaced by a new government.
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2capable of adapting to changes that are storming nations while taking institutional 
constraints into consideration, thus contributing to a stable polity.
Coalition Formation Debate
Past literatures examined variables responsible for the formation and duration of 
particular coalitions. Following William Riker’s infamous coalition theory in 1962, 
researchers were divided between adherents and critics. Riker advocated the view that 
coalitions form as the outcome of zero-sum games calculation (Riker, 1962). He viewed 
parties as rational players aiming to achieve maximum power in the game play. Thus, the 
sum calculation of all parties in a rational game, he maintained, contributes to the 
formation of a coalition that includes the minimum possible number of partners. This 
configuration, Riker believed, provided respective coalition members maximum benefits 
by dividing resources among the least number of beneficiaries.
Riker’s followers sought to enrich his research program by widening its protective 
belt, to use Lakatos’ terminology.2 Influential contributions to Riker’s theory were 
elaborated by periodical publications associated with J. Harasanyi (1969), W. Wright 
(1971), J. Dodd (1974), K. Strom (1984), and M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1990, 1996). 
Their contributions to the research program focused on innovative aspects and measures, 
which were associated with the costs and benefits to parties joining a particular coalition 
formation. Party electoral seats, cabinet ministries, ministry budget allocations, and other
2 Lakatos, Imre “Proofs and Refutations: The Logic o f  Mathematical D iscovery” Cambridge University. 
1977.
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3similar variables represented the foundations of parties’ strategies to join a particular 
coalition formation.
An antithetical paradigm to Riker’s was associated with the work of Robert 
Axelerod, whose “Conflict of Interest” (1970) prioritized the interest of social cleavages 
over the benefits associated with the particular structure of a coalition. Political alliances, 
Axelerod perceived, reflected shared interests between social groups, and was not merely 
a product of parties’ sharing calculations. He asserted that coalitions needed to have 
minimum common values and programs, and that governments are formed among 
ideologically close networks (Axelerod, 1970). Contributions to Axelerod’s thesis were 
made by various authors including S.M. Lipset and S. Rokhan (1967), A. DeSwan 
(1973), A. Lipjhart (1977), I. Budge (1978), P. Warwick (1979), D. Baron (1993), and 
Dunleavy (2001). Their research provided continuous support to the perspective that 
parties reflect the political, economic, or social interest of respective classes, groups, or 
cleavages in society and their decisions to join, defend, or abort a coalition are closely 
linked with the momentum of social conflict and political change. Policy programs were 
found to be among the best indicator of parties’ ideological positions in predicting 
coalition formation (Budge 1978, 90, 94; Baron, 1993).
Follow-up research exposed shortcomings and faults in both paradigms. Mogens 
Pedersen and Peter Mair, for example, found that electoral volatility in several countries 
was associated with ideological detachment and the ideological commitment of declining 
parties (Pedersen, 1990; Mair, 1983). Pedersen and Mair cited Otto Kirchheimer’s
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assertion (1966) that ideology can no longer be taken as a determinant of a party’s 
behaviors and coalition strategies. On the other hand, views associated with Lipset and 
Rokhan’s work “Party Systems and Voter Alignments” (1967) proposed the contrary. 
Studies by Michael Taylor and Michael Laver of twelve European countries between 
1945 and 1971, as well as Abram De Swaan’s study of eight European democracies and 
Israel between 1918 and 1972, found Riker’s theory of minimum winning formation was 
contradicted in most cases (De Swaan, 1973; Taylor and Laver, 1972). Also, Arend 
Lipjhart opposed Kirchheimer’s thesis on the basis that “parties’ policy preferences 
cannot be ignored” (Lipjhart, 1984, p.53) and found that many oversized or “grand” 
coalitions are often formed in pluralistic societies.
Synthetic research attempted to bridge both paradigms. Yet, these efforts often 
provided a greater weight of variables that supported aspects of one paradigm over the 
other. Mark Franklin and Thomas T. Mackie’s (1984) reassessment of parties’ size and 
ideology, for example, found size to be a more significant explanatory variable in 
coalition formation, although in specific countries the significance may be reversed 
(Franklin & Mackie, 1984). Recent research, associated with the ‘Manifesto Project’ has 
aimed at isolating indicators from party platforms that, along with size considerations, 
orient coalition formation (Budge; 1993, 1994). Other synthetic research is found in the 
work of Carol Mershon (1996, 2001), Itai Sened (1996), Martin Lanny and Randolph 
Stevenson (2001) who predicted coalition formations based on both party’s size and 
policy position while controlling for institutional variations.
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Coalition Duration Debate
Contemporary theoretical analysis of coalition politics has begun to demonstrate a 
growing interest in formation predictions, as well as an even greater interest in coalition 
stability analysis. Starting with P. Warwick (1979) many theorists believe that the 
question of coalition formation is fundamentally connected to that of coalition stability. 
A party’s decision to join a particular coalition formation is necessarily linked with the 
capacity of such a coalition to confront arising political and economic pressures, thus 
avoiding early divisions and breakups. The research question thus became associated 
with the question of what makes a particular alliance more durable than another. The 
answer to this question was thought to provide additional insight into the rationale of 
parties joining a particular coalition formation.
As was the case with formation research, the duration question polarized 
researchers into various theoretical camps. The division was between those who 
supported Riker’s styled coalition (Robertson, 1983; Mershon, 1996) and those who 
advocated Axelerod’s styled coalition (Warwick, 1979), with each camp predicting 
durability. Synthesizers also emerged (Lijphart, 1984; Ingelhart, 1987; Budge, 1990). The 
challenge to both theoretical core assumptions, however, came with B.C. Browne., J. P. 
Frendreis, and D.W. Gleiber’s milestone work "An 'Events' Approach to the Problem of 
Cabinet Stability" in 1984 and was followed by supporting publications in 1986 and 
1988. Browne and his co-authors found that the structure of any political alliance was 
subject to permanent accumulative pressures due to randomly occurring events that, 
throughout its life, undermine its duration. Whether formed according to Riker or
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Axelerod’s model, coalitions age and dissolve as the probability of shocking events 
increases with time. In this context, P. Warwick (1992) spectulated on the relevance of 
coalitions’ structural formations with respect to duration. J.D. Robertson (1983, 1984, 
1986), G. King (1990), P. Warwick (1992, 94), Lupia and Strom (1995), Grofman and 
Roozentaal(1997), Laver and Shepsle (1998, 1999), D. Baron (1998), and Diermeir and 
Stevenson’s (1999) respective studies rejected the idea that coalition structural 
formation is irrevalent in duration analysis. However, they disagreed over the extent to 
which stmctural formation or events impact duration.
The “event” theories marked a turning point in the study of coalition behaviors; 
the need to unify event and stmctural paradigms appeared urgent. Robertson, Warwick, 
King and various authors took on this task. In linking event to stmcture, Warwick 
established causality between economic indicators and government stability (Warwick, 
1992). Similarly, Robertson suggested that the economy is an important determinant of 
stmctural behaviors (Robertson, 1983; 1984). Finally, King established a unified 
statistical model that combined both “event” and “stmctural” propositions in duration 
analysis (King, Alt, Bums, and Laver 1990). In its turn, the unified model presents some 
problems in the literature. These problems were associated with the questions of which 
event(s) should be considered most critical in determining coalition behaviors. Do events 
exhibit a pattern in their impact on duration or is each unique in its implication(s). as a 
historian may suggest?
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7Persisting Anomalies
In order to address these questions this study attempts to build bridges between 
both formation and duration theories while strengthening core positions. We analyze 
both coalition formation and duration perspectives by considering explanatory variables 
common to both phenomena. Adopting coalitions as the unit of analysis, we distinguish 
between structural and event variables. We assess each in light of the size and 
ideological formation of the coalition. Then, we replicate our analysis in respect to 
coalition duration, revealing variables that impact formation and, in turn, duration.3
Before applying our research design, however, we recognized important 
shortcomings in most coalition studies, particularly their tendency to undermine 
important historic, cultural, religious, political and institutional differences between 
countries. While we admit that democracies do share core values and institutional 
dynamics, we believe that each maintains a unique set of attributes that often yield 
peculiar political outcomes. Taking Israel, for example, we instantly recognize the 
dramatic prospect of the ongoing national conflict with the Arabs and the Palestinians, 
the influence of Israel’s inner religious-secular-ethnic divisions, and the impact of 
economic, industrial and technological transformations shaping Israeli politics (Arian, 
1998). Historic transformations specific to a given democracy, particularly in light of 
globalization and modem global integration, may diminish or exaggerate certain national 
peculiarities and distinctively shape political momentum.4 In Israel, this became apparent
3 W e use two-stage quantitative statistical regression analysis in order to examine the formation then the 
duration models.
4 Such a view supports Browne’s reasoning for having ‘event’ variables determining the various durations 
of coalitions in democracies (Browne 1984, 86).
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8after 1969, when conquest of new territories, the development of mass industry, and the 
increasing fragmentation of political parties marked a substantial shift in normal politics.5 
Such transformation presented further complications to the generalizations associated 
with coalition theories. Not only can we find important differences in the attributes of 
democracies, but we can also recognize significant distinctions within the development of 
each country’s political history.
Thus, we find ourselves compelled to reexamine coalition theories in light of the 
peculiarities of each country, hoping to accumulate political knowledge about various 
nations via this process and consequently to provide, through their common behaviors, a 
mean to validate or reject aspects of coalition theories. This study begins this mission by 
examining the behaviors of Israeli coalitions in light of changing institutional and 
political circumstances. We study Israeli coalition behaviors while projecting various 
general theoretical propositions relevant to formation and duration analysis. We 
implement two analytical approaches: quantitative and qualitative. The former
incorporates the populations of 28 Israeli governments since independence in 1949 
through 1999, in order to reveal a general pattern and relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables; the latter includes eight coalitions evenly divided 
between shortest and longest lived governments and distributed between the periods 
before and after 1969, in order to reveal comparative behaviors.
5 Following the 1967 Six Day War, the Labor groups became further divided between “tenitorialists’, or those who 
claimed national right to the new Occupied Territories, and the “peace camp”, or those who advocated the return of 
conquered land in exchange for peace (Isaac, 1976, Perlmutter, 1985). The Labor party’s traditional influence 
deteriorated in favor of the Right Likud party (Blazer and Sandler, 1990; Arian 1998). . Following an industrial surge,
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A Synthetic Research Design
Our study is divided into a two-stage design consisting first of formation and then 
of duration variables. In the formation stage we aim at explaining the variant formation 
in coalition size and ideology. What makes particular coalitions form large, or 
consensual, while others are small, or exclusive? Why do certain governments adopt 
strong, narrow, or tight ideological policy positions while others lack such orientation, 
incorporating wide-inclusive policy programs? The answer to these questions will 
provide some analytical perspective to the Riker vs. Axelerod debate as well as an 
examination to the Lipjhart “consensual thesis” in pluralistic systems. Riker’s view 
asserts that coalitions will always form as minimum winning (Riker, 1962), Axelerod 
projects that coalition ideological programs will always form tight (Axelerod, 1970), and 
Lipjhart proposes that coalition in pluralistic Israel will always form large, expanding 
beyond minimum winning requirements (Liphart, 1977; 1984).
Our explanatory variables are of two types: structural and event-based. The 
structural variable we introduce in this study is “coalition competition,” or the degree to 
which there is an increased opportunity of rival coalitions to win a majority number of 
seats in the Knesset. Because Israel has maintained a dominant party tradition, i.e., there 
has been in each Knesset a party that maintained a substantially large number of seats and 
to which the formation of government has been traditionally assigned, the change in the 
dominant party’s power index to form winning coalitions has become the standard for 
measuring competition. The increase in the power of the dominant party to form a
labor disputes arose with increasing numbers of strikes. U.S. -  Israeli alliance was fortified throughout the same 
period.
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winning coalition undermines competition, while the decline of such power fosters 
parliamentary fractionalization and competition. How does competition impact coalition 
formation and duration? Mershon proposed that competition makes coalitions expensive, 
therefore, forming small and tight. This is particularly the case because parties in a 
competitive environment can choose from various potential coalition formations forcing 
the dominant party to make urgent concessions in budget and ministry allocation in favor 
of joining parties. Dominant parties, therefore, have grown less capable of affording 
large partnerships. By the same reasoning, Mershon thought that the cost associated with 
dismantling a coalition increases with competition since the dominant party cannot 
guarantee the reformation of a winning coalition. Mershon predicted that coalitions will, 
therefore, last longer in power as structural competition increases (Mershon; 1996,2001).6
The other set of explanatory variables are event pressure variables, i.e., variables 
associated with political, social, and economic change independent of institutional 
structure. We propose two types of events: external and internal. The first is associated 
with foreign policy issues such as annual severity of conflict, annual U.N. resolutions, 
and annual foreign assistance; the second is associated with indicators such as the annual
6 Mershon’s model resembles a free market in its supply-demand relationship having the dominant party 
acting as the supplier o f  a coalition and the minor parties as membership buyers. In situations where many 
suppliers compete to sell to buyers (many dominant parties), suppliers grew desperate to sell membership at 
low  prices, jeopardizing profitability (forming expensive coalitions by providing maximum benefits to 
minor partners). Because the coalition, under competitive circumstances is costly to the dominant party, the 
coalition is often formed small-tight. Continued competition forces coalition suppliers to maintain low  
membership cost, and therefore saves the coalition from early collapse (minor parties maintain rank and do 
not defect to a competing coalition, due to their respective maximum profitability). The situation is totally 
reversed when a supplier turn to be a monopoly (no competition), thus dictating prices (providing the least 
possible benefits to minor partners by controlling most government resources). Such a situation increases 
membership cost with the suppliers looking for greater profit by having more members (more supporters 
with the least possible benefits at higher return to the monopoly). The same situation provides the 
monopoly supplier with the luxury to dismantle the partnership whenever a feasible enterprise emerges as a 
more profitable alternative (more partners accepting lower benefits).
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number of immigrants entering the country relative to the total population, annual GDP 
rate change, annual unemployment rate, annual number of strikers per strike, annual 
inflation rate, and annual growth rate. The general theoretical perception is that event 
pressure leads to political consensus, where political parties undermine their ideological 
differences and unite to address obstacles confronting the nation. Robertson proposed 
that event pressures, and economic pressure in particular, are responsible for larger 
formations (Robertson; 1984, 1986). Browne’s aging thesis predicted that event 
pressures or “shocks” undermine the durability of the coalition (Browne; 1984, 1986). 
Our design will allow us to examine these views while making the necessary distinction 
between the variant impacts of the different event pressure variables on both the 
formation and the duration of the government.
In the second duration stage analysis the dependent variables, analyzed in the first 
formation stage analysis, become additional structural explanatory variables. The 
question we attempt to address in this stage is how the size and the ideological orientation 
of a coalition determine its duration. If Riker was correct, one would expect that the 
larger and ideologically wider coalitions are the least efficient, and therefore the less 
durable. Efficiency implies that minimum-tight coalition is the most lasting coalition 
while maximum-wide coalition is the least durable (confirming Mershon, 1996). If, on 
the other hand, Liphart was correct, we should expect in Israel’s pluralist society the 
contrary to be the case with larger inclusive (consensual) coalitions having longer 
duration.
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Significance of the Study
In formulating the various relationships existing between structural and event 
independent variables with formation and duration dependent variables, this study 
assesses the relevant strength of each relationship. What events and institutional settings 
matter the most in government formation and, consequently, respective durability? The 
answer to this question leads us to examine the relationship between government 
formation and duration. Does predicted formation lead to durable coalitions, or is 
duration determination dependent on structural and event pressure changes? This study 
will provide further assertion to the linkage existing between formation and duration 
analyses. It will show that a coalition government’s structural formation determines 
duration (confirming Warwick, 1994). It will further demonstrate that event pressures, 
responsible for particular government formation, may effect duration differently. For 
example, this study reveals that internal event pressure responsible for small government 
formation undermines duration. On the other hand, external pressure, associated with 
larger coalition formation, may prolong government duration (contrary to Browne, 1984, 
1986).
We recognize that the prospective validity and reliability of our study may change 
between countries and across time within each country. Many examinations of modem 
political process have hinted at fundamental changes in the shape and behavioral pattern 
of political alliances in democratic nations (Kirchheimer, 1966; Mair, 1983; Pedersen, 
1990). In this study, we consider these views by careful analysis of the annual trends in 
our variables. Early observations confirm the proposition that since the 1969 Israeli
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Knesset’s election, a serious shift has occurred in important variables. Most 
significantly, we noted, was the shift in structural competition among rival dominant 
parties within the Israeli Knesset (Chapter 3). Since 1969, Israel witnessed a rapid 
process of industrialization and territorial expansion, and its Knesset became further 
fragmented providing the ground for serious competition among rival dominant parties 
(Issac, 76; Perlemutter, 85; Arian; 98). Such situations instigate serious reconsideration 
of our two-stage models. The question we ask is: what historic development, if any, 
altered coalition behaviors in formation and duration perspectives? In order to answer 
this question, in this study our quantitative examination of 28 Israeli coalitions is 
reconsidered by applying our model qualitatively to 13 coalitions formed before 1969 and 
15 coalitions formed after (Chapters 5 and 6). In examining the general relationship 
between independent and dependent variables for all 28 Israeli governments we first 
implement a quantitative multiple linear regression analysis (OLS) and compare the 
result to a robust regression analysis (Chapter 4).7 Then, in order to examine the impact 
of historic developments in coalition behaviors, we divide our governments’ population 
into two sets of coalitions that were formed before and after 1969 and implement a 
qualitative case comparative study approach, as proposed by Alexander George (1969). 
We compare coalition formation and duration before and after 1969 by selecting and 
examining the two shortest and the two longest-lived coalitions in each time period. 
Thus, while the quantitative approach provides us with a means to evaluate the general 
application of our theoretical models, the qualitative approach allows us to highlight the
7 Both analyses are further discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
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comparative impact of historic developments on the formation and duration patterns of 
Israeli coalitions.
Data Sources
The data used in this study is compiled from various sources. Coalitions’ 
ideological measures were based on documents (1949-1999) titled “the Principle 
Guidelines of Government” and were primarily obtained from the Israeli Knesset 
Archive. They were content coded according to Ian Budge’s 55 identified sub-policies 
(Budge, 1993). Dominant Parties ideology (1949-1988) data were obtained from Essex 
University, which was compiled by Ian Budge (Dataset CMPr3). Party manifestos from 
1988 to 1999 were obtained from the Jerusalem Post and Israel Yearbook and Almanac 
and were content coded using Ian Budge’s approach. A third data set consisting of 
information about duration, the various shuffles, defections, and changes in cabinets 
(1945-1990) was also obtained from Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic 
Governments in 20 Democracies (1945-1990)” (Budge, 1993); the data was updated to 
1999 using Keesing’s Contemporary Archive. A fourth source of statistical data (1949- 
2003) was obtained from “Statistical Abstract of Israel”. The fifth data set consists of 
foreign aid to Israel (1949-1999) and was obtained from the following authors: Clyde R. 
Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, (May 11, 
2000); Larry Q. Nowels, “Israel: An Overview of U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional 
Research Service, (May 20, 1993); A. F. K. Organski, “The $36 billion bargain”, NY: 
Colombia University Press, 1990. The sixth data set consists of war data by D. Singer’s 
“Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992). The data was updated using “The Jewish
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Online Research Center”. “Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs” provided further
information and data regarding Israeli parties’ respective electoral strength and political 
positions.
Chapter Summaries
The following chapters are divided as follows: Chapter 2, “Coalition Theories and 
a Synthetic Model of Coalition Formation and Duration,” reviews the various research on 
coalition formation and duration theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory 
and its various sub-disciplines. It also considers ‘event’ theory as a competing theoretical 
model to coalition research. Synthetic approaches are examined for their contributions 
and shortcomings. An alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is 
advanced. This theory argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. 
Structural analysis must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition 
system while event analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. 
internal). The theory predicts coalitions’ structural formations and durations while taking 
into consideration important national transformations. It further provides means for 
examining the ‘event aging thesis.’
Chapter 3, “Methodologies and Measurements” examines two methodological 
approaches to evaluate the theory presented in chapter 2. The first is a quantitative 
method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method 
using comparative case study analysis. The purpose of having two methodologies is 
related to the small number of cases being examined in this research. Such a shortcoming
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makes a quantitative examiniation difficut to verify. An inductive comparative 
qualitative approach, on the other hand, allows rigorous examination of cases studied and 
provides further verification and/or refinement to theoretical assumptions. This chapter 
discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both 
methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative 
analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of 
case selections, and systematic case evaluation and comparison.
In Chapter 4 the data is quantitatively examined to reveal the relationship between 
coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures. 
The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel 
was founded. Multiple linear and robust regression analyses were conducted to show the 
significance of the model developed in chapter 2. While the model was not found 
significant, partly in light of low sample size, trend analysis showed that the dominant 
party power index has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of 
strikers per strike also increased over the years. These changes in trends have become 
apparent since 1969.
In Chapter 5 a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition 
formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to 
examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ early breakups and 
terminations. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided 
between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide
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comparative evidence as to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred 
following the 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include 
economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness 
of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure 
variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and 
the coalition’s ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in 
order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments.
A comparative qualitative analysis of longest duration governments, compared to 
shortest duration governments, is made in Chapter 6. The variables analyzed in this 
chapter are the same examined in Chapter 5. A comparative result of shortest vs. longest 
duration governments are also provided. Further comparison to quantitative vs. 
qualitative analyses is also shown.
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of our quantitative and qualitative data 
analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings 
appear to support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward 
tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets and results in short duration 
coalitions, particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. 
Economic and external pressures responsible for the formation of large coalitions before 
1969 appear to have had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many 
contemporary minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 
period also appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition
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formations. Supports to our duration hypothesis emerge in the significant negative 
association existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government 
duration. While competition is found to contradict long-duration proposition, large-sized 
and wide-ideological coalitions are found to have conditional impact, contributing to 
government longevity in situation of external threat. Supports to the ‘aging’ thesis also 
demonstrate negative associations between economic as well as external ‘shocks’ and 
government duration.
Our comparative examination of Israeli coalitions reveals a significant behavioral 
shift following 1969’s Knesset election. Increasing parliamentary fragmentation and 
coalition competition marks the transformation. Throughout the ‘post-national’ period, 
with the exception of grand alliances forming to repel external threat, coalitions have 
gown more competitive and less tolerant of policy differences, forming narrow agendas 
and smaller sized cabinets in response to domestic and external pressures. This 
transformation appears to instigate shorter duration governments, and consequently, 
instable polity.
The limitations of our proposition are due to the small number of cases studies 
and to the cultural and political peculiarities of the country examined. The contribution 
to the general coalition theory, however, shows that coalitions need to be examined in 
light of important historic-national transformations. Theoretical models must take into 
consideration the country’s level of national fragmentation arising as a consequence of 
global transformation to reveal proper conclusions about coalition behaviors. Future
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studies, we propose, can analyze countries with similar ethnic-cultural-political attributes,
clustering them into levels of national fragmentation while taking global developments 
into consideration. The significance of such a proposition lies in forecasting the 
formation of durable and stable post-national governments.
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CHAPTER 2
COALITION THEORIES AND A SYNTHETIC MODEL OF COALITION
FORMATION AND DURATION
This chapter reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration 
theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. It 
also considers ‘event’ theory as a competing theoretical model to coalition research. 
Synthetic approaches are examined in their contributions and shortcomings. An 
alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is advanced. This theory 
argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. Structural analysis 
must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition system while event 
analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. internal). The theory 
predicts coalitions’ structural formations and durations. It further provides aspects for 
examining the ‘event aging thesis.’
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Two Competing Structural Models of Coalition Behavior; Size vs. Ideology
The tendency towards a practical rationalism in conduct is 
common to all civic strata.8
The question concerning the formation of stable, effective, and durable coalitions 
is a classical research investigation approached in much of the comparative political 
literature. Research questions concerning coalitions have evolved into various sub-fields 
and many competing traditions. Most analyses, however, have been primarily focused on 
two important attributes of coalition making. The first considers the question of how 
coalitions are formed and the factors responsible for the emergence of one type of 
coalition rather than another. The second focuses on coalition duration and the variables 
leading to alliance stability and effective policy outcomes (Warwick, 1979, 94).
These traditions draw their analyses based on party behaviors. The first view can 
be labeled the Rational-Efficient model, where coalition formation and duration are 
strictly associated with the rationality of parties achieving and holding power (Wright, 
1971, pp. 17-54; Harsanyi, 1969). The rationality of coalition formation and duration in 
this model is found to be quantitatively calculable. The calculation is simply based on 
the net benefit of parties joining or leaving a coalition. The total benefit to all parties in a 
coalition determines both formation and duration of the alliance. The rest of this model’s 
analysis, focusing on coalition duration, lies in determining the cost and gains of each 
party joining or remaining in a coalition. Parties’ electoral seats, cabinet ministries, 
budget allocation, and other political resources represent the rational benefit-cost basis
8 Max Webber in JJ.R. Thomas, “Ideology and Elective Affinity”, Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 40, 
February, 1985.
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for calculating coalition formation and duration (Riker, 1962; Dodd, 1976, 84; Strom, 
1984; Laver and Shepsle 1990, 96).
William Riker’s influential theory of formation was based on the assumption that 
coalitions form as the outcome of zero-sum games calculations, especially by coalition 
leaders. He describes such a theoretical model as follow:
In n-person, zero-sum  games, where side-payments are perm itted, where players are 
rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions 
occur... In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments, 
participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger 
(Riker, 1962, p. 32).
In other words it is considered irrational in this formulation to pay more for a cabinet 
alliance than is required to win in parliament, with costs considered in allocating benefits 
to coalition partners. Therefore rational leaders supposedly tend not to include more 
partners than minimally necessary for victory.
The second view of coalition formation is associated with the Ideological-Interest 
model. This tradition primarily draws on the concept that parties reflect the political, 
economic, or social interest of particular classes, groups, or cleavages in society (Lipset 
and Rokhan, 1967; Axlerod, 1970; de Swaan 1973; Lipjhart, 1977; Warwick, 1979; 
Baron, 1993; Dunleavy, 2001). From this perspective, parties’ decisions to join, defend, 
or abort a coalition are closely linked with the momentum of social conflict and political 
change. The significance of a cleavage or a class in political life determines coalition 
behavior. Thus, cleavages and classes of similar interests tend to push their respective
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parties to politically bond in order to confront parties representing antagonistic programs. 
(Axlerod, 1970) Calculating interests involves numerous sets of quantitative and 
qualitative variables. However, most ideological-interest coalition researchers have 
attempted to find policy variables as indicators of parties’ coalition cohesion. (Budge 
1978, 90, 94; Baron 1993)
The core assumption of both these traditions considers the party as the main 
unitary actor in the political system. It is either the party’s electoral rationality or 
ideological position that largely determines its political alignment. Coalitions emerge as 
the final outcomes of the various partisan electoral configurations or ideological 
associations. “Most policy-driven coalition theories,” suggest Budge and Laver, “of 
course, operate on the basis that both the coalition that forms and its polity are in some 
predictable form the objectives of parties within the system.” (Budge, 1993, p.499). Or as 
Sartori puts it, “parties make for a ‘system,’ then, only when they are parts (in the plural); 
and a party system is precisely the system o f interactions resulting from inter-party 
competition” (Sartori, 1976, p.44).
Serious reconsideration of both theoretical paradigms has been made through the 
years. This was most evident in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan’s effort to revise the theories. 
In their famous study “Party Systems and Voter Alignments” (1967), Lipset and Rokkan 
advance the thesis that the western Democratic Party system of the 1960s resembled the 
same cleavage structure of the 1920s. Lipset and Rokhan established the view that both 
national and industrial revolutions of the 19th Century continued to shape the ideological
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straggle of the 20th Century. Their study suggested the “freezing hypothesis” in which the 
same ideological considerations continued to determine partisan conflict throughout the 
post W W II era. The Lipset and Rokhan analysis implied that the party continues to act as 
an ideological agent for its respective social cleavage, and this role has not changed. In 
other words, Lipset and Rokhan’s asserted that ideology remains the prominent vehicle of 
coalition politics and, in their view, it remained premature to support Riker’s theory of 
party politics based strictly on rational opportunity.
Several studies have challenged the Lipset and Rokkan findings. Most notable is 
the literature questioning the fundamental structure of the party system and its rationality. 
Lipset and Rokkan’s critics revived the view, proposed by Otto Kirchheimer, which 
suggested that the western political party system was in a process of transformation 
(Kirchheimer, 1966). Kirchheimer considered that parties in western democracies were 
moving further away from ideological traditions and were adopting opportunistic 
electoral strategies. He found evidence for this claim in the rise of what he called the 
“catch-all party” where winning votes becomes the essence of party strategy in the 
political process.
Several other authors found support for this view, such as Mogens Pedersen who 
suggested that electoral volatility in several countries is a proof of ideological 
detachment. Pedersen concluded that ideological detachment and electoral volatility are 
the consequence of the parties’ declining ideological commitment. Parties no longer 
commit to ideological programs and voters no longer identify with particular parties
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(Pedersen, 1990; Mair, 1983). Kirchheimer and Pedersen’s theses implied that a party’s 
ideology can no longer be taken as a determinant of a party’s behaviors and coalition 
strategies. Their model suggests that a greater consideration must be given to electoral 
opportunistic factors and that the Rational-Efficient model is best suited for coalition 
analysis.
However, the Rational-Efficient model also failed to provide a fully satisfactory 
account of parties’ coalition behaviors. Riker’s minimum winning coalition theme, for 
example, could not explain many collective formations and “deformations”. Early 
studies by Michael Taylor and Michael Laver of twelve European countries between 
1945 and 1971, as well as Abram De Swaan’s study of eight European democracies and 
Israel between 1918 and 1972 found Riker’s theory of minimum winning formation to be 
contradicted in most cases (De Swaan, 1973, Taylor and Laver, 1972). Also, Lipjhart 
opposed Kirchheimer’s thesis on the basis that “parties’ policy preferences cannot be 
ignored. This means that parties are not pure power maximizers” (Lipjhart, 1984, p.53). 
In Israel, for instance, religious parties in the past defected from a minimum winning 
coalition in protest to the Prime Minister’s attending a symbolic ceremony on the 
Sabbath. The consequence was a prioritization of ideological principles or symbolic 
politics despite the significant loss to the religious parties of cabinet seats and political 
power in the government. And contrary to Riker’s model many coalitions exceeded the 
minimum winning number of seats. At least seventeen Israeli governments exceeded the
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minimum wining coalition conditions out of a total of twenty-eight governments.9 In 
fact, contrary to Riker’s rational-efficient model, Lipjhart found that many oversized or 
“grand” coalitions are often formed. Grand coalitions, according to Lipjhart, are usually 
formed in plural societies as to accommodate the diverse societal cleavages (Lipjhart, 
1984). Yet, both Lipjhart, and later, Ronald Inglehart admitted to the weakening 
ideological commitments in favor of “value based politics” that required less 
comprehensive ideological identification (Lipjhart, 1984; Inglehart, 1987).
Bridging Rational and Ideological Paradigms in a Unified Structural Model
Attempts to bridge both ideological and rational explanations to parties’ coalition 
behaviors have been made throughout the years. Most notable was the early work 
presented by De Swaan in 1973 in which both ideological and size variables were 
combined in analyzing coalition formation. De Swaan examined coalition governments 
in nine democratic countries, including Israel, between the period of 1918 and 1970. He 
investigated 108 coalition formations while considering major factors contributing to 
their establishment. De Swaan focused on whether the coalitions confine to the size 
principle as proposed by Riker or to the policy-closeness position as suggested by 
Axelrod. De Swaan predicted that coalitions form as minimum winning. However, He 
hypothesized that minimum winning requirement is conditioned by ideological closeness 
among partner parties. His study suggested that the minimum winning conditions can be 
violated in favor of ideological closeness between partners. De Swaan implemented
9 See chapter 3 “M ethodologies and Measures” for Israeli governments’ share o f seats in the Knesset (Table 
3,2) A minimum winning coalition is a government with the minimum number o f  seats necessary for a 
Knesset majority.
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COAL as a statistical analysis method in order to reveal the impact of both ideological 
and size variables. De Swaan’s findings denied the Riker principle’s exclusive 
explanatory power in coalition formation. As he concluded, “all theories that ignore the 
actors’ policy positions and only take their weight into account fail to produce significant 
result...” (De Swaan, 1973, p. 150). At the same time, he found that “policy distant 
theory.. .produces results that are significant at a level of 3.7%: not entirely sufficient to 
accept, yet too good to reject the theory” (De Swaan, 1973, p. 153).
De Swaan suggested that a ‘close coalition proposition’ was the best explanatory 
synthesis of coalition formation. A close coalition, according to De Swan, is the coalition 
that prioritizes common policy objectives between partners while attempting to achieve 
the minimum size formation. De Swaan considered such a proposition to represent a 
theoretical improvement for its ability to incorporate both minimum-winning variables as 
well as closed coalition version of policy distance. Nonetheless, De Swaan’s model 
implied greater weight to policy distance variables; his final conclusion states that 
“parliamentary majority coalitions tend to be closed among the policy scale and, in times 
of normalcy, of minimal range” (De Swaan, 1973, p. 159)'
Mark Franklin and Thomas T. Mackie also attempted to reassess the importance 
of size and ideology in the formation of governing coalitions (Franklin and Mackie, 
1984). In their assessment of past coalition research theories they found fault with 
previously implemented methodologies. Particularly they considered that the 
assumption, universe, and statistical analyses implemented by past researchers have been
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responsible for generating contradictory results. Thus, and in an effort to reveal aspects 
of reconciliation between the various theories, Franklin and Mackie attempted to replicate 
past studies while joining the common universe of data that existed between the previous 
research studies. Additional weighting variables were given to different countries with 
varying numbers of coalition formations and party strengths. Both ideological and size 
variables were recoded as to maintain uniform coded variables across the various studies. 
Finally, a multiple regression analysis was conducted as to assess the best explanatory 
variables for coalition formation.
In their assessment of previous research, Franklin and Mackie suggested that most 
studies that proposed ideological closeness as the essence of coalition formation have 
adopted erroneous assumptions. This was particularly the case because in studying 
ideological or Minimum Connected Winning theories (MCW), researchers deleted from 
their analysis single party coalitions and gave others disproportional weights relative to 
their respective electoral strengths or made subjective sampling selections. When 
Franklin and Mackie corrected these problems they found that “ideological 
connectedness, as operationalized by MCW, has no special edge except when restrictive 
assumptions are made about what to count as a political party, when a particular 
weighting strategy is employed, or when the universe of countries is restricted” (Franklin 
& Mackie, 1984, p. 683). Through their improved data and coding techniques the 
analysis yielded the proposition that the additive combination of both ideology and size 
provided better explanation to coalition formation. Contrary to De Swaan they found size 
to be a more significant explanatory variable in coalition formation. Nonetheless,
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Franklin and Mackie considered that the choice of country was the most significant 
determinant of how either ideology or size was to be considered. They claimed to have 
discovered, “that in some countries either ideology or size proves to be much more 
powerful than in others,” and they proposed that “if we could discover what it is about 
these countries that make them different, this might provide us with powerful additional 
variables with which to attack the problem of predicting coalition formations” (Franklin 
& Mackie, 1984, p. 688).
Reacting to parties’ changing ideological commitments, more recent research has 
attempted to replace the theme of party ideological proximity with parties’ policy 
programs. (Budge; 1993, 94) These research programs have come to be closely 
associated with the ‘Manifesto Project’ that aims at revealing from parties’ platform 
policy indicators that, along with size considerations, policy positions orient coalition 
outlooks. Among recent work linking size and policy considerations to coalition 
behavior has been that of Carol Mershon (1996, 2001) and Itai Sened (1996). Both 
Mershon and Sened associated policy and electoral strength to parties’ coalition 
behaviors. Also, Martin Lanny and Randolph Stevenson provide an empirical approach 
that bridges and evaluates both size and policy variables while taking into consideration 
institutional variations (Martin & Stevenson, 2001).
The Stability (Duration) Structural Models of Coalitions
Mershon has advanced an approach with the aim of revealing the causes behind 
what she describes as the situational coexistence of government instability and stability in
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postwar Italy until 1992. Mershon noted that most Italian cabinets lasted less than two 
years in power, yet the leading parties in the various governments remained the same. 
This situation prompted Mershon to ask the question of “how can governments break up 
at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation?” Mershon’s inquiry led her to 
suggest the following proposition:
I argue that the costs o f making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions 
and on the array o f parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure 
politicians’ opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under some conditions ... coalitions are cheap, 
and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. (Mershon, 1996, p. 534).
Mershon’s measurement of coalitions’ costs and benefits were measured as both 
office and electoral costs. Office costs were measured as the parties’ proportional share 
of cabinet relative to their share of Parliament. The cost of coalition formation and 
maintenance can be high when parties’ percentage shares of cabinet were shown to be 
lower than that of Parliament. Electoral costs and benefits of breaking coalitions, on the 
other hand, were measured as “mean changes of parties’ share of the vote between pairs 
of consecutive elections...” (Mershon, 1996, p. 539). Mershon also considered policy- 
based costs associated with coalitions’ formation, breaking and maintaining. She 
suggested that policy payoffs, indexed by participation in government, indicate policy 
influence being gained or lost by parties.
After measuring the costs associated with the existence of Italian coalitions 
Mershon revealed evidence supporting her proposition. She found that Italy’s coalitions 
are costly to sustain, yet their formation and dissolution cause little damage. This
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conclusion was manifest in short-lived cabinets that at the same time closely resembled 
incumbent governments. Mershon finally claimed to have found evidence that “particular 
spatial and institutional conditions in Italy curbed the costs of assembling and 
dismantling coalitions and encouraged strategies that lowered costs further” (Mershon, 
1996, p. 549).
Similar to Mershon, Itai Sened proposed a theoretical model that “synthesizes the 
office and policy approaches to coalition formation...” (Sened, 1996, p. 351). Sened’s 
strategy was based on measuring the payoffs a party gets when joining a coalition. 
According to Sened, these payoffs were “the distance between the government’s position 
and the party’s ideal point in the policy-space and the share of the office-related payoffs 
the party receives as a member of the government in oj^?ce”(Sened, 1996, p. 352). And 
Sened hypothesized that coalition agreements are often reached as the trade between 
“office-related side payments for policy compromises and vise versa” (Sened, 1996, p. 
352). Sened’s model suggested the existence of a “structurally stable core (SSC)” where a 
stable coalition is often formed after equilibrium between policy and office side payments 
is reached.
Sened demonstrated his model by taking the formation of Israeli coalitions after 
1992 election as evidence. First, Sened used parties’ manifestos and official publications 
about the parties’ positions on different issues. He established policy space scales based 
on two most salient issues in Israeli politics as revealed by Arian and Shamir’s public 
opinion surveys: religion and security. After conducting factor analysis of ruling
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coalitions’ parties’ positions he constructed two Likert scales and plotted the core 
position of parties on a policy space. Likewise, the position of the government was 
plotted after coding Prime Minister’s presentations of the governments’ speeches. The 
parties’ share of the Knesset was integrated into the plot. His comparison to different 
time periods revealed that between 1948 and 1973 Labor captured an SSC position 
resulting in a stable government. This situation was changed between 1977-1988 having 
an empty SSC and resulting in unstable government. But following the election of 1992, 
the Labor party was able to recapture the SSC position.
Synthetic Structural and Event Models of Coalition Behavior: Competing 
Perspectives
The ideological (policy) and rational (size) debates suggest that the party’s 
coalition behavior is neither purely ideological nor purely rational. The Mershon and 
Sened studies suggest that a synthesis of both factors, perhaps conceptualized in policy 
space, shapes party political behavior in coalitions. However, Mershon and Sened share 
the same core assumptions as previous research. Particularly, they also adopt the view 
that a party’s rationality or policy position is the sole basis for coalition behavior. 
Mershon suggested that parties needed to be treated as unitary actors (Mershon, 1996, 
539). Similar to previous research, contemporary work attempts to solve the theoretical 
difficulties of predicting coalition behavior while relying on factors exclusively 
associated with party characteristics.
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Since Kirchheimer it has become evident that the party is not a solitary agent, but 
directly influenced by the changing political environment (see also Lipjhart, 1984 and 
Ingelhart, 1987). The consequence is that parties become more submerged in unlikely 
alliances where neither ideological nor rational interpretations are exclusively or even 
jointly able to explain the phenomenon. Alliances between ideological opposites, such as 
religious and left parties in Israel often generated strong and lasting coalitions.10 Other 
coalitions in Israel have conformed to the minimum-winning model, while still others 
tend toward the maximum winning model while having extended survival rates (Table 
3.2).
Generally, the structural models in both ideological and rational versions have 
continued to generate varying and often conflicting results. Theories aiming to predict 
coalition formation have struggled to assert determining variables such as size or policy. 
Furthermore, this debate has yielded different visions of which formation leads to a stable 
or enduring partnership. Anomalies, such as Israeli coalition behaviors, continue to 
challenge the structuralists’ core assumptions. This matter was a reason for the rise of a 
competing model with primary objective of explaining coalitions’ duration using 
alternative explanatory variables.
Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber (1984, 86,88) suggest that structural theories fail 
to account for important variables that determine coalition behaviors. They propose that 
the structure of the political system is subject to continuous pressure by randomly
10 This is best explained by Webber’s “elective affinity” concept that he used in explaining the 
submergence of capitalist rationalism  and Protestant ethics in the rise o f modem capitalism.
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occurring events that, subsequently, determine the behaviors of the coalitions. In their 
analysis of government durability they proposed a “...mathematical model of 
governmental dissolution in which duration is solely a function of the appearance of 
random events which trigger governmental collapse” (Frendreis, Gleiber, and Browne 
1986, p.624) and found that “ ...stochastic elements are important, if not dominant, in 
determining the downfall of cabinet governments” (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber, 
1986, p. 644).
The Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber studies suggested that regardless of how 
efficient or well structured the coalition; events will continue to exert tremendous 
pressure on the partners leading to its coalitional aging and eventually death. Unforeseen 
wars, flow of refugees, economic crises, scandals, etc... are events that guarantee the 
destruction of the best-structured coalition.
Critics of the “Event” model, however, point to the “unrealism” of ruling out 
structural variables (Warwick, 1992). Warwick suggested that while events may have 
significant impact on government stability, structural variables hold important 
determinant power when events are controlled for (Warwick, 92, p. 875). He protested 
the totality of the event model since “ ...to expunge causal factors from the analysis 
totally -  to treat durations as purely a function of random outside events -  seems even 
more unrealistic. If British governments normally remain in power longer than their 
Italian counterparts...is surely due in part to systematic differences between the two...
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not simply because British governments face fewer or less difficult events” (Warwick, 
1992, p. 875).
The “event” theories marked a turning point in the study of coalition behaviors. 
As Warwick observed, however, their totality was problematic, and unifying them 
appeared urgent. Robertson along Warwick and various authors took on this task. In 
linking event to structure, Warwick established causality between economic indicators 
and government stability (Warwick, 1992). Similarly, Robertson suggested that the 
economy is an important determinant of structural behaviors (Roberston, 1983; 1984). 
Robertson examined the effect of rising prices and the loss of jobs on seventy-seven 
coalitions in six European democracies (Robertson, 1983). His study establishes a linkage 
between the structure and the outside economic environment, and suggests that “the 
tenure of undersized and minimum winning coalitions is substantially and significantly 
shortened by unemployment, while oversized coalitions are free from the effects of either 
inflation or unemployment” (Robertson, 1983, p. 932). Not only did Robertson measure 
the impact of the economy on government stability, but also attempted to examine such 
impact on its formation (Robertson, 1986). He proposed that economic pressure 
contributes to the formation of oversized coalition, while the absence of economic 
pressure fosters the formation of MWCs (Robertson, 1986, p. 533).
Finally, King established a unified statistical model that combined both “event” 
and “structural” models in analyzing the durability of coalitions (King, Alt, Bums, and 
Laver 1990). King’s model combines recognition of stochastic element in cabinets’
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dissolution while establishing systematic predictable factors for governments’ durability.
The model permits the use of standard statistical methods in integrating both types of data 
(event and structural).
In its turn, the unified model presents some problems in the literature. These 
problems are associated with the questions of which event(s) should be considered most 
critical in determining coalition behaviors? Are there patterns to these events in their 
impacts on structural behaviors or is each event unique in its implication(s) as a historian 
may suggest? Despite various efforts to address these questions (Laver, Shepsle, 1998), 
they continued to require more rigorous analytical solutions. Laver and Shepsle argued 
that the different government formations (in game-theoretical model) provide ground for 
variation in impacts of “exogenous” shocks. They further suggest that the impact of 
these shocks may weigh on the durability of the government (Laver, Shepsle, 1998, 
1999). David Baron extended the research so as to account for various shocks, namely 
government incomes and resources, on government formation, reformations, and 
terminations (Baron, 1998). Last, but not least, was the work provided by Diermeir and 
Stevenson in which they found support to the increasing hazard rate over government life 
hypothesis (Diermeir and Stevenson, 1999).
Bernard Grofman and Peter Roozendaal present us with the most up-to-date 
attempt to account and weight for both structural and event variables (Grofman, 
Roozentaal, 1997). Roozendaal also suggests that the impact of both structural and event 
variables on government durability can be summed in five categories: structural;
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characteristics of party strength in the legislature; attributes of the government; overall 
ideological structure of party competition; institutional features of the political process; 
event: factors external to the legislature and government,(Roozendaal, 1997).
In the following section an attempt is made to develop a theoretical model that 
synthesizes the structural (in both its ideological and size components) with the event 
model (both external and internal events). The combined theoretical model will examine 
a wide range of variables that account for structural restrains on parties’ behaviors; thus 
avoiding to take parties as unitary free players, an assumption typical of most research. 
Two structural restraining variables will be introduced: coalition ideological parameter, 
coalition competition. As for event, the model will set the distinctions between important 
event variables that impact coalition behaviors differently (internal vs. external events). 
In addition, the synthesized model will provide a complete analysis of coalition behaviors 
using time-dependent variables, thus allowing examination of coalition formation, 
duration, and aging. Finally, the model will provide a first step analysis toward 
integrating comprehensive comparative coalition data from other countries to those of 
Israel.
Unifying the Structural and Event Models
The Size and Ideological Parameters of Coalition Systems
Theory needs to sum up the various historical cases within a comprehensive analytical 
framework. The objective o f the theory is to be able to identify and sort out the various causal 
patterns associated with particular historic outcomes. Thus, it accounts for the differences in 
the various historic outcomes. (George, 1969)
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Strom, Budge, and Laver point to an important fallacy in most coalition literature: 
taking for granted the political party as a unitary free player in the political system 
(Strom, Budge, Laver, 1994; also Laver and Garry, 2000). The question that needs to be 
addressed is not only to what extent parties act ideologically, pragmatically or rationally 
within a coalition but also the extent to which their actions are determined by the nature 
of the existing coalition itself. While elaborate research has attempted to answer the first 
question, in this study we suggest that coalition analysis should also consider the 
characteristics and processes o f the coalition itself, such as its size, underlying 
ideology, strength o f competing or challenger coalition (s), and the surrounding foreign 
and domestic events. It is from this perspective that parties ’ coalition behaviors are often 
derived.
The theoretical suggestion made here is that parties’ ideological closeness in 
coalitions should be analyzed under evolving coalition rules. While subject to 
ideological or policy restraints, parties are willing to make rational calculations in order 
to form and maintain coalitions. These calculations often violate ideological purity or 
size principles and deviate from inter-party ideological proximity under the pretext of 
political necessity. This violation usually takes place while forming a coalition between a 
dominant party and “volatile” parties, i.e., parties that can potentially defect to an 
ideologically opposite coalition (Baron, 1991). Mutual political needs force ideological 
concessions. As a consequence, new ideological parameters are established within 
which all partners in a coalition can be contained. Theoretically these ideological 
parameters are set outside every party’s ideological core, yet they satisfy the best possible
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coalition outcome and the closest feasible ideological perspective relative to the dominant 
party (Baron, 1991; Sened, 1996).
Thus, coalition theory must discover ideological parameters for potential coalitions 
that account not only for ideological proximity but also for ideological differences among 
coalitions’ constituents, and also account for political circumstances that cause conditions 
of unlikely ideological bedfellows. These ideological parameters are thought to rank 
among the primary determinants of parties’ behaviors in an alliance. The ideal coalition 
is one that can set the most common ideological denominators among the parties and 
establish a tight ideological or policy program, thus making parties’ participation in the 
coalition consistent with their principles and more feasible to defend and maintain. A 
realistic coalition under urgent electoral or political pressure, however, stretches its 
parameters to accommodate opposing points of view of the various parties. Thus, 
parties’ participation in the coalition can become more costly and difficult to maintain 
and defend.
This study suggests that there must be an interactive relationship between 
pragmatic rationality and ideological parameters. (Sened, 1996; Mershon, 1996, 2001). 
The proposition is that within a coalition a direct relationship exists between ideological 
parameters and rational-efficiency that influences party behavior. The ideal model 
suggests that narrower ideological parameters result in the best rational outcomes that can 
be produced through a small sized or “minimum winning” coalition (Riker, 1962). The
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pragmatic/realistic model, on the other hand, proposes that larger ideological parameters 
may become necessary to accommodate a larger coalition.
The ideal model can be applied during periods of relatively low political pressure, 
or whenever a coalition can be established without serious challenges from opposition 
parties to form an alternative ruling alliance (predominant-coalition system) (Sartori, 67; 
Elazar & Sandler, 90). The realistic model, on the other hand, can best be applied under 
conditions of political pressure or to situations where the threat of the opposition forming 
an alternative coalition is real (competitive-coalition system) (Sartori, 67; Elazar & 
Sandler, 90). The consequence is that parties’ behaviors within a coalition-system are 
determined by taking into consideration the competitiveness aspect of the coalition and 
its surrounding political environment.
It was Arend Lipjhart who provided a similar rationale for the formation of 
coalition-systems. Lijphart argued that nations that are politically homogenous tend to 
produce a Westminster model for coalition formation. This coalition model, according to 
Lipjhart, is characterized by its maximum efficiency and minimum winning formation. 
Societies that are heterogeneous or plural, on the other hand, favor a consensus coalition 
system characterized by the formation of grand sized alliances (Lijphart, 1984). 
Lipjhart’s models are applied in this study to the ‘plurality of the parliamentary 
coalitions’ rather than to society per se. Whenever a plurality of possible coalition 
formations is present, or competitiveness is high, we consider the consensus or even 
preemptive (i.e., keep partners away from the competition) as the realistic model.
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Otherwise, the Westminster or the ‘ideal’ tight and minimum winning model is most 
applicable.
In the formation process, and before the establishment of the coalition, the 
weaknesses of parties’ ideological commitments make coalitions easier to establish. 
Ideological constraints or parameters generate defined possibilities of various coalition 
configurations. Potential coalitions can be determined relative to each country’s political 
spectrum, such as having left-religious, right-religious, left-right, or left-right-religious 
potential alliances, with each having a corresponding ideological parameter.11 Thus when 
forming coalitions, ideological parameters are likely to be stretched whenever the size of 
the coalition is enlarged or diversified. A party’s rational calculus in joining or abstaining 
largely depends on such a structural combination.
If the seats controlled by the parties allow for potentially more than one winning 
coalition configuration (realistic or competitive model), then competition can be fierce 
between dominant parties to win volatile parties or parties that can be swayed to switch 
coalition ranks. Under high competition, ideological parameters are thus stretched to 
accommodate for diversity and larger size coalitions. In contrast, the absence of potential 
winning competing coalition configurations relieves dominant parties of attracting 
ideologically distant or opposite partners, making ideological concessions unnecessary 
while predictably reducing the number of partners (Table 2.1). The presence or absence 
of potential winning competing coalition is determined based on the relative size of the
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dominant parties and their respective capacities to form winning majorities in alliance 
with other partners. Hypothetically, as long as no party controls a majority of the seats in 
Parliament more than one winning coalition is possible to form. Yet, whenever the size 
of the dominant party approaches that of majority seats the potential for competitors to 
form winning coalitions decline (See chapter 3 for definitions and measures).
Table 2.1: Probability of Coalition Formation under Competition
Competitiveness Coalition Size Ideoloaical Parameter
High Large Wide
Low Small Tight
The same rationale that governs coalition formation determines parties’ behavior 
within a coalition after its inception. In this study, we are further interested in parties’ 
behaviors contributing to coalition’s duration. Therefore, among our objectives is to 
reveal factors leading to or preventing party’s defection from a coalition.
Combining both rational and ideological perspectives, this study implies that 
parties’ behaviors within a coalition depend on the cost associated with participation. In 
the best possible outcomes, if both size and ideological costs for participation in a 
coalition are low, then probability of parties’ defection is also very low. If the 
ideological cost of alliance is low but accommodation is made in limiting the size of the 
coalition, then the overall cost is endurable and parties’ probability of defection is low or
11 For ways parties are ideologically classified see Gabel, Matthew and Hubber, John, “Putting Parties in 
Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data”, American 
Journal o f  Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 94-103,2000.
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moderate. By the same token, if the size of the coalition is large but accommodation is 
made in limiting ideological parameters, the cost of participation is also endurable and 
the probability of defection low or moderate. Otherwise, defection possibility can 
increase and coalition stability is threatened. The confirmation of this rationalism is a 
further demonstration that the nature of the coalition (size, ideology, and 
competitiveness) can to a large extent determine party behavior. Of course, factors such 
as available and competitive alternative coalitions and dominant parties will also affect 
these calculations.
Accounting for Effects of “Competition” in Coalition Behaviors 
It has been previously suggested that the presence or absence of potentially 
alternative coalition configurations reshape both ideological parameters and coalition 
size. The increased potential of challenging coalitions theoretically increases the risk of 
defection by centrist and minor parties. Coalition competition forces ideological 
moderation in order to accommodate the various members within the alliance that 
includes potential defectors. The result is a large accommodating coalition with 
ideologically stretched parameters. These considerations also thereby are likely to affect 
the duration of the government. The coalition leader tries to minimize the risk of 
defections as a consequence of having ideologically unaccommodating parameters, 
thereby seeking to preclude unstable short duration governments. This effort to 
accommodate more partners, however, can run into difficulties as the partners themselves 
seek to exact greater “side payments” or concessions for staying in the coalition. Thus, 
the probability of being able to satisfy everyone would appear to go down with time.
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In contrast, the situation is reversed when the presence potential challenging 
coalitions are reduced. While dominant parties still require the support of center and 
volatile parties to form ruling coalitions, the threat of their defection is not serious. 
Dominant party’s ability to substitute small sized parties without fearing a total 
overthrow makes ideological tightness feasible if not a requirement for partnership. 
Furthermore, since the dominant party is not in an immediate threat from a challenger, 
the party is not pressured to enlarge the coalition partnership or to make serious policy or 
ideological concessions. Under these circumstances, smaller size and tighter ideological 
parameters theoretically extend coalition duration.
This discussion implies that coalition duration is largely determined by the cost 
parties are willing to pay while considering the size and ideological parameter of the 
coalition and the alternatives they perceive in rival potential coalitions (these might be 
perceived as opportunity costs). The absence of potential challenging coalitions makes 
the existing coalition more cost effective. It could be concluded from such a model, 
therefore, that under conditions of coalition competition and high cost the difficulty of 
maintaining accommodating alliances grows and government duration becomes shorter 
than under circumstances where competition is absent and partners can be shed without 
fear of lost power. The presence of a potential challenging coalition that could attract the 
centrist and volatile parties, and the high or increasingly unacceptable price for 
maintaining the current coalition, destabilizes it and shortens its life span. In contrast, the
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absence of a coalition challenge reduces the cost associated with maintaining the 
coalition and would appear to maximize its duration.12
According to Mershon, however, the cost calculations must take into consideration 
not only maintaining the coalition but also the cost associated with its termination 
(Mershon, 1996, 2001). Mershon suggested that there are cheap coalitions and more 
expensive ones. Cheap coalitions can be discarded and easily replaced by the dominant 
party, while others are indispensable. Mershon’s model provides significant 
implications for coalition duration. Applying her model to the cases where coalition 
competition is high suggests that a higher cost must be paid for dismantling coalitions 
than under conditions of low competition, since the dominant party would risk losing 
governance to the challenging alliance.13 This risk forces the dominant party to make the 
most concessions possible in order to maintain and perpetuate its ruling alliance. In 
contrast, the absence of coalition competition makes alliances relatively cheap and 
replaceable. The dominant party grows intolerant and easily willing to dismantle and 
form alternative coalitions. Thus as a rival hypothesis, and contrary to the view of 
Grofman and Roozendaal, it might be expected that coalition competition contributes to 
longer coalition duration.
Furthermore, applying Lipjhart and later Mershon’s thesis suggests that the 
existence of political pressure (coalition competition) forces ongoing coalitions to take
12 Grofman and Van Roozendaal, “Toward a Theoretical Explanation o f Premature Cabinet Termination’, 
hypothesized that the greater num ber of feasible alternative coalitions, the less durable, on average, will be 
the present coalition. European Journal o f  Political Research, 26, 1994, pp. 155-70.
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extreme measures to guarantee their duration. That is, coalitions are more likely to form 
accommodating the largest possible partnership. Therefore, it is expected that under the 
condition o f  competition coalitions are likely to form having wide ideological parameters 
and large size partnership. It is also likely that coalitions with larger size and wider 
ideological param eter will be form ed often jeopardizing their durability. On the other 
hand, the absence of coalition competition reduces the ideological and political cost of 
ousting coalition partners, since every smaller partner is replaceable. Smaller participants 
would have to abide by the narrowness of the coalition’s ideological parameters and 
platform or risk a forced withdrawal from the coalition. Therefore, under these 
circumstances -  the absence o f coalition competition -  it is expected that coalitions 
would be form ed having narrow ideological parameters and small-sized partnership. It 
is expected that the absence of coalition competition would in general reduce the 
durability of the coalitions. Yet, the tighter is the ideology and the smaller is the coalition 
(the more efficient) the more durable it is expected to be (Figure 2.1).14
Accounting for “events” in Coalition’s Behaviors
Thus far we have considered the structural impact on coalition behaviors. What 
remains is the “event” variable that has been widely seen as important factor shaping the 
coalition system and duration in particular (Frendreis, Gleiber, and Browne, 1984,86,88; 
King, 1990, Warwick 1992).
13 See chapter 3 “Methodologies and Measures” for a further discussion o f  how leaders o f dominant parties 
in Israel are named to form governments.
14 Through a multiple linear regression analysis the association o f  every independent variable with the 
dependent variable can be calculated, while controlling for other variables.
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As has been noted in literature review, the unified model, while resolving major 
anomalies in the structural theories, introduces new challenges to coalition theories. 
These challenges are related to the issue of “weighting” events as they impact the 
structure. The question is whether a general theory is possible to establish, factor, and 
predict “event” impact on coalition structure whenever it occurs. While efforts have been 
made to meet challenges, particularly in the later work of Laver and Shepsly (1998) and 
through their debate with Warwick, major obstacles remain.15
Whether event or structure is a more significant factor in the process of coalition 
formation and maintenance is disputable. Lupia and Strom (1995) analyzed the various 
structural ‘legislative and electoral’ constraints as well as event ‘exogenous shock’ 
variables on coalition termination. They found evidence that decision to terminate the 
coalition “result from the party leaders’ rational responses to the constraints of legislative 
and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate” (Lupia and Strom, 
1995, p. 648). Lupia and Strom thus undermined the ‘event’ in favor of ‘structural’ 
variables and electoral politics. Diermeier and Stevenson’s work, on the other hand, is a 
further effort to resolve the anomaly between both the structure and event models (1999). 
Their study reaffirms earlier hypotheses that events become more hazardous as the life of 
a government is prolonged (1999). Thus, they establish distinctions between earlier and 
later weight of events on structural formation and termination. They conclude that
15 See Warwick’s response to Laver and Shepsle. Warwick, P. “Getting the Assumptions Right: A  Reply to 
Laver and Shepsle”, British Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 402-412,1999. Also Laver 
and Shepsle’s response. Laver, M., Shepsle, K. “Government Formation and Survival: A  Rejoinder to 
Warwick’s Reply” British Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 412-415, 1999.
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coalitions are more capable structurally in handling the challenges o f earlier events in 
their life, but less so as they age.
This study adopts Diermeier and Stevenson’s hypotheses; however, it suggests that 
a major issue remains unresolved. While accounting for government aging, the question 
is which events matter most in structural formation, duration, and aging? Research is still 
in its early stage in accounting for various ‘event’ variables. Nevertheless ‘event’ 
variables appear to deepen the divisions in structural frameworks, but the impact of 
external conflicts on coalition durability can vary across time and between political 
systems, such as in Britain as opposed to Germany, Japan, or Israel. Likewise if we 
consider domestic discontent with government conduct or the outbreak of political 
scandals, their impact may vary considerably in the coalition systems from one country to 
another.
When it comes to religious issues, for example, Israeli and Lebanese governments 
are sometimes extremely sensitive and the implications of religious related action can 
immediately determine the fate of a particular coalition at a particular moment. At least 
five Israeli coalition governments collapsed as a direct consequence of disputes between 
partners over religious issues, policies, and events.16 In France the coalition system is 
generally less sensitive to changes in ‘religious events’ compared to the flow of 
im m igration into the country, another event variable that presents a major distinction in 
impact on coalition behavior. Israel, Canada, and Australia have either consistently or at
16 See Table 3_1 under ‘End Reason’ of coalition. Information was compiled from Keesing Contemporary 
Archives.
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times striven to attract immigrants, and the inflow may prove stabilizing to coalitions, 
while the same event(s) may emerge as troubling for coalitions in France, Japan or 
Germany where immigration has been a more divisive political issue. Thus, what was 
presented by Lijphart as a ‘structural model’ of coalition systems may prove insufficient 
in light of politically charged policies or events.17
This line of reasoning suggests that it is premature for ‘event’ research to conduct a 
general analysis before making the necessary distinction between the various ‘events’ 
driven coalition systems. But how is it possible that a theoretical distinction be advanced 
in this domain? In this study we propose that first a “country” analysis effort is required 
before a general clustering of coalition systems is made. In other words, research must 
focus on gathering event-structure variation data in separate democracies as a step toward
system categorization and conclusively a general coalition theory. The case study
18appears as a starting point for event theory building.
The theoretical contribution of this study, therefore, is to provide an examination of 
whether a distinction exists between ‘internal-domestic events’ and ‘external-foreign 
events’ and their interactive influence on the structural behaviors of coalitions in one 
specific democracy. Recognizing Israel’s unique geo-cultural situation and tradition, 
using Israel as a case study and implementing comparative analysis between the various
17 Lijphart distinguished between two structural coalition models. One is typical o f nations that are 
politically homogenous (Westminster model) and the second is established by societies that are 
heterogeneous or plural (Consensual model) (Lijphart, 1984). Each o f these models provides distinct 
coalition formations.
18 See Hary Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, 
eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7, (Reading, MA: Addison-W esley), pp. 79-138,1975.
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Israeli cabinets we identify ‘internal and extemal-event’ variables’ impact on coalition
behavior.
Early theorization was made by J. Robertson in order to account for intemal- 
events’ impact on coalition formation (Robertson, 1986). Robertson’s study suggested 
that minimum-sized coalitions are usually formed under conditions free from economic 
“event pressure.” In his analysis, event pressure refers to the situation of economic stress 
resulting in the increase of inflation and unemployment. Such a pressure is considered 
polarizing because it instigates greater divisions between the socio-political strata within 
the country. Oversized coalitions, on the other hand, are likely to form under conditions 
of domestic economic pressure. In other words, Roberston’s study theorizes that 
‘domestic pressures’ press coalition toward consensualism and therefore larger size 
structural formation. The Robertson thesis has ideological-structural implications, 
suggesting that ‘domestic pressures ’ force coalition toward consensualism and therefore 
wider-ideological agendas. Furthermore, according to our earlier logic, maintaining the 
coalition under condition of domestic pressures appears pressing though potentially 
relatively difficult and costly; ‘Domestic pressures’ push coalitions toward  
consensualism and therefore stability and durability, though with lower overall durability 
than when such pressures do not exist.
The question remains whether extemal-events have similar impact on coalition 
formation and duration. Can a hypothesis be established that ‘external pressures’, such 
as external conflict (-) and foreign aid  (+), press coalition toward consensualism and
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
51
therefore larger size structural formation and wider ideological agendas? Furthermore, 
can it be maintained that 'external pressures ’ push coalition toward consensualism and 
therefore stability and durability that could have otherwise been greatly undermined? To 
answer these questions we develop and examine a synthetic structural-event model of 
coalition formation and duration.
A Synthetic Structural-Event Model of Coalition Formation and Duration
A. Coalition Formation Model: Predicting Size and Ideological Parameter 
Coalition competition determines conditions of cabinet formation. Parties’ 
rationality in forming alliances is mostly based on the calculation of relative party 
strength in parliament or system competitiveness. Equally important are the political 
conditions of the country both externally and internally. Parties must weigh domestic and 
foreign political pressures to establish the consequences of particular formation. These 
conditions (independent variables) as they relate to the dependent variable and 
particularly to duration are shown in Figure 2.5.
Hypothesis 1: High coalition competition presses toward wide-ideological parameter 
and large-sized cabinets (Figure 2.1).
This research predicts that coalition competition can be captured in the relative 
power index of dominant party to form winning coalitions. The increase in the power 
index of a dominant party to form winning coalitions indicates a decrease in the ability of 
rival coalitions to form. Thus, whenever the dominant party’s power index increases
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competition decreases.19 Ideological parameter is defined as the ideological distance 
between dominant party and the coalition’s policy objectives (See Chapter 3 for 
definition and measure). Coalition size is defined as the number of seats partner parties 
control in the Knesset.
Again the logic of Hypothesis 1 flows from our discussion of ‘cost analysis’ 
thesis advanced by Mershon (1996, 2001). The high cost to the dominant party of 
defection under competition requires the formation of accommodating grand and 
ideologically wide coalitions. Alternatively the decline of coalition competition provides 
the dominant party with a different strategy and more options for alliance formation. 
Thus, dominant parties afford the formation of efficient alliance keeping both policies 
and side-payments to a minimum. Therefore, as coalition competition declines, it is 
preferable for a dominant party with the absence of a challenger to form a minimum 
winning tight durable ruling alliance. (Figure 2.1).
Hypothesis 2: Domestic and Foreign Events’ pressure generates domestic pressure on 
coalitions toward consensualism and therefore large formation and wide ideological 
parameter (Figure 2.1).
19 See Chapter 3 “M ethodologies and Measures” for further discussion, definition, and measures.
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Figure 2.1; Coalition Formation Linear Synthetic Model
Event Parliamentary
Competitiveness
Coalition Size 
Formation
Ideological
Parameter
Formation
Events’ pressures considered are either domestic or external. Domestic events 
which put pressure on the political system are: economic; such as decline in GDP annual 
rate, increase in annual strikers and strikes, and increase in annual unemployment rate; or 
social, such as increase in annual immigration rate. External events are captured in terms 
of annual increase in the severity of external conflict and in the decline of foreign aid 
receipts or prospects (Figure 2.2).
The logic of these hypotheses flows from our previous discussion, which suggested 
that ‘event pressure’ creates conditions of consensualism and therefore expanded or 
grand alliances. For example, external conflicts often unify loyal and opposition groups 
against foreign threat. Internal ideological differences become less significant relative to 
the gain of having more unity in coalitions of grand size. The null hypotheses, however, 
may indicate that ‘event pressure’ intensifies the divergence in policy positions, thus 
excreting pressure toward smaller and narrower alliances as it becomes more difficult and 
ultimately infeasible to bridge the ideological or policy preference gaps in forming 
governments.
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Figure 2.2% Internal and External Event Pressure Impact on Structural Formation
Internal Event Pressure
Annual change Increase in % GDP (-)
Annual % of Unemployment (+'
Annual % o f#  of strikers per strike (+)
Annual % of immigrants per population (+)
External Event Pressure
Annual Severity of External Conflict (+)
Annual Foreign Aid (-)
Internal Event Pressure
Annual change increase in % GDP (-) 
Annual % of Unemployment (+)'
Annual % of # of strikers per strike (+)
Annual % of immigrants per population (+)
External Event Pressure
Annual Severity of External Conflict (+)y 
Annual Foreign Aid (-)
deological
Parameter
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B. Coalition Duration Model
Coalition’s durability appears fundamentally to be a function of two primary factors: 
a, event and b. structure. In other words, a coalition would last longer in power if it was 
most efficiently formed around a small sized and ideologically similar core (reducing 
defection) while taking into consideration both systematic and event factors at hand. As 
has been discussed in the literature there has been increasing interest in this theoretical 
area, particularly after the introduction of event variables (Lupia and Strom, 1995; Laver, 
Shepsle, 1998, 1999; Baron, 1998; Diermeir and Stevenson, 1999; Martin and Stevenson, 
2001; Grofman and Roozentaal, 1997; Roozentaal 1998; Sened 1996; Mershon 1996, 
2001).
In order to determine both event and structural variables we need to control for the 
‘aging theme’ as advocated by Laver and Shepsle (1998) as well as by Diermeir and 
Stevenson (1999). It is suggested that ‘coalitions are more capable structurally to the 
challenges of earlier events in their life, but less so as they age’ (Laver & Shepsle 98; 
Diermeir & Stevenson 99). Controlling for ‘aging’ is possible by examining and 
comparing first year events and structural impacts on duration and those in later years 
after formation. Again the rational argument proposed that coalitions that are efficiently 
formed would be more durable than those that violate efficiency formation as proposed in 
previous discussion (Warwick, 1992).
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Hypothesis 3: Increase in events’ pressure yields short coalition durations (Figure 2.2). 
Yet the impact o f  increasing event pressure is most significant in shortening the duration 
o f coalitions as they age. Again events considered are external and domestic and their 
impact on coalition duration is demonstrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Interna! and External Event Pressure Impact on Coalition Duration 
Internal Event Pressure
Annual change increase in % GDP (+)
Annual % of Unemployment (-)
DurationAnnual % of # of strikers per strike (-)
Annual % of immigrants per population (-)
External Event Pressure
Annual Severity of External Conflict (-)
Annual Foreign Aid (+)
The null hypothesis will confirm that event pressure presses toward greater 
consensualism and therefore longer duration. For example, external war or conflict may 
provide reasons for the various political groups to set ideological differences aside and 
align together against foreign threats. Such a situation may prolong government life 
rather than shortening it.
Coalition competition also is an important structural variable to consider in 
durational analysis. As has been advanced by Mershon’s argument we examine the thesis
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that coalitions are more valuable to dominant parties to maintain or costly to lose at 
higher levels of competition. Contrary to Grofman and Roozendaal (1997), under 
competition dominant parties will make significant concessions and efforts to maintain 
the coalition and not risk losing power in favor of a rival alliance. Alternatively, when 
competition declines the risk of dismantling and forming a coalition is reduced, so is the 
expected duration of the ruling alliance.
Hypothesis 4: Increase in coalition competition contributes to long coalition durations 
(Figure 2.4).
Alternatively, the null hypothesis would suggest that increase in competition 
increase the incentives for partners to break away for greater rewards by joining 
alternative coalition and therefore shorten duration.
In addition to competition, coalition’s size and ideological parameter are 
significant structural variables that impact durability. Adopting the efficiency model 
suggests that the best formation is the least costly in term of policy concessions or size of 
side-payments. Efficiency implies that minimum-tight coalition is the most lasting 
coalition while maximum-wide coalition is the least durable.
Hypothesis 5: Wide ideological parameter shortens coalition duration (Figure 2.4). 
Hypothesis 6: Large size coalition shortens coalition its respective duration (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4; Coalition Formation and Duration; Linear Synthetic Model
Competitiveness
Size Formation
DurationEvent Pressure
Ideological
Parameter
Formation
Summary; A Structural-Event Synthetic Model of Coalition Formation and 
Duration
In sum, coalition literature has struggled to construct theoretical models 
predicting coalition behaviors and outcomes. Most significant were two competing 
paradigms rationalizing coalition formation and duration: the ideological policy-interest 
and the rational-efficiency models. The first expressed the party as a representative of a 
particular group of people struggling to achieve policy or philosophical objectives. 
Within this framework coalitions tend to form between ideologically close parties with 
similar objectives and policy intentions. The second view presented the party as an 
electoral opportunist agency which aims to achieve maximum gains in the electoral 
process and through the ruling coalition. From this perspective, coalitions form in order
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to achieve the maximum possible collective benefit that no single party can accomplish 
alone. Excessive or unnecessary payments diminish these returns.
Both competing paradigms are found somewhat lacking. The ideological-interest 
model has been considerably weakened due to the prospect of “catch-all-party” 
phenomena. Literature, particularly after the post-War II era, points toward weakening 
party identification and broadening voters’ volatility in many countries. 20 Parties have 
become less doctrinaire and more vaguely positioned in order to attract voters. On the 
other hand, rational-efficient model literature failed to explain seemingly irrational 
patterns in coalition formations around the world. The occasional lack of minimum 
winning coalitions in various ruling governments provides serious opposition to this 
model.
In this study, it is suggested that the problem with the literature can be found in 
party analysis. Each approach builds on the party’s rationality basis for coalition 
formulation and maintenance. Alternatively, for purposes of explaining seeming 
anomalies in existing theory, this study attempts to analyze the coalition on its own terms. 
First, the parties in the coalitions are not treated as pure unitary rational or ideological 
agents. Rather, the parties are studied within the context of an overall ideological and 
rational coalition system, tending toward or away from compromise. It is proposed that 
not only does the party shape the framework of the coalition, but also the nature of the
20 Mogens N. Pedersen “Electoral Volatility in W estern Europe, 1948-1977” in Peter Mair “The West 
European Party System” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. p. 195. Also, Peter Mair “Adaptation and 
Control” in H. Daalder and P. Mair “Western European Party Systems” Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983, pp. 405- 
430.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
6 0
coalition itself, the exogenous events in the environment, and the level of inter-party 
electoral competition determine parties’ behaviors. The size and ideological parameters 
of the coalition also dictate its duration, i.e., determine the extent to which parties are 
willing to stretch their compromises and not defect.
Second, this study implies that the impact of compromises on coalition duration 
varies with respect to political pressure of various sorts, arising from party competition 
and from emerging internal or external politically charged events. In other words, 
coalition compromises under conditions of coalition competition impact duration 
differently than under conditions of reduced or absent competition, since the costs and 
risks associated with compromise vary relative to the presence of coalition competition. 
Contrary to a hegemonic situation (predominant coalition-system), under competition the 
relative and perceived cost of coalition compromise is reduced relative to the gains.
It is hypothesized that under a predominant coalition system, the condition where 
one dominant party is capable of leading the formation of a ruling alliance, minimum- 
tight ideological parameters contribute to durable coalitions. Under a competitive 
coalition system, the condition where at least one rival dominant party is capable of 
forming a competing coalition consensual-wide ideological parameters and large-sized 
cabinets are often formed, thus undermining durability.
Coalition competition increases the pressure for political concession by dominant 
party as to accommodate partners both ideologically and through forming larger
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alliances. By the same reasoning, coalition competition makes it more difficult and risky 
for a dominant party to dismantle a coalition. Breaking a coalition may boost the chance 
of the opposition to form a ruling alliance. Therefore, it is theoretically suggested that 
coalition competition, while widening coalitions, also contributes to longer duration.21
In addition to coalition competition, political events determine formation and effect 
duration. Two distinct event variables are proposed: external and internal pressures. 
Both are suggested to press the coalition to be formed on an accommodative basis, i.e., 
larger by size and wider by ideology. The impacts of these events increase progressively 
as they emerge after coalition formation. The more the coalition ages in power the more 
these events can become factors in shortening its duration. As has been argued in the 
literature, events will continue to accumulate “shocks” against the coalition making them 
with time less sustainable and more divisive. From this hypothesis another hypothetical 
conclusion could be drawn suggesting that more efficient coalitions shall be more 
resistant over time to events changes. Thus we would expect that the longest lasting 
coalitions to be the smallest in size.
This synthetic model of coalition behavior can best be applied to democratic 
systems where coalition formations are necessary for ruling alliances. Distinctions must 
be made, however, as to whether the party system is predominant or competitive. 
Another important discrimination must be made as to categorize the system being 
domestically or externally event-sensitive. The model could then be applied to each
21 See Chapter 3 for further discussion definition and measure for coalition competition.
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situation differently (this distinction shall be made more evident in the following 
chapter). This research study aims at examining this theoretical model within the context 
of the Israeli party system, since we can apply both propositions to Israeli coalition 
behaviors. The Israeli party system always dependent to some extent on coalitions was 
predominant before 1969 and since has become multi-polar or competitive.
Israel’s case represents a challenge for coalition theories in multi-party 
democracies for two other important reasons. First, Israel’s coalition politics synthesize 
both Eastern and Western cultural and political traditions. The political loyalty to 
religious authority by many Israeli parties, for example, reflects something of Eastern 
cultural-political practices, while the dominance of Labor and bourgeois secular politics 
mirror Western practice. Second, Israeli politics, while sharing essential characteristics 
of the Western democratic model, also maintains exceptional characteristics. Such 
characteristics pertain to Israel’s foreign policy that uniquely shapes parties’ ideology and 
coalition behaviors and to the tendency to exclude certain parties, most notably among 
Arab parties, from coalitions or cabinet participation. Israel foreign policy is peculiar for 
having an unresolved national component that continues to be expressed in the unsettled 
Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli national claims.
In the case of Israel we examine hypotheses 1 to 6 within two historic periods 
(pre-1969 vs. post-1969) that set different political formulations to the Israel’s coalition 
structure and events. Israel’s ideological landscape has been divided on Left-Right and 
Hawkish-Dovish ideological spectra. After 1967 the ‘external’ (Hawkish-Dovish)
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dimension began to greatly impact the ‘internal’ (Left-Right) dimension of party ideology 
(Issac, 76; Perlemutter, 85; Arian; 98). Among the direct effects has been the 
fragmentation of the Israeli Left in favor of rival Right and Religious parties. During the 
Seventh Knesset of 1969, the Israeli political party and coalition systems transformed 
from a Labor-dominant toward a competitive formation.
Two approaches are proposed in chapter 3, “Methodologies and Measures,” in order to 
examine the underlying hypotheses of coalition formation and duration: quantitative and 
qualitative. We implement a quantitative analysis to examine the linear relationships that 
have been established in the theoretical model. However, the shortcoming of having a 
small sample size of Israeli coalitions (N=28) and the dramatic transformation of Israel 
after 1969 compels us to implement an additional qualitative comparative approach for 
verification, possible theoretical refinement, and alternative measures.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGIES AND MEASUREMENTS
T h is chapter examines tw o  m ethod ologica l approaches to evaluate the theory presented in 
chapter 2. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The 
secon d  is a q ualitative m ethod u sing com parative case  study analysis. T he purpose o f  having tw o  
m eth o d o lo g ie s  m ethods is related to the sm all num ber o f  cases b ein g  exam in ed  in this research. 
S uch  a shortcom ing m akes a quantitative exam ination  d ifficu lt to verify. A n  inductive qualitative 
approach, on  the other hand, a llow s rigorous exam ination  o f  cases studied and provides further 
verifica tion  and/or refinem ent to theoretical assum ptions. This chapter d iscu sses the unit o f  
an alysis, independent, and dependent variables im plem ented  in both m ethods. It defines  
operational variables and m easures em p loyed  in the quantitative analysis. It further d iscu sses the 
qualitative m ethod, its various p hases, the criteria o f  case se lection s and system atic case  
evaluation  and com parison.
Unit of Analysis:
This study provides an analysis of party behaviors based on the systematic 
characteristics of the coalition system. It establishes the universe in which parties 
operate. Hence, parties’ behaviors become significantly a function of coalitions’ 
structures and the events shaping them. Therefore, ruling coalitions are recognized as the 
unit of analysis while parties are considered players within those units.
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After a general election the president of the country names the head of the party 
that received most votes in the election to establish a government.22 The President also 
names the party leader to form a government if a previous government collapses. In the 
event that the party leader failes to form a coalition, the President can name the head of 
the second dominant party to form it. In case neither is successful the President may call 
a new national election.23
Each coalition government represents the joining of various Israeli parties that 
agree to govern the country while commanding a majority of seats in the Knesset. 
During formation process, the dominant party engages in negotitions with other smaller 
parties to convince them to join the coalition. In its package are offers that usually 
combine policy proposals, ministrial seat incentives, as well as budgetary allocation for 
each ministry. Israeli religious parties, for example, has conditioned their participation in 
the coalition to their control over Ministry of Religious Affairs. Beside the carrots the 
dominant party may demostrate sticks that threaten non participating smaller parties in 
diverting funds and isolating supporters. A successful coalition building leads to a 
cabinet agreement which primarily provides a general policy proposal and a distribution 
of ministrial seats along with respective budget allocation.
The coalition must then be presented to the entire Knesset to receive a vote of 
confidence. It is essential that the coalition commands the majority of the Knesset’s seats
22 This process has been relatively changed with the introduction of the second ballots in 1996 where the public began 
to cast their votes directly to the Prime Minister. The president was obliged to name the prime minister elect to form 
the government. However, the second ballot system was abandoned in the 2003 election. This was institutionalized 
following an increasing concern in the Knesset that the Second Ballot has caused greater fragmentation to the electoral 
system contrary to what was intended.
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to win and retain confidence. A new government is said to be officially formed when it 
receives the confidence of the majority of Knesset’s members or MKs’votes.24
Many events can disturb the coalition’s life after formation. The least is 
abstention of some coalition members from voting when a no-confidence vote is 
presented against the government. On some occasions coalition members may resign 
either individually or by entire parties. Most threatening occasions occur when one or 
many parties Pullout from the coalition reducing its command of the Knesset to a 
minority stand. Changes in political circumistances can also lead the Prime Minister to 
dissolve the cabinet and/or Knesset and call for either a new election or a new 
government. Terminating the government may take only a small party withdawing or a 
prime minister demanding its dissolution. A government’s life is officially over and the 
coalition is considered dead when a new government is inaugurated.
Various studies suggest different ways to define a ruling coalition among political 
parties. Strict definitions suggest that a ruling coalition is established each time an 
individual cabinet member leaves or enters the alliance (Budge, 1990). Loose 
definitions, on the other hand, establish that a ruling coalition remains the same when 
dominant parties or the Prime Minister are not changed (Mershon, 1996). Both 
definitions have advantages and disadvantages. Strict definitions provide a larger N-size 
to analyze but too many basically identical cases, particularly in policy domain. On the
23 See www.mfa.gov.il. Official Foreign Ministry website for detail illustration of government formation processes.
24 Israeli Knesset: www.knesset.gov.il, 2003. Knesset consists o f  120 MKs. The government can be 
dissolved when a vote o f no-conftdence receive a majority o f  votes.
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other hand, loose definitions diminish the number of cases to analyze while providing 
essential policy differences to consider.
According to the strict definition of a coalition there could be over 60 Israeli 
ruling alliances between 1949 and 1999, marked by ministers’ resignation and/or 
appointments in addition to government inaugurations by the Knesset. The loose 
definition, on the other hand, suggests that Israel witnessed only eleven Prime Ministers, 
and therefore eleven coalition governments.
This study adopts the definition officially established by Israel, listing twenty- 
eight Israeli ruling coalitions between 1949 and 1999 (Table 3.1).25 Each of these 
coalitions was inaugurated in the Knesset. Inauguration entails the presentation of the 
coalition’s policy guidelines along with members of the new cabinet. The Knesset’s 
confidence vote to the coalition establishes the formation of the new government (see 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il).
In determining the life duration of a ruling coalition authors have disagreed over 
the issue of government termination (Gorman and Rosendale, 1997). Again, strict and 
loose definitions are relevant to this issue. Lose definition considers the resignation of a 
Minister as a termination while strict definition suggests only the change of the entire 
cabinet along with the Prime Minister as condition for a dissolution (Budge 1990 vs. 
Mershon 1996). Additional complications are introduced such as the consideration of 
care-taker government and the changes that occur within it, the death of the Prime
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Minister, the establishment of an emergency government, etc... For the purpose of our 
analysis the termination date of the coalition is considered to be that day when a new 
ruling coalition is inaugurated by the Knesset (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Israeli Governments 1949-1999
Prime Begins
Ends Reason26Gov Begins Ends Minister Reason Days
1 3/10/1949 10/29/1950 Ben-Gurion Election 1 Religious issues/Economic problems 599
2 10/30/1950 10/6/1951 Ben-Gurion Religious issues 342
3 10/7/1951 12/22/1952 Ben-Gurion Election 2 Religious issues 442
4 12/23/1952 1/6/1954 Ben-Gurion Resignation of PM 380
5 1/7/1954 6/28/1955 Shared Resignation of General Zionists 538
6 6/29/1955 11/1/1955 Shared Care taker election
Dispute with Ahdut Avoda over German
126
7 11/2/1955 1/5/1958 Ben-Gurion Election 3 weapons 796
8 1/6/1958 12/5/1959 Ben-Gurion Religious issues 709
9 12/6/1959 11/1/1961 Ben-Gurion Election 4 Levon Affairs 688
10 11/2/1961 6/23/1963 Ben-Gurion Election 5 Resignation of PM 599
11 6/24/1963 12/21/1964 Eshkol Levon Affairs/Labor split 547
12 12/22/1964 1/9/1966 Eshkol Electoral Opportunity 383
13 1/10/1966 3/16/1969 Eshkol Election 6 Death of PM 1162
14 3/17/1969 12/14/1969 Meir Election 273
15 12/15/1969 3/5/1974 Meir Election 7 Election
P.M Resignation, Internal Labor
1553
16 3/6/1974 6/2/1974 Meir Election 8 disputes 90
17 6/3/1974 6/18/1977 Rabin Religious issues 1112
18 6/19/1977 8/4/1981 Begin Election 9 Election 1507
19 8/5/1981 10/9/1983 Begin Election 10 Resignation of PM/Economic crisis 796
20 10/10/1983 9/12/1984 Shamir Weakness of Government 338
21 9/13/1984 10/19/1986 Peres Election 11 Agreement 768
22 10/20/1986 12/21/1988 Shamir Election 794
23 12/22/1988 6/10/1990 Shamir Election 12 Peace question 536
24 6/11/1990 7/12/1992 Shamir Peace question 760
25 7/13/1992 11/21/1995 Rabin Election 13 PM killed 1194
26 11/22/1995 6/17/1996 Peres Election/Peace question 206
27 6/18/1996 7/6/1999 Netanyahu Election 14 Election/Peace question 1113
28 7/7/1999 3/7/2001 Barak Election 15 Peace question 609
23 Israeli Knesset: www.knesset.gov.il, 2003.
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Dependent Variables:
Three dependent variables are analyzed in two stages. In the first stage, coalition
formation analysis is performed in which the dependent variables considered are coalition 
size and coalition ideological parameter. Coalition size is simply the number of Knesset 
seats controlled by the coalition upon inauguration. For our qualitative analysis, the size 
of the coalition can be considered either large or small. A small coalition is the coalition 
that is established by the minimum number of seats necessary for a Knesset majority.
97Another word for a small coalition is minimum winning coalition or MWC. An Israeli 
MWC requires the least possible number of parties in control of the least possible 
majority seats. When additional parties join the coalition, making their presence 
unnecessary for the control of a minimum winning requirements (excessive), the coalition 
can no longer be regarded as MWC. Therefore, we consider a MWC to be the ruling 
alliance with the minimum required parties to achieve simple majority. In contrast to 
MWC, a large coalition (LWC) is that which exceeds the minimum winning requirement 
with more parties than needed included in the alliance. Eleven Israeli governments were 
established as minimum winning coalitions while seventeen were larger than minimum 
formations (Table 3.2).
26 Based on events as covered by Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1949-1999.
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Table 3.2: Size and Ideological Parameters of the Israeli Governments 1949-1999.
Government
SEATS SIZE Coalition
Ideology28
Ideological
Closeness29
Ideological
Parameter
1 73 LWC L-C-R 3 W
2 73 LWC L-C-R 3 W
3 65 MWC L-R 2 T
4 87 LWC L-C 3 W
5 87 LWC L-C 3 W
6 63 MWC L-R 2 T
7 80 LWC L-C 3 W
8 80 LWC L-C 3 W
9 86 LWC L-C-R 3 w
10 66 LWC L-R 3 w
11 66 LWC L-R 3 w
12 66 LWC L-R 3 w
13 73 LWC L-R 3 w
14 104 LWC L-R 3 w
15 102 LWC L-R 3 w
16 68 MWC L-R 2 T
17 61 MWC L-R 2 T
18 68 MWC RT-C-R 1 T
19 57 MWC RT-C-R 1 T
20 60 MWC RT-C-R 1 T
21 96 LWC L-RT-R 3 W
22 96 LWC RT-L-R 3 W
23 90 LWC RT-L-R 3 w
24 56 MWC RT-R 1 T
25 62 MWC L 1 T
26 58 MWC L 1 T
27 62 MWC RT-R 1 T
28 68 LWC L-C-R 3 W
Coalition ideological parameter, on the other hand, represents the ideological 
distance between the dominant party policy position and that of the coalition as a whole 
after formation. In our quantitative approach we content code dominant parties’ 
manifestos and government’s policy guidelines in order to determine the distance
27 An Israeli MWC requires the least possible number o f  parties in control of the least possible majority 
seats. When additional parties join the coalition making their presence unnecessary for the control o f a 
minimum winning requirements the coalition is no longer regarded as MWC.
28 Governments’ composition of parties ideologically identified as Left (L) Right (Rt) Center (C) or Religious (R). 
This classification is provided by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHhyd0).
29 Ideological Closeness Index of coalition is developed by Ian Budge where 1 indicates very close while 6 very wide.
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between them as being the ideological parameter (see below for measurement and 
definition). 30
In the qualitative section ideological parameters are said to be tight or wide. 
Israeli coalitions are formed by a partnership of parties that are categorized as left, center, 
right, or religious. The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides ideological 
categorization of Israeli parties and ruling coalitions since 1949. Budge provides an 
ideological closeness index of Israeli parties within each government. We consider 
ideological parameter of the coalition to be tight (T) whenever Budge’s ideological 
closeness index scores less than 3; otherwise the coalition is said to be wide (W) (Table 
3.2).
In the second stage the durational analysis is conducted in which the dependent 
variable considered is the number of days the coalition lasts in power. As has been 
discussed, the count begins in the day the government is inaugurated and runs until the 
day it is replaced by an alternate. In the qualitative case study we examine the shortest 
vs. the longest-lived Israeli coalitions in order to compare explanatory variables (see 
below for further examination of case selection criteria).
30 Similar approach in measurement was made by Sened, Itai "A Model o f Coalition Formation: Theory and 
Evidence", the Journal o f Politics, vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 350-72, 1996.
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Independent Variables:
In order to explain cabinet formations two types of independent or explanatory
variables are considered. The first are structural, i.e., variables that are measurable 
through the institutional structure of the government. In this case it is the dominant 
party’s power index which is obtained by measuring the power of the dominant party to 
form a winning coalition while considering the various possible partnerships. Party 
power index is established after every national election.
Whenever the dominant party’s control of the Knesset increases we assume that 
coalition competition decreases. The power growth of the dominant party decreases the 
opportunity for rival coalitions to be formed. We used Banzhaf’s power index (see 
Banzhaf Power Index in Appendix B) that calculates the power of the dominant party to 
form winning coalitions within the Knesset (See below for measures).31 To confirm the 
validity of our measure we also established a “feasibility” of coalition formation table 
showing the ideological coalitions that were potentially possible along party ideology 
(Table 3.3). This was done by listing all Israeli political parties that have won Knesset’s 
entries since 1949 (Table 3.10). Then, we grouped the parties as left, religious, right, or 
anti-system parties as established by International Almanac o f International History as 
well as Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For each ideological category we added the 
number of seats each camp could have “feasibly” controlled in the Knesset, not including 
anti-system parties, as listed in Table 3.3. (See below for further discussion) We
31 Banzhaf power index provides a % power o f each party’s ability to form a winning majority among a 
population of parties based on the number o f seats each party controls. The formula for calculating the 
power is provided in the Appendix.
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projected ‘feasible’ alliances which add the religious parties to either the left or the right 
camps.
Table 33% Knesset Seats by Ideologically Feasible Coalitions and Dominant Party
Power Index 1949-1999'32
Date Left Riqht Reiiaious Left-Reliaious Riaht-Reliaious Anti-System)**i Power
1/25/49 71* 23 20 91* 43 6 0.855
7/30/51 66* 29 17 83* 46 8 0.876
7/26/55 67* 28 17 84* 45 8 0.843
11/3/59 74* 25 18 92* 43 3 0.927
8/15/61
«COCD 34 18 81* 52 5 0.831
10/28/65 67* 31 17 84* 48 5 0.847
10/28/69 58 35 2 0 78* 55 6 0.993
12/31/73 56 43 15 71* 58 6 0.812
5/17/77 51 46 17
*COCD 63* 6 0.715
6/30/81 52 51 13 65* 64* 4 0.561
6/23/84 53 49 13 66* 62* 5 0.606
1 1 / 1 / 8 8 50 47 18 6 8 * 65* 5 0.548
6/23/92 56 43 16 72* 59 5 0.743
5/29/96 43 45 23 66* 6 8 * 9 0.548
5/20/99 52 31 27 79* 58 10 0.585
* A “feasible” winning coalition with more than 60 seats (50%) o f the Knesset.
** Anti-System parties consist o f non-Zionist parties primarily communist and /
Both measures reflect similar conclusions suggesting that the larger a “feasible” 
coalition, the greater is the power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition and, 
therefore, the lower coalition competition.33 Table 3.3 shows that ‘feasible’ winning 
alliances control of Knesset’s seats grow as the power of the dominant party to form 
winning coalitions increase. Competition increase as indicated by the ability of both the
32 We categorized Israeli parties as left, right, or religious based on the description provided by International 
Almanac of International History, 2nd Edition, 1982.
33 The only exception of this pattern occurred in 1969 election. In 1969 election almost all left oriented parties joined 
the Alignment (56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand 
coalition bloc. Therefore when Benzhaf power index calculation is made without taking into consideration potential 
ideological partners it scores high. However, if ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have 
only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short o f a ruling majority.
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right and the left to form winning coalitions while the power of the dominant party 
declines particularly since 1977 Knesset election.
For the qualitative case study analysis coalition competition is said to be low 
when dominant party’s power index to form a winning coalition scores above 80 or when 
an ideological alliance is capable of controlling a majority of the seats. As indicated in 
table 3.3 alliances of left-parties were practically capable of forming governments 
throughout pre-1969 without needing the support of outside ideological camps. These 
situations indicate low-level of ideological competition within the Knesset before 1969 
election. Additional indications of low competition are often observed in the low 
occurrence of defection from parties’ ranks. At low competition, defection from parties 
and by parties from alliances is hardly rewarding because it does not impact the overall 
balance of power within the Knesset. In contrast, coalition competition is said to be high 
when dominant party’s power index to form a winning coalition scores low, i.e., below 
80 or when an ideological alliance is not capable of controlling a majority of seats in the 
Knesset. At high competition defection from party ranks or by parties from coalitions 
can be rewarding due to the increasing values of defectors in tilting the balance of power 
in favor of one Knesset’s pole rather than another.
The second set of variables considered in analysis of coalition formation are event 
pressures, i.e., variables that vary on yearly bases relative to internal and external 
political developments [See below for further illustration of variables and measures].
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
75
These variables account for a variety of “internal” and “external” political events that 
present pressure on structrual variation during alliance formation (see chapter 2).
Event variables are considered in the 1st stage analysis, i.e., the formation analysis 
based on developments a year prior to government’s inauguration. What are the impacts 
of prior events on the formational structure of the government? This study considers the 
following variables as a source for explaining size and ideological formations of 
governments: annual severity of external conflict, annual foreign aid, annual percentage 
change in Gross Domestic Product, annual percentage of immigrants relative to 
population, annual percentage of unemployment, annual percentage of strikers per 
strikes. [See Appendix C :Data Structure]. In the quantitative study various “event 
pressures” are also included: United Nations resolutions, inflation rate, and economic 
growth.
In the 2nd stage durational analysis event pressure variables are combined with 
formative variables, i.e., coalition size and ideology parameter, as to determine their 
combined impact on the durability of the government (Figure 2.4). In order to assess the 
variation of structrual vs. event variables on the duration of governments as they age we 
examine the model in stages. First we examine duration based on first year events 
following government formation. Second, we examine duation based on events that 
proceeded govememnt termination. This makes our structural independent variables act 
as control variables for comparison. The contrast will establish the different significance 
of structural vs. event variables on duration as coalition ages in power.
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Finally we examine our hypotheses based on pre-1969 vs. post-1969 Israeli 
coalitions. Our rationale for this comparison is provided in Chapter 1 and 2 where we 
establish grounds for introducing such a controlled comparison design.
Measuring Ruling Coalitions’ Ideologies:
Definition: Coalition ideology is defined in this study as the combined ideological
policies taken by a coalition on domestic-liberal and extemal-peace positions (C) as 
expressed in the Principle Guidelines o f the Government.
Upon its formation every Israeli government is required to present a policy 
statement to the Knesset entitled “The Principle Guidelines of the Government” (PGG). 
This statement represents an actual agreement drafted by a coalition of political parties 
who have agreed either to support or to share the new cabinet. In his inauguration speech 
in 1999 Mr. Barak defined the PGG as follow: “the guidelines constitute the identity card 
of the government, the principles of its policy and its declaration of intent.”34 By 
agreeing to the PGG, it becomes binding for the parties in the coalition to support every 
government policy that is inspired by the PGG. Violation to these policy principles can 
invite immediate fragmentation in the coalition and may lead to the collapse of the 
government. This makes the PGG a major source that underlines the government’s 
political program and coalition’s ideology.
34 Speech by Prime Minister Ehud Barak during the Presentation of the 28th Government to the Knesset 
Jerusalem, July 6, 1999.
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In this study, a content coding is conducted for government guidelines using Ian 
Budge’s approach to coding party platforms/5 For governments that adopted previous 
governments’ PGG, the speech of Prime Minister’s speech upon introducing the 
government are coded and added to the previous PGG. Budge coded party platforms as 
they emerge in newspapers or publications of their respective parties. The coding was 
aimed to reveal the saliency of policy issues that were emphasized and prioritized by 
political parties throughout electoral campaigns. Budge’s coding scheme provided seven 
general policy domains: External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, Government, 
Economy, Welfare and Quality of Life, Fabric of Society, and Social Groups. Each 
domain was divided into various defined categories for the total sum of 54 sub-domains 
[See Appendix A for definitions].36 We made adjustments to the sub-domains as they 
relate to the particular circumstances of Israeli politics. For example, we replaced 
Budge’s sub-domain “favorable mention of European community” with what we thought 
a category related to Israel’s case as “favorable mention of Jewish community”. 
Furthermore, we inserted the following significant Israeli sub-policies: (609) immigration 
and settlement, (610) support of religious laws (611) same as (610) but negative, and 
(612) Jerusalem.37
35 Ian Budge, David Robertson, Derek Hearl “Ideology, Strategy and Party Change” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987).
36 Dataset CMPr3 (Author A Volkens), Comparative Manifestos Project, Science Center Berlin, Research Unit 
Institutions and Social Change (Director H-D Klingemann) in cooperation with the Manifesto Research Group 
(Chairman I Budge). The dataset is also referred to as SN3437- Comparative Manifestos Project: Programmatic 
Profiles of Political Parties in Twenty Countries, 1945-1988. Description of the data and method of order is available 
online at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/fmdingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437.
37 Inter coder reliability test was made by having two university students content-coding the same five 
PGG texts that were randomly selected. My content coding agreed with that of the students over 90% of 
the times.
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Because Israeli politics is highly partisan, both cabinet and the Knesset tend to be 
driven by the same ruling coalition agenda (Asher, 1998). For this reason, the PGG 
represents not only the program of the cabinet, but it sets the scope of the legislative 
agenda in the Knesset. For example, when the Likud-led coalition began to rule Israel in 
1977 its PGG prioritized the support of religious institutions among other objectives. 
This was also reflected in its legislative activities in the Knesset. The legislative agenda 
was highly religious and the religious institutions received its highest financial support 
from the government through out this period.
Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, twenty-eight coalition 
governments have adopted twenty-two PGGs. Most PGGs were authored by newly 
emerging coalitions reflecting the new political policy direction of the government. 
Coalitions that underwent minor changes in their formation or policy programs, 
particularly during the life of the same Knesset, occasionally adopted the same program 
of the previous coalition. This makes the formation of new PGG an indicator of major 
changes in the policy objectives of the emerging coalitions and, therefore, of the 
government’s programs (Table 3.4).
38 In 1976/77 Under the Labor government Ministry of Religious Affairs received annual budget of only 208.2 
millions. Since 1977 Likud government, the ministry’s budget continued to be annually doubling until it reached 1615 
millions in 1980/81. See Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics under Government Expenditure.
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Source
Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949 
Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949 
Israel Governm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1951 
Israel Governm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1955 
Israel Governm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1955 
Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1955 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1955 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1955 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1959 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1959 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1959 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1959 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1966 
Major K nesset D ebates, 1948-1981 
Israel Governm ent Yearbook, 1969 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977 
Jerusalem  Post, 1981 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1983 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1986 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988 
Israel Governm ent P ress  Office, 1990 
Israel K nesset Archive, 1992
39 Previous was adopted with no adjustment as presented by Gurion on Nov.l, 1950, See Keesing Contemporary 
Archives, December 2-9, 1950, p.1131a.
40 Previous was adopted with no adjustment as presented by Shared. See Sharett's speech on January 25, 1954 to the 
Knesset. Israel Government Yearbook p. 18.
41 A caretaker government was formed with no new guidelines. See Keesing: July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308a
42 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Gurion. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 25-Febl, 
1958, p. 15990
43 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Gurion. See Israel Knesset Archive, 1961, Translated.
44 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Eshkol. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 1-2: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH0dxd0
45 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Eshkol. See Statement to the Knesset by P.M Eshkol in 
Hebrew 1964, p. 675. Also see Keesing Contemporary Archive, online 
http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesing/country3055.htm. Volume 11/January 1965/Israel
46 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Mrs. Meir. See Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel 
Lorch, University Press of America, pp. 1650-1653
47 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Mrs. Meir. See online Volume 1-2: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH0dxd0. Also available in Hebrew, Israel Knesset Archive, 1974
48 See online Volume 1-3: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH0elg0. Also available in Hebrew, Israel Knesset 
Archive, 1974.
49 See Israel Foreign Policy, 1977
50 See The Jerusalem Post, Thursday, August 6, 1981.
51 Translated to English from Hebrew.
52 Previous was adopted without adjustment. See Israel Foreign Policy, 1984.
53 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Shamir, See Israel Foreign Policy, pp. 515-521.
54 See Israel Foreign Policy, 1988. p. 1-4
55 See the Jerusalem Post, Tuesday, June 12, 1990.
56 Same as 1995 Peres's Guidelines. Translated from Hebrew to English
Table 3.4: Government Guidelines 1949-1999
G ov
D o cu m en t
D ate D o cu m en t Title
1 3/9/1949 Basic Principles of G overnm ent Guidelines
2 10/30/1950 B asic Principles of Governm ent Guidelines30
3 10/7/1951 B asic Outlines of the  Policy of the Governm ent
4 10/23/1952 Basic Principles of G overnm ent Program
5 1/7/1954 Basic Principles of Governm ent Program40
6 6/29/1955 Basic Principles of G overnm ent Program 41
7 11/2/1955 Basic Principles of Governm ent Program
8 1/7/1958 Benn Gurion's S ta tem ent to the Knesset42
9 12/17/1959 Basic Principles of Governm ent Program
10 11/2/1961 Presentation  of New Governm ent and Its Policy43
11 6/24/1963 S ta tem ent to the  K nesset by P.M. Eshkol44
12 10/22/1964 S ta tem ent to the  K nesset by P.M. Eshkol45
13 1/12/1966 Basic Principles of the  New G overnm ent's Program m e
14 3/17/1969 Com position and Program  of the  New Governm ent46
15 12/15/1969 The Basic Principles of the  New Government47
16 3/10/1974 Basic Principles of the Governm ent
17 5/3/1974 A ddress in the  K nesset by P.M. Rabin48
18 6/20/1977 Basic Guidelines of the  Governm ent40
19 5/8/1981 T he Coalition Agreem ent50
20 10/10/1983 Principle Guidelines of the Governm ent of Israel51
21 9/13/1984 Basic Policy Guidelines of the  Governm ent's Program 52
22 10/20/1986 S tatem ent in the  K nesset by P.M. D esignate Shamir53
23 12/22/1988 Basic Policy Guidelines of the Governm ent's Program 54
24 6/11/1990 The Policy Guidelines of the New Governm ent55
25 7/13/1992 Principle Guidelines of the Governm ent of Israel58
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26 11/22/1995 B asic Policy Guidelines of the Israel Government57
27 6/18/1996 T he N ew  Governm ent's Guidelines58
28 7/7/1999 Basic G uidelines of the  28th Governm ent of Israel59
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995 
Governm ent P ress  Office, 1996 
Governm ent Printing Office, 1999
A rectangular data matrix was established where each Israeli ruling coalition was 
content-coded according to its respective coalition guideline. The data matrix was 
established where the unit of analysis was the coalition (case) entered in the rows while 
the sub-policy domains were entered in the columns (variables). Sentences in the 
document were coded according to each sub-policy domain. We then counted the 
sentences as they fell in their respective sub-policy category. Then, we calculated for 
each government the mean percentage of each sub-policy out of all sub-policies. These 
mean scores were entered in the database as proportional sub-policy factors. The sums of 
these sub-policies were then calculated as to determine the factor of each of the seven 
major domain policies (See Appendix A).
A new variable was added as an indicator of coalition’s “liberalism”. This 
variable subtracted conservative sub-policies from liberal sub-policies. We implement 
Patterson’s definition of “liberal” policies being those which propose active role for 
government in area of economic security and a lesser role in area upholding traditional 
values, whereas conservative policies seek the contrary (Patterson, 2002, p. 172). We also 
established a similar variable as a peace policy indicator. This variable subtracted all 
“security” from those of “peace” oriented sub-policies. Our operational definitions of
57 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs online: Volume 15: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH01dt0. Also available 
in Hebrew, Knesset Archive, 1995.
58 The Jerusalem Post, Tuesday, June 18,1996.
59 See http://www.laborisrael.org/govemme.htm
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security sub-policies are the sentences that stress defense, security, strength, and anti- 
terrorism in contrast to peace oriented policies that emphasize conflict settlement, 
negotiation, concession, cooperation, and mutual recognition. Each of these sub-policies 
is numbered as shown in the formulas below (definitions are provided by Budge in the 
Content Coding Appendix A). !
LC (X) = 201 + 202 + 301 -  302 -  401 + 504 -  505 + 506 -  507 -  601 + 602 -  603 + 604 
-  605 + 606 + 607 -  608 -  610 + 611 -  612 + 701 -  702 + 703 -  704 + 705 + 706 (Table 
3.5).60
LC is the coalition liberal (X) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
PC (Y) = 101 -  102 + 103 -  104 +105 + 106 (Table 3.6).
PC is the coalition peace (Y) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
Then C(LC, PC) or coalition ideology is the government’s joint position on the 
liberal-peace dimensional space.
60 See Content Coding Appendix on the general coding frame and definitions.
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Table 3.5: Sub-Policies Codes Considered in Liberalism Score Calculation.
201 Freedom and Dom estic Human Rights
202 Democracy
301 Decentralization: Positive
302 Decentralization: Negative
4Q1 E nterprise
504 Social Services Expansion: Positive
505 Social Services Expansion: Negative
506 Education Pro-Expansion
507 Education Anti-Expansion
601 Defense of National Way of Life: Positive
602 Defense of National Way of Life; Negative
603 Traditional Morality: Positive
604 Traditional morality: Negative
605 Law and Order
606 National Effort of Social Harmony
607 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: positive
608 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: negative
610 Support of Religious Laws: Positive
611 Support of Religious Laws: Negative
612 Jerusalem
701 Labor Groups: Positive
702 Labor Groups: Negative
703 Agriculture and Farmers
704 Other Economic Groups
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups
706 Non-economic DemoFigureic Groups
Table 3.6: Sub-Policies Codes Considered in ‘Peace’ Score Calculation.
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative
103 Decolonization
104 Military and Security: Positive
105 Demilitarization
106 Peace
Based on our above calculations, each ruling coalition’s ideology was plotted on a 
Liberalism-Peace dimensional space (Figure 3.1). This plot illustrates the distributions of 
the Israeli governments on the Peace-Liberal ideological scale. Among the most peace 
oriented Israeli governments was the 16th coalition scoring 46.58 (Table 3.8). This 
government was initially a national unity headed by Golda Meir, but soon became a left-
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leaning coalition. The government position was the establishment of peace with Arab 
states and the end of hostility. The government adopted the Rogers Plan (the peace 
initiative of the U.S. Secretary of State) which proposed the formula ‘land for peace.’ 
Yet, it was among the shortest lived government in Israel’s coalition history. Among the 
most liberal governments were the first two established in Israel. Both of these 
governments were Labor dominated and headed by David Ben Gurion. These 
governments strongly leaned toward early social idealism (Table 3.8).
Figure 3.1: Government’s Ideology 1949-1999
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Measuring Dominant Party Ideology in Ruling Coalitions
Definition: Dominant party ideology is defined in this study as the ideological 
policies taken by a dominant party in a ruling coalition on domestic-liberal and extemal- 
peace positions (P) as expressed in the party ’$ election platform.
We implement Budge’s party platform data in order to determine parties’ 
ideology. Budge’s ideological closeness approach suggests that parties’ emphases on 
policies determine their corresponding ideologies. As has been previously discussed, 
Budge coded party platforms as they emerge in newspapers or in publications. The 
coding was aimed to reveal the saliency of policy issues that were emphasized and 
prioritized by political parties throughout electoral campaigns. Budge’s coding scheme 
provided the same seven general policy domains in twenty democracies examined 
including Israel. Each domain was divided into various defined categories for the total 
sum of 54 sub-domains [See Content Coding Appendix A for definitions].61
61 Note that our content coding method for PGG is the same as that used by Budge with respect to party platforms. 
However, while we inserted new sub-policy categories specific to Israel in our PGG coding (108, 609,610, 611,and 
612) Budge did not have them in his party platform data. This is because Budge aimed at providing general policy 
categories common to most democracies. These added categories, however, do not present discrepancies between both 
data sets when calculating ideological position in Israel in either the PGG or party platform. Our aim is not to merge 
the data sets but rather to calculate ideological positions of governments and parties. The ideological position formula 
we implement accounts for all possible sub-policies that contribute to either peace or liberalism positions. Budge’s 
party platform data, while not specifically including the sub-policy categories we added, incorporate them in other 
categories that our formula accounts for as well. For example, our formula subtracts traditional morality (604) in 
measuring liberalism (LC or LP). In Budge’s coding scheme religious laws (610) — a category that we established — is 
incorporated under traditional morality (604). Thus, when we calculate ideological liberalism (LC or LP) the same 
result will be found whether we subtract 604 that incorporate 610 in Budge’s data or we subtract 604 and 610 that are 
separately established in our content coding. The only reason we present these additional categories is to establish a 
database particular to Israel that accounts for its peculiarities in future studies.
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Budge’s dataset ends in 1988. We updated Budge’s data as follow: Dominant 
parties in coalitions publish their respective policy platforms in various journals, 
magazines, and newspapers. Israel Government Yearbook has consistently published 
major Israeli parties’ platforms. The intention of this study is to conduct a content 
analysis of the dominant Israeli parties within the ruling coalitions and to later calculate 
coalition’s ideological parameter. Using the same content coding approach implemented 
by Budge, we coded dominant parties’ platforms from 1988 until 1999 (Table 3.7).62 
These documents are very typical of those implemented by Budge’s study.63
Table 3.7: Dominant Party Platforms 1992-1999
Election Party Document Source
1992 Labor Party Guide for the Perplexed Voter64 Jerusalem Post
1992 Likud Party Guide for the Perplexed Voter65 Jerusalem Post
1996 Labor Platform for Elections to the 14th Knesset66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1996 Likud 1996 Likud Party Platform67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1999 Labor 1999 Electoral Platform66 Jerusalem Post
1999 Likud The Only Peace That Will Hold69 Jerusalem Post
A data matrix was established where the unit of analysis was the party (case) 
entered in the rows while the sub-policy domains were entered in the columns (variables). 
All sentences in the document were coded according to each sub-policy domain. We
62 Inter coder reliability test was made by having two university students content-coding the same five PGG 
texts that were randomly selected. My content coding agreed with that of the students over 85% of the 
times.
63 Description of the documents, data, and method used by Budge is available online at http://www.data- 
archive.ac.uk/fmdingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437.
64 Jerusalem Post Supplement -  Election 1992
55 ibid. This document, however, was not used in our analysis because the Likud didn’t form a government.
66 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online a t: www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH01 fuO.
67 The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE) later became the Jewish Virtual Library, “1996 Likud Party 
Platform” http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Politics/likud.html. This was an official translation from the Likud Party 
platform, chapter 1.
Jerusalem Post, “1999 Electoral Platforms” 1999 Election Supplement. We also coded and added the Jerusalem 
Post’s interview with Barak “Netanyahu is living the Truman Show” (1999 Election Supplement).
69 We coded but didn’t added this document in our analysis because Likud was not part of the Government. This 
document was an election interview with Netanyahu conducted by Jerusalem Post “The Only Peace that will Hold is a 
Peace we Can Defend” (1999 Election Supplement).
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counted the sentences as they fell in their respective sub-policy category. Then, we 
calculated, for each party, the mean percentage of each sub-policy out of all sub-policies. 
These mean scores were entered in the database as proportional sub-policy factors. For 
example, a party platform with ten sentences emphasizing “need for strong military” out 
of a total of 100 sentences receives .1 or 10% factor for the sub-policy category of 
“military and security: positive” (104).
Sub-policies are grouped into seven general domain policies. One of these 
general domain policies, for example, is ‘external relations’ which include ‘military and 
security: positive” in addition to others sub-policies such as ‘decolonization’ (see Content 
Coding Appendix A).
‘Liberalism’ is a variable we calculate based on our sub-policy scores. This 
variable subtracts conservative sub-policies from liberal sub-policies. We established a 
similar variable as a peace policy indicator. This variable subtracts all security from 
those of peace oriented sub-policies in the same manner we conducted our calculation of 
the coalition ideology.
LP (X) = 201 + 202 + 301 -  302 -  401 + 504 -  505 + 506 -  507 -  601 + 602 -  603 + 604
-  605 + 606 + 607 - 6 0 8 -6 1 0  + 611 -  612 + 701 -  702 + 703 -  704 + 705 + 706.70
LP is the party liberal (X) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
PP (Y) = 101 -  102 + 103 -  104 +105 + 106.
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PP is the party peace (Y) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
Then P(LP, PP) or party ideology is the party’s joint position on the liberal-peace 
dimensional space.
Based on our above calculations, each dominant party ideology was plotted on a 
Liberalism-Peace dimensional space (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Dominant Party Ideology 1949-1999
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Figure 3.2 shows each dominant party’s ideological position based on the content 
coding of its election platform. For example, among the most ‘dovish’ Israeli dominant 
parties ever to emerge was Mapai under Ben Gurion during the 7th government in 1955.
70 See Content Coding Appendix on the general coding frame.
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
88
The party’s platform consistently proposed the achievement of peace with Arabs. The 
party scored over 30 on the ‘peace’ scale (Table 3.8). The dominant party under the 20th 
and 19th governments, on the other hand, was the most conservative. The Likud was the 
dominant party under Begin then Shamir respectively scoring -57 on the liberal scale 
(Table 3.8).71
Measuring Coalition Ideological Parameters
Definition: A coalition ideological parameter (I) is defined as the distance between the 
ruling coalition’s ideology (C) and that of the dominant party (P).
IL(X)= CL -  PL
IL is the liberal (X) ideological parameter of each coalition.
IP(Y) = CP -  PP
IP is the peace (Y) ideological parameter of each coalition.
Then, the overall coalition ideological parameter or I (IL, IP) is IL + IP and it is 
calculated as the distance between two points: d = *J(x2 - x l ) 2 + ( y 2 - y l ) 2 or I as the
distance between P and C: I = tJ( PP -C P) 2 + ( P L - C L ) 2 (Figure 3.3). Each Israeli 
government has an ideological parameter being the distance between its PGG and the 
dominant party platform.
71 A lthough Labor’s platform, throughout the various governments and particularly that o f Ben Gurion, 
emphasized the achievement of peace, events often contradicted rhetoric. The 7th government, for example, 
was supposed to be among the most ‘dovish’, yet it was confronted with major military conflict against 
Arab countries, particularly in the Sinai Campaign. Similar situations were faced by the Likud 
governments which were supposed to have stood for ‘hawkish’ agenda. During both 19th and 20th Likud
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Figure 3.3 s Theoretical Illustration of Ideological Parameter
P Dovish
Left Right
Hawkish
Table 3.8: Content Scores of Governments and Dominant Parties’ Ideologies
Government C P CL PP PL I
1 2 19 1.92 9.62 9.38
2 2 19 1.92 9.62 9.38
3 -3.85 12.31 11.36 -4.55 22.70
4 -0.87 15.65 11.36 -4.55 23.61
5 -0.87 15.65 11.36 -4.55 23.61
6 -0.87 15.65 11.36 -4.55 23.61
7 0 6.13 31.76 -2.35 32.88
8 0 5.86 31.76 -2.35 32.81
9 5.71 10 -2.69 4.30 10.15
10 5.71 10 7.78 0 10.21
11 5.07 9.68 7.78 0 10.05
12 5.49 8.86 7.78 0 9.15
13 8.18 9.55 22.22 2.22 15.84
14 0.66 6.89 0.82 0.06 6.82
15 7.17 10.75 0.82 0.06 12.43
16 46.58 2.74 2.13 -2.13 44.71
17 12.24 16.33 2.13 -2.13 21.05
18 18.75 0 29.09 -16.36 19.36
19 0 -62.32 0 -57.14 5.18
20 6.82 2.27 0 -57.14 59.81
21 8.82 0 -0.97 0 9.79
22 9.84 -1.64 -0.97 0 10.93
23 4.94 -3.70 1.03 0.07 5.43
2 4 5.13 -3.85 1.03 0.06 5.66
25 8.05 14.09 0.09 12.68 8.09
26 -1.39 3.47 0.09 12.68 9.32
2 7 1.27 2.55 0 7.69 5.30
28 1.70 8.94 0 3.70 5.50
governments’ major peace steps were taken to end the state of war with Egypt as concluded in the Camp 
David peace agreement.
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Figure 3.4: Israeli Government’s Ideological Parameters 1949-1999
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the pattern of Israeli governments policy position distance 
from that of dominant parties. The Figure shows that later Israeli governments were 
more coherent with their dominant parties than predecessors. The 20th government, for 
example, had an I value of 59.80 scoring very high (Table 3.8). Indeed this government 
was very ideologically incoherent, with the Likud greatly differing from the PGG.72 The 
20th government was a national unity government with a range of partners that included 
left, right, and religious parties. Such a range of wide ideological coalition makes the 
PGG a representative to the least common policy denominator among all partners. This 
also makes the dominant party further apart from the PGG.
72 This study will aim to reveal reason for such variation. Supports are found in the analysis chapter to the 
claim that increase in structural competitiveness and decline in economic pressure bring about efficient 
formations (tight rank and small formations).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
91
Figure 3.4 also shows that the most ideologically coherent government was the 
27th government headed by Netanyahu and scoring 5.3 on the ideological parameter scale 
(Table 3.8). This reflects the small number of partner parties with very close ideological 
positions; making the PGG with most ideological common denominator and placing it 
very close to the Likud’s principle policy positions.
Measuring Coalition Size
Definition: Ruling coalition’s size is the original number of Knesset’s seats 
controlled by coalition partner parties.
Consideration of coalition’s size could be the number of parties within the 
coalition. However, such a variation has not been considered in our quantitative analysis 
for two reasons. First, there are not many significant variations in the number of parties 
throughout the coalitions. Almost all coalitions consisted of 4 or 5 parties. Second, and 
more importantly, such a consideration is well accounted for in the number of seats the 
coalition as a whole controls. Most significant to our analysis is to examine the size of 
the coalition in terms of the number of seats it controls which indicate the extent to which 
the coalition maintain control over the Knesset as a whole.
Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic Government: Party Government in 20 
Democracies (1945-1990)” provides detailed information about every ruling coalition 
that was formed in Israel from 1945 to 1990. The information provided by Budge
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
includes the number of parties participating in the coalition, the number of Knesset seats 
they control, the cabinet ministry(ies) each party controls, in addition to other 
information.73 We updated Budge’s data on seats controlled by each government from 
1990 to 1999 using Keesing’s Contemporary Archive (Table 3.9).
Table 3.9: Israeli Coalition Governments Knesset’s Total Seats 1949-1999
CABINET SEATS SIZE
1 73 LWC
2 73 LWC
3 65 MWC
4 87 LWC
5 87 LWC
6 63 MWC
7 80 LWC
8 80 LWC
9 86 LWC
10 66 LWC
11 66 LWC
12 66 LWC
13 73 LWC
14 104 LWC
15 102 LWC
16 68 LWC
17 61 MWC
18 68 LWC
19 57 MWC
20 60 MWC
21 96 LWC
22 96 LWC
23 90 LWC
24 56 MWC
25 62 MWC
26 58 MWC
27 62 MWC
28 68 LWC
73 Budge, Ian; Jaap Woldendoip and Hans Keman “Handbook o f Democratic Government: Party Government in 20 
Democracies (1945-1990)”, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
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Measuring the Competitiveness of the Coalition System
Definition: Coalition competition is defined as an increasing opportunity for rival 
ruling coalitions to be established by dominant parties.
Opportunity of rival coalitions to be established is determined in this study by the 
relative power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition compared to the rest of 
parties in the Knesset. The greater is the power of the dominant party to form a coalition 
the lesser is the competition. The ability of the dominant party to form a coalition is 
measured by Banzhaf s power index that calculates the power of each party to form a 
winning coalition relative to other parties.74 “The standardized Banzhaf index can be 
interpreted to give an answer to the question: what is voter's relative share among all 
pivotal positions?”75 The voter here is the party’s sum of votes that are under its control 
in the Knesset.
Table 3.10 provides a description of all Israeli parties’ share the various Israeli 
Knessets (1 to 15) from 1949-1999, and shows two dominant blocs that have dominated 
Israeli Knesset. The Right bloc was originally that of Herut, then became Gahal and 
today is organized under the Likud. The Left bloc was primarily organized under Mapai 
then was re-established under the Alignment then under Labor and by the 15th Knesset 
was renamed as One Israel. Both of these blocs have controlled large shares of the 
Knesset and presented themselves as the main rival factions in Israel. Table 3.10 is
74 See Banzhaf Power Index calculation and discussion in the Appendix.
75 Antti Pajala ('anoaia@utu.fi): http://powerslave.val.utu.fi. See Banzhaf, John. F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Does not 
Work: A Mathematical Analysis." Rutgers Law Review 35: pp. 317-343.
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implemented in this study in order to calculate the Banzhaf s power index of each party 
in the Knesset and ultimately the dominant parties.
Table 3.10: Distribution of Knesset Seats by Parties by Knesset 1949-1999
Knesset
1
Political Parties
Agudat Yisrael 
Ahdut Ha'avodah 
Center Party 
Degel Hatorah
Arab Parties 2
Democratic Party for Change 
Fighters List 1
GeneralZionists/Liberal 
Party/Independent
Liberals 7
Hadash/Democratic Front for 
Peace and Equality 
Hakla'ut Ufituah*
Hamerkaz Hahofshi 
Hamizrahi
Ha'olam Hazeh-Koah Hadash 
Hapo'el Hamizrahi
Herut Movement/Gahal/Likud 14
Israel Our Home (Yisrael Beiteinu)
Kash
Kidmah Ufituah*
Kidmah Va'avodah
Maki 4
Mapai/Alignment/Labor/One Israel 46 
Mapam 19
Mahaneh Sheli 2
Meretz/Democratic Israel 12 9 10
Moked 1
Moledet 2 3 2
National Democratic Alliance -
Balad 2
National Unity 4
Omez 1
One Nation 2
Plato Sharon 1
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha 2 2 2 2 1 2
Progressive List for Peace 2 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
3 4 4 4 4 4 2 5
10 7 - 8
6
2
3 2 1 1 1 2 4 5
15
20 13 8 17 5 4 4 1
5 4 4 4 3 5 3
1 1 1
2
2
1 2
8
8 15 17 17 26 26 39 43 48 41 40 32 32 19
4
1
2 2 2 2 2
1 2
5 6 3 5 1 1
45 40 47 42 45 56 51 32 47 44 39 44 34 26
15 9 9 9 8 3
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Progressive Party 5 4 5 6
Rafi 10
Rakah 3 3 4
Ratz 3 1 1 3  5
Religious Torah Front/United
Torah Front 6 6 5
Sephardim and Edot Mizrah/Shas 4 2 4 6 6 10 17
Shlomzion 2
Shituf Ve'ahvah* 2 2 2 2
State List 3
Tami 3 1
Tehiya/Tsomet 3 5 3
Teiem 2
The Third Way 4
Tsomet 2 8
United Religious Front /NRP 16 11 12 12 11 12 10 12 6 4 5 6 9 5
United Torah Judaism 5
Shinui 2 3 2 6
WIZO 1
Yahad 3
Yahadut Hatorah 4 4
Yemenite Association 1 1
Yisrael Be'aliyah 7 6
Table 3.11 illustrates the changes in the ruling dominant party power index. 
Since 1969, the power index of the ruling dominant party has substantially declined 
(Figure 3.5).76 This indicates a considerable increase in the competitiveness of the 
coalition system -  also referred to in literature as “fragmentation”.
76 1969 election data, however, may be misleading in our power index consideration. The power index calculation 
indicates an overwhelming power gain by the Labor bloc (56 seats and scored .99 on the power index). Nonetheless, if 
we take into account the ideological orientations of possible partners its power to form a winning coalition may greatly 
decline. See feasible coalitions in Table 3.11.
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Table 3.11." Power Index of  the Ruling Dominant Party in the Knesset 1949-199977
Power index of
Knesset Year Dominant Party
1 1949 0.86
2 1951 0.88
3 1955 0.84
4 1959 0.93
5 1961 0.83
6 1965 0.85
7 1969 0.99
8 1973 0.81
9 1977 0.71
10 1981 0.56
11 1984 0.61
12 1988 0.55
13 1992 0.74
14 1996 0.55
15 1999 0.58
Figure 3.5: Power Index of Dominant Party 1949-1999
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77 For formula see B en zh af P ow er Index Appendix
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Note that the Banzhaf power index calculates the power of the party relative to the 
coalition’s members based solely on the number of seats. Although this is a very strong 
measure of party’s power, ideological consideration may also prove significant in the 
determination of party’s power to form coalitions and therefore in the relative 
competitiveness or flexibility of the system as a whole.
Ideological consideration can be accounted for by looking at ideologically feasible 
competing coalitions. In addition to three dominant Zionist ideological camps, left, right, 
and religious, various other camps have also been formed most notably the ethnic camp 
of Sephardic Jews under Shas and Russian Jews under Israel Ba’aliah. While these 
camps have gained greater significance over the years they continued to play the 
ideological partner of major traditional Zionist camps. Shas remains strongly associated 
with the religious camp while Israel Ba’aliah with the center-right camp. As for the Arab 
parties -  which are not associated with Labor — and the communists, they have been 
considered as anti-Zionist and categorized in most literature as ‘anti-system parties’. In 
fact no Israeli ruling coalition has ever formed in partnership with either the communists 
or the Arab parties.
We divided Israeli feasible coalitions among parties into the most likely ideological 
grouping scenarios: left, right, religious, left-religious, and right-religious coalitions. 
We ruled out left-right and left-right-religious formations because they were not 
ideologically feasible to form in our considerations. Such formations usually occur not
78 We categorized Israeli parties as left, right, or religious based on the description provided by International 
Almanac of International History, 2nd Edition, 1982.
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on ideological basis (not ideologically feasible) but rather on the consideration of other 
factors such as having a national unity government in war or for strictly electoral 
opportunistic non-ideological purposes. Our objective is to simulate the most 
ideologically likely and opportunistically least likely formations. The result is shown in 
table 3.3. This is being done in order to compare such a result to that of Banzhaf s power 
index that measures dominant party’s power to form coalitions on a non-ideological 
basis. Our ideological measure of feasible ideological coalitions in addition to that of 
Bazhaf s dominant party power index should provide a compatible result to the 
measurement of ‘competitiveness’. For example, we should expect that the larger the 
seats an ideological feasible coalition is capable to control, the higher is the power index 
of the dominant party, and therefore the lower is the competitiveness of the system.
Both ideological feasible coalitions and Banzhaf s measures reflect similar 
conclusions, which suggest that the greater the seats an ideological coalition is capable of 
controling the greater is the power of the dominant party. As Table 3.3 shows, from 1949 
until 1965 a ruling left alliance was always feasible strictly on ideological basis. For the 
same period Mapai was the dominant party scoring above 83 on Banzhaf s power index. 
Contradictory results emerge only in 1969 where dominant party power index scored 
high (99%) but feasible winning coalition scored low seats relative to previous years (78 
on the left-religious ideologically feasible coalition). This result is due to the 
simplification of power calculation after1969 with the absence of smaller left-parties 
outside the grand left-alliance that was formed under the Alignment Bloc.79
79 In 1969 election almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment (56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No 
left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition block. Therefore when Benzhaf power index
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Since 1969 the Labor-left parties were no longer in clear command of the 
Knesset. For the first time the Labor alliance needed the essential support of either the 
Religious or the Right parties in order to form a government. Banzhaf s power index 
similarly shows that the post-1969 era represents a period where the dominant party’s 
power to form ruling coalitions has been significantly reduced (Figure 3.6). For this 
reason, we consider the 1969 Israeli Knesset to have introduced for the first time into 
Israel a strong competitive coalition system.
Measuring Coalition Duration
Definition: Coalition duration is the number of days a ruling coalition lasts in 
power from the time it is inaugurated by the Knesset to the time a new government is 
likewise established.
The coalitions’ duration was measured by the duration of each government using 
Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic Government”.80 Figure 3.6 shows the pattern of 
duration for 28 governments. The main observation to be made is that the duration of 
Israeli governments in post-1969 period and since the 13th government has come to
calculation is made without taking into consideration potential ideological partners it scores high. However, if 
ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance 
short o f a ruling majority.
80 Ian Budge, Hans Keman, Jaap Woldendorp “Handbook of Democratic Government: Party Government in 20 
Democracies (1945-1990)”, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). Data for government duration from 
1990 to 1999 were gathered from “Keesing Archive of World Events”.
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fluctuate between very long and very short lived ruling coalitions. On average, 
governments of post-1969 lived longer than their predecessors.81
Figure 3.6; Government Duration in Days 1949-2000
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Measuring Event Pressure Variables
Event pressure variables are the non-structural variables that indicate political, 
social, or economic changes that impact the country as a whole.
81 Explaining this pattern is provided in Chapter 3, where proper government’s structural formation, 
reflecting external pressure, and the decline in econom ic pressure during the office term o f the government 
are found to explain long duration governments. These attributes characterize post-1969 governments 
more so than governments formed before 1969.
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In this study we consider six event pressure variables that are significant to Israeli 
politics. Two variables are measures of external political pressures: severity of external 
conflict and foreign aid. Severity of external conflict generally refers to the conflict with 
the Arab states and the Palestinians. It is measured based on annual events that take into 
consideration: number of Israeli casualties and fatalities, frequency of annual disputes 
reported to the U.N., border skirmishes and attacks. Our measurement is established 
based on the information provided by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and
89published online. The MFA’s information provides data reflecting the views and 
political concerns of Israelis as events shape their politics. Furthermore, J. David Singer 
provides data from 1948 to 1992 documenting annual number of casualties in conflicts 
and indexing annual fatality rate where 1 refers to low and 6 a very high rate.8J
We established a similar scale to Singer as to measure the severity of conflict. 
The severity of conflict variable provides a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 indicates a very low 
severity of conflict while 6 indicates a high severity (Table 3.12). This variable differs 
from Singer’s index by incorporating two additional sources of external pressures: U.N. 
resolutions and border skirmishes and attacks. The UN resolutions are those adopted by 
both the General Assembly and Security Council. A list of UN resolutions related to 
Israel is provided online by the Jewish Virtual Library (http://www.us-israel.org/isource). 
We coded these as either 0 for resolution that carry no annual condemnation or criticism 
to Israel, 1 for some condemnation, and 2 severe condemnations. As of border 
skirmishes and attacks, we thought that Singer undermined some conflicts that did not
82 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website, “Timeline of Events: Half a Century of Independence 1948-1998. 
www.mfa.go.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH00ul0.
83 See D. Singer’s “Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992). I have updated this to 1999 using “The Jewish Online 
Research Center -  Jewish Virtual Library” w ww.Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html: “Israeli Casualties in Battle”.
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resemble a major war. Therefore, we coded a new variable “Skirmishes/Attacks” taken 
into considerations Singer’s coding while relying on the annual skirmishes/attacks 
incidents as reported by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.84 Skirmishes/Attack is 
indexed from 1 to 4 with 1 representing low and 4 representing high level of 
skirmishes/attacks. Severity variable adds both Skirmishes/Attack and condemning UN 
resolutions for a maximum index score of 6 (Table 3.12).
Table 3.12: External Conflicts and their Severity 1949-1999
Year Event Casualty85 Fatality86 Skirmishes/Attacks R
1949 War of Independence 6373 6 4 2
1950 Suez canal blockade 0 1 2 1
1951 Syrian incursions / Suez canal blockade 0 2 2 1
1952 Syrian border skirmishes 0 1 1
1953 Water issue with Jordan/Syrian border skirmishes 0 1 2 1
1954 Egypt interfere with ships 0 1 2 1
1955 Kinneret incident with Syria/ 2. Gaza incident with Egypt 0 1 1 1
1956 Sinai campaign 231 6 4
1957 Post Sinai campaign87 0 1 3 1
1958 Skirmishes on the Syrian and Jordan borders 0 1 1 1
1959 Egypt blockade of Suez 0 1 2
1960 Israeli goods are seized in Suez 0 1 2
1961 Syrian-Egyptian union is dissolved/ Conflict on Syrian border 0 1 1 1
1962 Conflict on Syrian border 0 1 2 1
1963 Conflict on Syrian border 0 1 2 1
1964 Divergence of Jordan water/arm race/establishment of PLO 0 1 3 1
1965 Border conflict 0 1 2 1
1966 Border conflict 0 1 2 1
1967 Six days war 776 6 4 2
1968 War of attrition 324 2 2 2
1969 War of attrition 500 2 2 2
1970 War of attrition 600 2 3 2
1971 Arab boycott/ War of attrition 0 2 2 1
1972 Lebanese Syrian border skirmishes/ Munich attack 0 1 1 1
(-) U.N Severit
y
6
3
3
2
3
3
3 
6
4 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3
3
4 
3
3 
6
4
4
5 
3 
2
84 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website, “Timeline of Events: Half a Century of Independence 1948-1998. 
www.mfa.go.il/mfa/go.asD7MFAH00ul0.
85 As reported by Singer.
86 As reported by Singer as an index o f 1 to 6 where 1 represents low fatality rate while 6 high fatality rate.
87 Although no casualties were reported by Singer, tension ran high with Egypt under Nasser. Border 
penetrations and attacks were common. U.N. criticism to Israel for violating the Armistice Agreement was 
severe. International Isolation o f Israel was mounting.
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1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Yom Kippur War 2688 6 4
Syrian border skirmishes/ Ma’alot attack. 0 1 1
Borders conflict with Lebanon/Savoy Hotel incident 7 Israelis 0 3 2
killed/talk with Egypt suspended/bomb in Jerusalem 14 
killed
EI-AI attack in Istanbul, border skirmishes with Lebanon 0 1 1
Borders conflict with Lebanon 0 1 2
Terrorist attack in Haifa kills 37/invasion of Lebanon 0 1 3
Borders conflict with Lebanon 0 1 2
Borders conflict with Lebanon/conflict in territories 0 1 2
Borders conflict with Lebanon/Bombing Iraqi nuclear 0 1 2
site/assassination of Saddat
Invasion of Lebanon 400 4 3
Lebanon occupation 400 4 2
Lebanon occupation 416 4 2
Lebanon occupation/attack on PLO in Tunis 0 1 2
Lebanon occupation 0 1 2
Lebanon occupation 0 1 2
Intefadah 0 1 2
Intefadah 0 1 2
Gulf War 0 1 2
Gulf War 0 1 3
Lebanon conflict/ Embassy in Buenos Aires is destroyed 0 1 1
Lebanon conflict 0 1 2
Lebanon conflict/conflict in territories 0 1 2
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians 0 1 2
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians 0 1 2
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians 0 1 2
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians/suicide attacks 0 1 3
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians/suicide attacks 0 1 3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
6
2
4
2
3
4 
3
3
4
5 
4 
4 
3 
3
3
4 
4
4
5 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3
3
4 
4
Foreign aid, on the other hand, is the measure of total annual money received by
oo
the government in millions. Total aid is simply the sum of U.S. and European aid that 
includes both military and economic aid excluding any loans or loans guarantees (Table 
3.13). Foreign aid is considered a potential external pressure due the ability of aiding 
nations to implement financial assistance in pressing the recipient government to pursue a 
particular policy course. U.S. aid to Israel, for example, has been often associated with 
Israel settlement policies. President George H.W. Bush conditioned increased U.S. aid to
88 Data of foreign aid to Israel (1949-1999) are obtained from the following sources: Clyde R. Mark, “Israel: U.S. 
Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, (May 11, 2000); Larry Q. Nowels, “Israel: An Overview of U.S. 
Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, (May 20, 1993); A. F. K. Organski, “The $36 billion bargain”,
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Israel on halting settlement activities in the Occupied Territories in 1991. Other times, 
U.S. assistance to Israel has been increased following peace agreements in reward for 
- such a policy as was the case in 1993.89
Table 3.13: Foreign Aid to Israel in Millions of U.S. Dollars 1949-1999s0
Year U.S. Aid European Aid Total Aid91
1949 100 0 100
1950 0 0 0
1951 0.3 0 0.3
1952 295.7 0 295.7
1953 249.6 0 249.6
1954 250.7 26.9 277.6
1955 174.9 62.3 237.2
1956 163.1 82.5 245.6
1957 126.7 142.2 268.9
1958 185.4 200.9 386.3
1959 150 1022.3 1172.3
1960 163.8 285.7 449.5
1961 139.5 333.3 472.8
1962 240 396.7 636.7
1963 217.6 404.5 622.1
1964 103.3 401.6 504.9
1965 167.7 307.9 475.6
1966 338.1 400.4 738.5
1967 33.8 718.5 752.3
1968 191.4 689.4 880.8
1969 287.6 585.9 873.5
1970 159.3 612.9 772.2
1971 1285.7 534.7 1820.4
1972 838.3 656.3 1494.6
1973 818.9 576.8 1395.7
1974 4516.3 628.9 5145.2
1975 1064.2 531.7 1595.9
1976 3476.3 593.3 4069.6
1977 2583.4 571.4 3154.8
1978 2476.5 560.2 3036.7
1979 6102.7 543.8 6646.5
1980 2075.8 498.4 2574.2
NY: Colombia University Press, 1990. See also Jewish Online Research Center, www. 
Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html, “U.S. Assistance to Israel.”
89 Our hypothesis is that increase in foreign aid constitute a decline in external pressure and therefore 
contribute to smaller formations and durable coalitions.
90 Figures are adjusted to 1995 inflation index.
91 Including German reparations
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 0 5
1981 2294.3 441.9 2736.2
1982 2206 61.1 2267.1
1983 2393.1 0 2393.1
1984 2631.6 0 2631.6
1985 3376.7 0 3376.7
1986 3663.5 0 3663.5
1987 3040.2 0 3040.2
1988 3043.4 0 3043.4
1989 3045.6 0 3045.6
1990 3434.9 0 3434.9
1991 3712.3 0 3712.3
1992 3100 0 3100
1993 5103.4 0 5103.4
1994 5097.2 0 5097.2
1995 5102.4 0 5102.4
1996 5144 0 5144
1997 5132.1 0 5132.1
1998 3080 0 3080
1999 3010 0 3010
The other set of socio-economic event pressure variables provide important 
statistical insights into the country’s internal stress. These variables are: change in annual 
GDP, annual unemployment rate, annual percentage of strikers per strike, and annual 
percentage of immigrants per population. This set of data is obtained from Statistical 
Abstract o f Israel for the period of 1949-1999 (Table 3.14).92
92 See “Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il for data 
since 1996.
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Table 3.14; Statistical Data 1949-1999
Year GDP GPDRATE Immigration Population Percimmig Strikes Strikers Avgstrik Unem
1949 0 239,954 1,174,000 0.20 53 5189 98
1950 10,155 170,563 1,370,000 0.12 72 9100 126
1951 11,202 0.09 175,279 1,578,000 0.11 76 9715 128
1952 10,880 -0.03 24,610 1,630,000 0.02 94 14010 149
1953 10,436 -0.04 11,575 1,669,000 0.01 84 8804 105
1954 12,172 0.14 18,491 1,718,000 0.01 82 12123 148 8.6
1955 13,352 0.09 37,528 1,789,000 0.02 87 9861 113 7.2
1956 13,922 0.04 56,330 1,872,000 0.03 74 11452 155 7.5
1957 14,352 0.03 72,634 1,976,000 0.04 59 3692 63 7
1958 14,867 0.03 27,290 2,032,000 0.01 48 6050 126 5.7
1959 16,259 0.09 23,988 2,089,000 0.01 51 5873 115 5.5
1960 16,883 0.04 24,692 2,150,000 0.01 135 14420 107 4.6
1961 18,099 0.07 47,735 2,234,000 0.02 125 26184 209 3.6
1962 19,051 0.05 61,533 2,332,000 0.03 144 37588 261 3.6
1963 20,249 0.06 64,489 2,430,000 0.03 126 86475 686 3.6
1964 21,380 0.05 55,036 2,526,000 0.02 136 47168 347 3.3
1965 22,328 0.04 31,115 2,598,000 0.01 288 90210 313 3.6
1966 21,980 -0.02 15,957 2,657,000 0.01 286 85953 301 7.4
1967 21,774 -0.01 14,469 2,776,000 0.01 142 25058 176 10.4
1968 24,304 0.10 20,703 2,841,000 0.01 100 42146 421 6.1
1969 26,658 0.09 38,111 2,930,000 0.01 114 44496 390 4.5
1970 27,835 0.04 36,750 3,022,000 0.01 163 114941 705 3.8
1971 30,009 0.07 41,930 3,121,000 0.01 169 88265 522 3.5
1972 32,905 0.09 55,888 3,225,000 0.02 168 87309 520 2.8
1973 33,364 0.01 54,886 3,338,000 0.02 96 122348 1,274 2.6
1974 33,990 0.02 31,981 3,422,000 0.01 71 27141 382 3
1975 34,434 0.01 20,028 3,493,000 0.01 117 114091 975 3.1
1976 34,227 -0.01 19,754 3,575,000 0.01 123 114970 935 3.6
1977 34,166 0 21,429 3,653,000 0.01 126 194297 1,542 3.9
1978 34,823 0.02 26,394 3,738,000 0.01 85 224354 2,639 3.6
1979 35,585 0.02 37,222 3,836,000 0.01 117 250420 2,140 2.9
1980 36,005 0.01 20,428 3,922,000 0.01 84 91451 1,089 4.8
1981 37,048 0.03 12,599 3,978,000 0 90 315346 3,504 5.1
1982 36,876 0 13,723 4,064,000 0 112 838700 7,488 5
1983 37,129 0.01 16,906 4,119,000 0 93 188305 2,025 4.5
1984 37,185 0 19,981 4,200,000 0 149 528638 3,548 5.9
1985 38,159 0.03 10,642 4,266,000 0 131 473956 3,618 6.7
1986 38,913 0.02 9,505 4,331,000 0 142 215227 1,516 7.1
1987 40,645 0.04 12,965 4,407,000 0 174 814501 4,681 6.1
1988 41,340 0.02 13,034 4,477,000 0 156 327193 2,097 6.4
1989 41,148 0 24,050 4,560,000 0.01 120 209841 1,749 8.9
1990 42,412 0.03 199,516 4,822,000 0.04 117 571172 4,882 9.6
1991 42,314 0 176,100 5,059,000 0.03 77 38776 504 10.6
1992 43,727 0.03 77,057 5,196,000 0.01 114 211833 1,858 11.2
1993 44,156 0.01 76,805 5,328,000 0.01 73 462208 6,332 10
1994 46,073 0.04 79,844 5,472,000 0.01 75 106047 1,414 7.8
1995 47,765 0.04 76,361 5,619,000 0.01 71 75792 1,067 6.3
1996 49,096 0.03 70,605 5,689,000 0.01 75 124215 1,656 6.7
1997 49,464 0.01 65,962 5,987,000 0.01 69 434335 6,295 7.7
1998 49,471 0 57,700 6,038,000 0.01 53 265781 5,015 8.6
1999 49,359 0 77,921 6,200,000 0.01 66 232583 3,524 8.9
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Data Analysis;
After compiling the data into twenty eight cases representing the entire Israeli 
array of coalition governments a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two 
stages.
In the first phase we regressed independent variables on size and then on 
ideological parameter of the coalition as dependent variables. This is conducted in order 
to measure the significance of the multiple regression models in accounting for size and 
ideological parameter of the coalition. In a further examination of our model we 
measured its significance before and after 1969. We call this stage coalition formation 
analysis.
In the second phase we regressed independent variables, along with size and 
ideology, on duration as the dependent variable. This was done in two steps: first we 
regressed the model using first year events data as to determine first year events in the 
life of government in days; second we regressed the last year events data as to determine 
last year events in the life of government in days. We further examined our model in pre 
and post-69 using the same steps in analysis.
It is important to keep in mind that regression analysis provides a linear-based 
measure of association rather than an affirmation of causation. The major pitfalls of our 
least squares multiple regression is that our measurement of association is based on
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relatively small number of cases (N=28) with seven independent variables in the 
formation analysis and nine independent variables in the durational analysis. This 
represents a major shortcoming for any generalization that can be made in regard to 
regression results. Multicolinearity represents another problem for the analysis. Such a 
problem is associated with the integration of correlated explanatory variables. Although, 
our independent variables may have no significant correlation among each other, such an 
association may slightly remain present.
Comparative Case Study Methodology
The short comings of having a small number of cases to investigate quantitatively
(N=28) make us search for an additional methodology for theoretical confirmation. A
suitable investigative approach is the one that can, as Alexander George reasons, “convert
‘lessons of history’ into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the
phenomenon or activity in question” (George, 1979, p. 43).
We adopt George’s analytical approach known as “the method of structured 
focused comparison” (George, 1979). It is based on the strategy of grouping historic 
phenomena that occur repeatedly throughout history as classes of similar events to be 
studied and compared. It allows the development of scientific generalizations and general 
laws that are specific to each class. This is achieved through establishing correlation 
between independent and dependent variables in each case and describing the 
relationship in general terms as to be considered as one of a class of such events. 
Alexander suggests that this is possible through an inductive analytical approach whereby
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categories are established to describe the variance in each variable through different 
cases.
The structured focused comparison approach has various weaknesses and 
advantages. The main weakness is that generalization would remain limited to the small 
population investigated unless similar conditions can be shown to exist for a comparative 
group. Also, no formal statistical methods and probability calculations are employed. 
Among the advantages of this approach is the ability to systematically deal with a 
relatively small number of cases. Also it provides the researcher with the capacity to 
select cases based on a variety of outcomes, not just quantified data. Furthermore it 
allows the identification of the conditions and context under which each distinctive type 
of causal pattern occurs rather than attempting to address the question of how often each 
occurs or is expected to occur. As George suggested a “ ... controlled comparison is 
useful for developing a differentiated theory comprised of conditional generalizations 
rather than frequency distributions” (George, 1979, p. 60).
George’s approach requires important prerequisites. First there must be a 
capacity to employ “disciplined-configurative’’ mode of analysis which “describes and 
analyzes the case in terms of theoretically relevant general variables” (George, 1979, p. 
51). Furthermore, the structure of the research must be able to define the “class” of 
events which the theory seeks to explain. And finally, this approach should be capable of 
applying a selective and focused technique in all the case treatments.
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Application o f Structured Focused Comparison to Israeli Coalition Study
Three phases are essential in this research design and implementation: design, 
case studies, and theoretical implications (Figure 3.7). Each phase must achieve various 
tasks and answer essential questions as follow:
Phase I: Design
• Research question. Literature review, and initial theorization
a. What is phenomenon or behavior to be explained?
b. What are the relevant theories (variables)?
c. Which theory (ies) are most relevant and may require refinement or 
elaboration.
• Model of investigation
a. What is the dependent variable?
b. What are the independent and intervening variables?
c. What are the control variables which will allow comparison?
• Case study selection
a. Select appropriate representative cases from the universe.
• Plausible Theory
a. Generalize the causal relations between independent and dependent variables. 
In other words, establish a set of hypotheses that are the essence of a plausible 
theory.
• Establish criteria for case evaluation
a. Ask the same questions that examine plausible theory hypotheses for each 
case or class of cases in the controlled comparison.
Phase II: The Case Studies
a. Apply analysis for each case or set of cases.
b. Develop a historic explanation (casual imputation) for the outcome in each 
case as they relate to the independent variables.
c. Examine alternative or null hypotheses.
Phase III: Drawing the theoretical implications of the case studies
a. What are the results: answer to the questions and confirmation to the 
hypotheses.
b. Assess, refine, and/or elaborate initial theory.
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Figure 3.7: Steps in Structured Focused Comparison Approach
TheoryDesign Case Studies
Pre-Research
Requisites
I. Pre-Research requisites:
Applying George’s focused case comparison approach presupposes the ability to 
establish a “disciplined-configurative” mode of analysis. Our objective is to explain two 
phenomena that are relevant to most coalition theoretical research, i.e., coalitions’ 
formation and duration. As has been elaborated in chapter 2 we have proposed various 
theoretically relevant variables responsible for coalition behaviors. These include 
structural variables such as coalition competitiveness, coalition size, and coalition 
ideological parameters as well as event variables, such as internal and external pressures. 
These variables are thought to discriminate between the formation and duration of 
various Israeli coalition governments and they meet the first prerequisite of George’s 
method by constituting a ‘pre-theory’ model for analysis.
The second prerequisite establishes the need for the researcher to define and examine 
the “class” of events which the theory seeks to explain. In this study, the aim is to reveal 
the variables responsible for particular coalition formation; namely the coalition size and 
ideological parameter. Why is a particular “class” of governments established with a 
particular size and ideology? And consequently how is this structural formation, while 
taking political developments at hand, attributed to a short-lived or a long-lived “class” of 
governments? By being able to define the “class” (short-lived governments vs. long-
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lived governments) which the theory seeks to distinguish the second prerequisite of the 
research approach is fulfilled.
The final prerequisite presupposes that the researcher must be able to apply a 
selective and focused technique in case treatment to see whether the predictions are 
correct. In this study we meet this by establishing a selective criteria to study “the 
shortest” and “the longest” governments. This prerequisite is further satisfied in 
comparing both groups by asking the same set of questions. Such a comparison provide 
a mean to evaluate independent variables responsible for different government durations.
II. Design
a. Theoretical Relevance
In Chapter 2 we reviewed major theoretical research in the domain of coalition 
theory. We examined the structural paradigm and its sects. We also reviewed the event 
paradigm which originally emerged as a challenge to the structural views. However, we 
have come to realize that contemporary efforts have aimed to bridge and synthesize both 
approaches. We examined some of the gaps evident in these synthetic views and we 
proposed alternative solutions and measures. Most importantly we advanced the view 
that coalition behaviors are significant to be analyzed as a determinant to party behaviors, 
rather than the contrary. Parties’ decisions to abort a coalition, for example, are often 
calculated relative to the policy objectives and the side-payments the coalition offers. 
And in order to examine the coalition on its own terms we establish variables that are 
essential for such an analysis. Namely, we formulate two new structural variables:
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coalition ideological parameter and coalition competitiveness (see chapter 3 for definition 
and measures).
As we further examined the literature we recognized another inadequacy in 
synthetic coalition literature. We find that theories continue to debate whether to take the 
structure or the event as a more determinant factor in coalition durability. Further 
investigation leads us to question which events matter the most and at what particular 
time in the life of a coalition government? We propose to examine this by analyzing the 
different impacts “external” and “internal” event pressures have on coalition formation 
and coalition duration as the ruling alliance ages. We consider the theory composed in 
chapter 2 as a tentative theory in need of investigation towards either confirmation or 
further revisions.
b. Unit of Analysis, c. Dependent Variables, and d. Independent and Control
variables
Unit of analysis and variables are examined and defined at the beginning of the 
chapter.
e. Case study selection
As has been discussed, our goal is to understand the underlying structural and 
event factors responsible for government’s formation and duration. Therefore, our case 
selection criteria for comparison take both extremes of government duration as a base of 
analysis. We select the shortest vs. the longest lived coalitions to be the object of our
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 1 4
investigation. Our selection criteria, however, does not include caretaker governments, 
since their shortcoming and termination (election) is inevitable regardless of any 
consideration.93
The shortest lived pre-1969 governments were the second and twelfth coalition 
governments. The second government lasted only 342 days while the twelfth 
government lasted 383 days (Table 3.15). In post 1969 the shortest duration 
governments were the sixteenth (90 days) and twenty-sixth governments (206 days). In 
contrast the longest lived governments were the seventh (796 days) and thirteenth (1162 
days) in pre-1969 and eighteenth (1507 days) and twenty-fifth (1194 days) governments 
in post-1969 (Table 3.16). These governments will serve as our cases for analysis and 
comparison. In depth description and case analysis of each of these governments will be 
provided in chapter 4.
Table 3.15: Shortest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions in Pre vs. Post 1969 (in days)
Knesset Government Begins Ends Prime Minister Duration
1 2 10/30/1950 10/6/1951 Ben-Gurion 342
5 12 12/22/1964 1/9/1966 Eshkol 383
8 16 3/6/1974 6/2/1974 Meir 90
13 26 11/22/1995 6/17/1996 Peres 206
Table 3.16: Longest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions in Pre vs. Post 1969 (in days)
Knesset Government Begins Ends Prime Minister Duration
3 7 11/2/1955 1/5/1958 Ben-Gurion 796
6 13 1/10/1966 3/16/1969 Eshkol 1162
9 18 6/19/1977 8/4/1981 Begin 1507
13 25 7/13/1992 11/21/1995 Rabin 1194
93 Only one Israeli government is officially considered as a caretaker, i.e., the Sixth Israeli government inaugurated in 
6/25/1955 under Shared and lived 126 days until an election was held.
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f. Plausible Theory
We turn our theory that was established in chapter 2 and diagramed in Figure 3.1 
into a plausible theory to be inductively analyzed and possibly refined and revised. 
Restated, our theory suggests two relevant stages crucial for understanding coalition 
stability: formation and duration. In the formation process structural variables such as 
competition as well as event pressure variables are thought to determine the size and 
ideological parameter of the coalition. Increasing competition and event pressures press 
coalitions toward consensual formations where size and ideological parameters are 
enlarged and widened. In the duration process, structured variables serve in prolonging 
government life to the extent coalitions are most efficiently formed in the first place, i.e., 
the coalition formed smaller in size and tighter in ideological parameter is thought to last 
the longest. Another structural variable that impacts duration is competitiveness. 
Coalition systems that are more competitive would tend to be maintained more 
significantly than non-competitive systems. Event pressure variables are also important 
to durability; the greater the pressure the shorter the duration of the government.
g. Criteria for Case Evaluation
As suggested by George the principal strategy of this research is to implement the 
same questions to be investigated in each case and ‘class’ of cases under study, allowing 
a final controlled comparison evaluation. Questions for each case are formulated to 
address three distinct phenomena. First we need to understand the pre-formation 
conditions. Toward that that purpose we design our questions to evaluate the impact of 
both structural and event pressure variables on the formative size and ideological
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parameter of the coalition. Second the questions are designed to examine the impact of 
early formation and event pressure variables on duration. Lastly, the questions aim to 
reveal the impact of the later event pressures to examine the ongoing changes of events’ 
pressure on government’s durability. In other words, the questions will measure whether 
the government duration was linked to aging or its ability to reduce event pressures 
(Table 3.17).
This design will allow us to set the stage for comparative analysis first between 
short-lived and long-lived coalitions and then between pre-1969 and post-1969 coalition 
systems if necessary. This is done in order to answer the fundamental research questions 
as to whether systematic or events’ pressure determines coalition formation and duration, 
which is more significant in determining formation and duration, and whether event 
pressure gain momentum in coalition termination as they age (Table 3.17).
Table 3.17: Question for the Comparative Case Study of Israeli Coalitions94
Structure: How and why is the coalition structurally formed? (Size, Ideology, and Competitiveness) 
Economics as Event Pressure: Is the country facing economic growth or decline before formation, after 
formation, and at termination?
Immigration as Event Pressure: Is the country facing immigration increase or decline before formation, 
after formation, and at termination?
External Developments as Event Pressure: Is the country facing external pressure before formation, after 
formation, and at termination?
94 Details about measuring and analyzing these questions have been discussed in the previous sections 
regarding qualitative variables’ definitions and measures.
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CHAPTER 4
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this chapter a quantitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition 
formation and duration. The data were analyzed as to reveal the relationship between 
coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures. 
The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel 
was founded. A multivariate linear regression (OLS) and a robust regression analysis 
were conducted to show the significance of the models developed in chapter 2. While the 
models were not found significant, partly in light of small population of cases, certain key 
variables did emerge, as trend analysis also showed that the dominant party power index 
has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of strikers per strike 
increased over the years. These changes in trends became apparent since 1969. Thus, the 
need for a qualitative comparative approach emerges in order to examine our models in 
light of each separate historic period while analyzing a small number of cases.
Data Analysis:
The purpose of this chapter is to implement multiple linear regression analysis in 
order to establish the existing relationship between coalition formations and duration 
variables with event pressure and structural electoral factors. After compiling the data for 
twenty-eight cases representing all Israeli coalition governments established between 
1949 and 1999, a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first 
stage we regressed the independent variables on the size and then on the ideological
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parameter of the coalitions as the dependent variables. This is done in order to measure 
the significance of our theoretical models (Chapter 2) in accounting for coalition 
formation tendencies.. We call this stage coalition formation analysis.
In the second stage, ‘duration’ or the number of days the coalition spent in office 
became the dependent variable. We regressed independent variables, which included the 
number of seats (size) and ideological parameter (ideology) of the coalition, on duration. 
This was done in two steps: first we regressed the model using first year events data so 
as to determine first year event pressures on the life of government in days; secondly we 
regressed the last year event pressures data as to determine last year events’ effect on the 
life and demise of government. Potential differences between first year and last year’s 
independent variables on cabinets’ duration should provide indication as to which 
variables impact the process of aging. We call this stage coalition duration analysis.
It is important to note that regression analysis provides a measure of association 
rather than an affirmation of causation. The major pitfalls of our bivariate and multiple 
regression analyses were that our measurement of association was based on a relatively 
small number of cases (N=28) with seven independent variables in the formation analysis 
and nine independent variables in the durational analysis. With such a small N and such a 
large number of independent variables a lack in the degrees of freedom will be present. 
Some cases were dismissed during statistical analysis due to the lack of unemployment 
data during early years of government formations. This further contributed to the 
decreasing size of our already small number of cases and represented another shortfall for
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any generalization we could have made in regard to the regression results. As one 
remedy for this, the weakly associated independent unemployment variable was dropped 
from the analyses in efforts to identify the largest associations.95
In addition, the analysis assumes linear relations among the variables, a situation 
that might not pertain especially in looking at duration since variables might have more 
impact on mid-range than long or short coalitions. Some variables associated with the 
annual number of immigration per population and average number of strikers per strike 
also revealed skewed distributions. This was corrected by implementing logarithmic 
scales for these data. In order to further remedy such problem we implemented the robust 
regression technique in STATA. The major advantage of ‘robust regression’ in our data 
analysis over OLS is its ability to lessen the influence of outliers while analyzing a small 
number of cases (Hamilton, 1992; p. 185).96 Both OLS and Robust regression analyses 
were implemented, as to compare results. However, we favored the robust regression 
results due to the better capacity of this approach in handling small N size. Nonetheless 
and regardless of the statistical application used it remained difficult to assert any 
quantitative generalization.
Examining the Findings
We examined our data in two ways. First, we observed the historic trends in each 
variable throughout the various years prior to government formation. Trend analysis
95 Although coefficients may be unbiased they are likely to have large standard errors and lack the 
important property o f robustness— that is, their size and even the signs o f  the coefficients may change with 
small changes in specification (deleting or adding one independent variable) or small changes in the sample 
(adding or deleting a single case).
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provided directional projection for variables over time. Secondly, we conducted 
bivariate and a multiple regression analyses for our models in order to examine their 
significance based on the data prior to government formation, first year of government 
formation, and by the last year before government termination.
A. Trends:
The dependent variables this study attempt to explain are: coalition size, coalition 
ideological parameter, and coalition duration. Although no significant trend emerged out 
of these variables some trend variation can be observed. For example, duration of 
governments slightly increased over the years and duration in post-69 governments 
became more extreme, fluctuating from very short to very long duration cabinets (Figure 
4.1). This suggests a shift in the formative requirements and/or event pressure on post-69 
coalitions, an issue that we will further examine. In Chapters 5 and 6 we analyze the 
changes in coalition politics and conclude that after 1969 coalitions needed to cope with 
increasing competition and the change associated with external and economic pressures. 
Such a change required durable coalitions to form small and tight at low level of external 
pressure and large and wide at high external pressure.
96 See Hamilton, Lawrence C. “Regression with Graphics” (Belmont: Wadsworth Inc.) 1992.
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Figure 4.1: Government Duration in Days 1949-2000
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Data Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il
Coalitions’ size slightly decreased over the years, again fluctuating more after 
1969 (Figure 4.2). Coalitions appear to have shifted from mainly large sized formations 
(65-90 seats) in the pre-1969 period to either very large or very small post-1969 
coalitions (less than 65 or more than 90 seats). Most largely formed coalitions, 
particularly before 1969, responded to high level of economic pressure as well as low 
level of competition, a conclusion that we will discuss in Chapter 7. However, in the 
post-1969 period formation became increasingly sensitive to external pressure, large 
formations during situations of external tension and small formations during times of low 
external pressure. Such formations, we will further suggest, have contributed to lasting 
coalitional alliances.
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Figure 4.2: Israeli Coalition Governments’ Knesset’s Size 1949-1999
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Data Source: Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make Up”: www.knesset.gov.il. 2003.
Coalitions’ ideological parameters do not appear to have changed much over the 
years. Ideological perspective of the dominant party remained close to that of coalitions 
partners and became more consistently closer in recent years. This illustrates that 
ideological closeness was necessary between the dominant party and coalition members 
for any government to be formed. By the sixteenth and twentieth ruling coalitions (1974 
And 1983), wide ideological differences between the dominant party and its partners led 
to very short-lived governments (Figure 4.3).97 Increase in competition seems to have 
necessitated tight formation contrary to our proposition. Domestic and foreign pressures 
in post-1969 period appear to have had a polarizing impact on coalitions; thus
97 The sixteenth government was headed by M eir and lasted only 90 days while the twentieth government was headed 
by Shamir and lasted 338 days.
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necessitating close rank among alliances. This is another result supporting our null 
hypotheses.
Figure 4.3: Israeli Governments’ Ideological Parameters, 1949-1999',98
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Data Source: The Principle Guidelines of the Government of Israel (PGG).
Three of the independent variables examined in the model appeared to have 
significantly changed through time, and 1969 emerged as a watershed in each category." 
First is the government’s ruling dominant party power index, representing the party’s
98 Ideological parameter o f each coalition government was obtained by content coding the policy statem ent 
of each government entitled “The Principle Policy Guidelines o f  the Government”. The Policy Program o f  
the dominant party in each government was also content coded. The difference between the government 
position and that o f the dominant party represents a policy space difference that we label as ideological 
parameter. For further measures and discussion see Chapter 3.
99W e consider a “significant” trend emerging over time when R 2, in a scaterplot that places consecutive 
governments on the y-axis, sores higher than .50 (suggesting steep linear change in relationship over the 
time). See Scatterplot Appendix D: Regression by Government. Other variables appear to have a positive 
or a negative trend over the years, however, the “significances” o f  such trends were considered low  due 
their respective low R2 score.
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ability to form coalitions relative to other parties. A consistent decline in this index is 
evident after 1969 indicating a shift in the Israeli political system toward fragmentation 
and competitiveness (Figure 4.4). This fragmentation emerged after a series of setbacks 
for Mapai and the labor parties starting with the Lavon affair.100 This episode divided 
the leadership of Mapai and fostered the situation of splinter movements among its ranks. 
Further fragmentation emerged after the 1967 War, paving the way for territorial and 
settler movements that further divided traditional ideological camps over the future of the 
Occupied Territories (Isaac, 1984).
Other aspects of fragmentation have been observed in the decline of ideological 
parties in favor of ethnic politics. This pattern emerged strongly in Israel following the 
arrival of the Soviet Jews in the 1990s and the rise of Israeli Ba’aliah. In the same 
period, Sephardic discontent with traditional ideological parties found its way in the 
formation and growth of Shas. The propositions made in this study predicted that such an 
increase in fragmentation and competition would yield larger-accommodating and more 
durable governments (See Figure 2.4 for illustration).
100 In July 1954 Egypt was plagued by series o f  bombs directed against American and British interests in 
Cairo. Islamisist groups were the suspect o f  responsibility. It was later discovered, however, that these 
bombs were the work o f  Israeli intelligence, orchestrated by Colonel Benyamin Givli and aimed at 
widening the wedge between the government o f Egypt and both the U.S. and British administrations. 
Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, G ivili’s boss, was accused o f having link to this plot. Investigation to this 
affair raked the Labor bloc into bitter internal dispute and continued to the early 1970s. This scandal came
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Figure 4.4: Dominant Party Power Index 1949-1999101
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Data Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il. Calculation of the power of the 
leading government party was based on Banzhaf, John. F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Does not Work: A Mathematical 
Analysis." Rutgers Law Review 35.
to be known as the Lavon Affair (See David Hirst, “The Gun and the Olive Branch” (Futura Publications: 
1977, 1984).
101 Four post-1969 governm ents em erged am id a noticeable rise in the dom inant party pow er index: the 14th 
and 15th governments (.99%) as well as the 25th and 26th cabinets (74.3%). The 14th and 15th governments 
were formed following the election o f the 7th Knesset where almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment 
(56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition bloc to 
make alliance with. Therefore when Benzhaf power index calculation was made regardless of ideological 
consideration, the Alignment power index to form a winning coalition scored high. However, if ideological 
consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short of a ruling 
majority. Likewise, both 25th and 26th governments were formed during the 13th Knesset and led by the 
Labor Party who controlled 44 seats (34.7%). The numeric power gain o f  Labor in the 13* Knesset 
indicated an increased in its capacity to form a winning coalition. However, a closer look into aspects that 
stretched beyond the electoral strength in the distribution o f  seats among the 13th K nesset’s parties may 
reveal otherwise. Particularly if we examine the various ideological orientations of the parties we will find 
that ideological partners to a Labor-led coalition were very limited. Only M eretz (12 seats) emerged as an 
ideologically close partner to Labor. Taking ideological consideration in coalition formation, the power 
index o f  Labor in both 25th and 26th governments would have been undermined. In fact both 25th and 26th
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The second trend change is found for foreign aid (Figure 4.5). Foreign assistance 
to Israel in early statehood was based primarily on German reparations, which amounted 
between 60 and 80-million U.S. dollars annually.102 Subsequently, aid to Israel has grown 
tremendously, particularly with U.S. assistance after the Camp David Accords. Post- 
1969, military and economic aid to Israel came to exceed two billion U.S. dollars 
annually.103 This represented a great improvement over the pre-69 period where annual 
aid amounted to less than one-billion U.S. dollars (Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.5: Foreign Aid to Israel in Millions of Dollars 1949-1999104
W 6000.00
C  ;O
2
c
T3
<
C
09
©
Ou.
«
3
Cc
<
5000.00 :
4000.00 -
3000.00 -j
2000.00 -
1000.00
00
§
o CMLO LO to
o C)
1
COCO
o l
1 2 3 4
•*t i to to I lOr> o5 
cS
6
I \
Ml
CO : T- m ! in CD : to I® ss toi ^
05 05 r- CD
. ..
CD CO ! o CM LO CD o>CD CO £ 5 CO 59 SS 5 05 P 05LO CD CD 05 2? O CD o CM CD s cov— CO c3 T— CO CM CM CM T— fs.
Csl c5 O 05 O Csl CD N T- CO
T ~ T- T" T-
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Governm ent's Formation Date
Data Source: Jewish Online Research Center, www.Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html, “U.S. Assistance to Israel.”
Labor-led governments struggled to maintain majority support in the 13th Knesset, while forming as 
minimum winning coalitions controlling less than half o f  the 13th Knesset.
102 In constant dollars. Kimche, Jon “Israel in 1965” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 208, No. 5; pages 60-65. November 
1961
103 In constant dollars.
104 Figures are adjusted to 1995 inflation index.
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The increase of U.S. aid to Israel (and Egypt) signaled Washington’s growing role 
in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly after the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War. A U.S. -  Israeli strategic alliance was further solidified following the U.S. 
sponsored Camp David Accords that eliminated Egypt as a major Arab threat against 
Israel.
After Camp David, U.S. assistance remained very crucial for Israel’s military and 
economic wellbeing. As posited in the model, foreign assistance can reduce external 
pressure, thus relaxing conditions for consensus and helping prolong government 
duration. Thus in light of this trend we would expect smaller-based coalitions and 
governments of longer duration after 1969.
A third major change is evident in the number of strikers per strike in Israel, an 
indicator of potential social disruption which could threaten governments’ longevity. 
Major strikes became frequent through time reflecting Israel’s industrial development and 
consequently greater labor disputes. Again post-69 Israel witnessed greater intensity in 
labor strikes reflected in larger number of strikers per strikes than that in the pre-1969 
period (Figure 4.6). This might have reflected or contributed to Likud’s growing political 
power, and the attendant policy changes that might have threatened trade unions and 
Labor Party status.
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Figure 4.6: Annual Strikers per Strike 1949-1999105
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il 
for data since 1996.
According to our theoretical propositions, increase in labor strife should have 
been a factor in the establishment of large or accommodating coalitions. Furthermore, 
the increase in such a pressure is expected to have led to shorter duration coalition 
governments after 1969.
No significant trend was evident in other independent variables, suggesting a 
relative political and economic stability in the country.106 Severity of external conflicts 
variable, for example, shows that since its establishment Israel continued to exist in an 
environment of conflict and confrontation. Coexistence between Israel and the
105 R2 value was improved from .55 to .81 when we plotted the log value o f  the number o f strikers per 
strike.
106 Scatterplots for the rest o f  the variables revealed very low values o f  R.
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Palestinians often entailed violence. Israel’s military engagements with the surrounding 
Arab countries saw outbreaks of wars or collective violence approximately every five to 
ten years (Figure 4.7). It must be recognized, however, that the Arab states’ collective 
military and security threat against Israel has tremendously declined over the years, 
particularly after 1967 and 1973 Wars. The signing of the various peace agreements 
between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority as well as the beginning path 
of normalization between Israel and most Arab States contributed to an increasing 
expectation of peace and security. Yet, despite security gains, Israel’s sensitivity to 
external and then internal pressure after 1969 grew tremendously. As we will later reveal 
in Chapter 6, foreign or security policy became a source of greater polarization and 
division among Israelis, leading in one instance to the assassination of a Prime Minister 
(Rabin).
Thus, we find that the severity of conflict remained relatively high throughout the 
history of Israeli coalitions, yet its impact on coalition formation and duration became 
more prominent in later governments, as we will show in both our multiple regression 
analysis and throughout our qualitative case study Chapters 5 and 6. We will further 
demonstrate that larger coalitions, forming amid high level of external conflict, lasted 
longer than smaller coalitions.
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Figure 4,7: Severity of External Conflicts Confronted by Israeli Governments 1949-1999107
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Data Source: Casualties and Conflicts: D. Singer’s “Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992), The Jewish 
Online Research Center -  Jewish Virtual Library” www. Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html : “Israeli Casualties in 
Battle.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website, “Timeline of Events: Half a Century of Independence 1948-1998. 
www.mfa.go.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH00ul0. VJ.N. Resolutions: Jewish Virtual Library
http://www.iewishviruallibrarv.org/isouroe/UN/stoc.html and http://www. ievvishvirualli brarv.org
/isource/UN/gatoc.html compiled from he Avalon Project: http://www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon.
Other variables showed slight trends over the years. Noticeable increase in 
Israel’s GDP occurred over the years and by the 1990s exceeded that of its neighboring 
countries combined. Thus Israel had the capabilities to take an economic leadership 
position in the region, and to support its military establishment, but lacked the political 
legitimacy to reach regional leadership potential. This fact had political implications for 
Israeli governments, and for the origin of desired peace accords as well. Annual changes 
in GDP slightly declined over the years, again suggesting relative economic stability. In
107 See Chapter 3 for severity o f  external conflict definition and scale.
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the post-69 period, annual average changes in GDP declined to less than + or - 4% while 
scoring above + or - 4% before 1969 (Figure 4.8).
These patterns suggest that, in accordance with our theoretical propositions, the 
decline in economic pressure over the years has potentially contributed to smaller and 
more durable coalition formations.
Figure 4.8; Annual Change in Israeli GDP 1949-1999
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il 
for data since 1996.
Israel’s e annual unemployment rate slightly increased across time. Israel’s 
development into a major economic industrial country and a world mini-economic power 
helped establish a relatively large labor force and demand. In earlier years, most labor 
was agriculturally oriented around the Kibbutz and similar collectivities. With
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industrialization, labor dislocation emerged with more people moving to industrial 
centers and reporting employment status.108 (Figure 4.9). This trend of increased annual 
unemployment is matched by the increasing rate of annual strikers per strike (Figure 4.6). 
Both variables reflect certain economic dislocation as a direct consequence of growing 
industrialization in the country. The predicted impact of such dislocation on the 
formation and maintenance of governments would be increasing pressures leading to 
larger but less durable governments.
Figure 4.9: Annual Unemployment Rate by Israeli Governments 1949-1999
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il 
for data since 1996.
108 Also a growing num ber o f poor can be recorded, which is another problem associated with growing 
industrialization. In 1998, for exam ple, the number o f poor reached 18% o f the population during high 
industrial growth, (see Jewish Virtual Libray: http://www.israeltour.org/jsource/vitaltoc.html)
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The last trend variable is annual number of immigrants per population. Despite 
significant immigration from the USSR and Ethiopia, the annual per capita figure slightly 
declined over the years (Figure 4.10). This was measured in order to record the pressure 
immigrants might have exerted on the country as a whole relative to its entire population. 
The size of the population becomes relevant in this regard. There could be a 
tremendous drop in Israeli immigrants in the future particularly after the pool of Russian 
immigrants has been drained.109
Figure 4.10: Annual Immigration and Immigration per Population Rate by Israeli Governments 
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract o f Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il 
for data since 1996.
109 See the distribution o f the Jewish population around the world in the Jewish Virtual Library: 
http://www.israeltour.org/jsource/vitaltoc.html. Also see projected population change in Statistical Abstract of Israel.
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Figure 4.10: Approximate Number of Immigrants by Israeli Governments 1949-1999110
350,000 -    -
soo.ooo IlilllllM llIlllllillllB lM
c  250,000 4 I \  ■
•2 200, 000 - i * \ A
I  150,000 1 M  ' * A | i I 1
I  100,000 -j \ ^  A J y  \
~  50,000 -j \  I f  \  /  y  i
-50,00cpi)0- - ■ 5.00 ■ - ■ 10.00 - - 15.00....... 20.00  25.00 - 3Ch00
Government
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for data since 1996.
Approximate number of immigrants during governments’ time in power is also 
demonstrated in figure 4.10 with no apparent trend. Immigration pressure appears to 
have been periodically renewed throughout the history of Israeli governments. Both 
governments formed before and after 1969 encountered periodical change in 
immigration, although none so great as in the wave of Russian immigration of the early 
1990s. This fluctuation, it will be later revealed in our regression and qualitative 
analyses, has been partially responsible for the variant impacting pressure on the 
formation of coalition and duration of the coalition. Immigration pressure, it will be
110 The number of immigrants per government was not a straightforward measure, since every government 
may begin in the middle o f the year and terminate in the same year or in the middle o f the following year. 
The number o f immigrants is calculated annually. Therefore, we approximated the number o f immigrants 
per government by calculating the proportion o f government stay in power in a particular year and 
multiplying that proportion by the total number o f  immigrants for the same year. Then we added all annual 
proportions o f immigrants that responded to the total annual proportions o f  government’s time in office. 
This is done in order to obtain an approximation to the total number o f immigrants who entered the country 
while the government was serving office.
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revealed, has been partially responsible over the downsizing of cabinet formation and the 
shortening of the coalition duration.
B. Examining the Models
The models proposed in Chapter 2 suggested that there are two important 
components to coalition formation that need to be explained: the size and the ideological 
parameter of the governing alliance.111 Explanatory variables selected in the models 
were mainly of two types. The first are of structural nature and measure the 
competitiveness of each Knesset as reflected in the power of the dominant party to form 
winning alliances. The second set of independent variables indicates external and 
internal political pressures exerted on coalition after formation and at termination 
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). It was originally hypothesized that competitiveness as well as 
political pressures press political parties to form large alliances and wide accommodating 
policy programs (Figure 2.1).
Our trend analysis points in various directions:
>  First, we observed a stochastic decline in dominant party power index, suggesting 
higher competition, and expecting larger and durable formations.
> The observed increase in foreign assistance undermines external pressure and, 
thus, we expected small coalition formations of long durations.
> Increase in the number of strikers per strike presented expectation for larger but 
less durable formations.
1,1 Definition and measures o f  both size and ideological parameter is discussed in details in chapter 3.
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Therefore, because various factors may have different impact on governments’ 
formation and duration, the trend of both formation and duration variables alone cannot 
show patterns corresponding to the combined impact of independent variables, seen in 
Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. The only quantitative way to reveal the various directional 
impacts of each independent variable in shaping the formation and the duration of the 
governments is to conduct bivariate correlation as well as a multivariate regression 
analysis.
Based on the formation data, and after plotting the variables against the 
coalition’s ideological parameter and then the number of coalition seats (size), our 
bivariate analysis did not produce any statistically significant result Duration analysis, on 
the other hand, had one significant correlate, i.e., severity of external conflict a year prior 
to government termination. In a two-tailed test it showed significant correlation with 
durable governments of .49 at the .01 level.112 This suggested that with N=28 the 
increase in the severity of external conflict a year prior to government termination was 
associated with prolonging governments.
Our OLS model produced reasonably significant results in predicting coalition’s 
size but not ideological parameter. The model predicted the number of coalition’s seats 
(44% of variance) at a significance level of .06, and ideological parameter (35% of 
variance) only at a significance level of .17 as seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.3). In either case, 
the model failed to explain at least 50% of the variance in the dependent variables.
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In terms of individual predictor variables, in OLS regression only one 
independent variable in each analysis showed significance relationship with our 
dependent variables. A unit-increase in the level o f external severity o f conflict was 
nearly significantly associated at a .063 level with a 6.61 increase in ideological 
parameter scores while holding other variables constant (Table 4.1). This result 
supported our proposition that external pressure undermines or suppresses the policy 
differences between political parties resulting in a broader government policy program.
By the same token, for OLS analysis of coalition size (Table 4.3), only the annual 
percent of immigrants per population appeared to have a significant and negative impact 
on number of coalition seats in formative decision making. Indeed this was a highly 
significant association, and the entire model was quite significant as well, though not 
especially strong in accounting for overall variance in coalition size.
These findings were partly upheld and partly contradicted in robust regression 
analysis (Tables 4.2 and 4.4). Robust analysis did not support the significance of external 
conflict for coalition ideological parameters. Instead robust regression showed, in the 
only significant relationship, that a unit-increase in the log o f annual number o f strikers 
per strike is strongly associated at a .01 level with a 6.29 decrease in ideological 
parameter while all other variables were held constant (Table 4.2). This finding 
supports the null hypothesis 2, indicating contrary to Robertson (1984), that internal 
‘event pressure’ intensifies the divergence in policy positions, thus exerting pressure 
toward smaller and narrower alliances as it becomes more difficult and ultimately
112 See Bivariate Analysis Appendix.
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infeasible to bridge the ideological or policy preference gaps in forming governments 
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).
The robust overall model for the number of seats did not reach significance. 
However, as with OLS, the annual percent of immigrants per population appeared to have 
a significant (negative) coefficient, while the rest of the variables were held constant 
(Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Both in the OLS and Robust analysis showed similar significance 
levels, with the robust analysis suggesting that a percentage increase in the log o f annual 
immigrants per population is associated with 8.86 decrease in the number o f coalition 
seats with all other variables held constant (Table 4.4). This finding supports the null 
hypothesis 2 that immigrant pressure flares partisan differences and instigates alliances to 
form smaller and closer ranks (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).
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Table 4.1
OLS Regression Analysis of Ideological Paramei ter(n= 26)113
Independent Variable B Sb t sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index -0.23 0.33 -0.68 0.50
Severity o f Conflict 6.62 3.36 1.97 0.06**
Foreign Aid 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.95
GDP change year to year -125.67 75.62 -1.66 0.11
Log o f  Number o f  Immigrants as 
Percent of Population
1.40 3.08 0.46 0.65
Log o f  Number of Strikers Per Strike -6.74 4.07 -1.65 0.12
R2 = .35 12.41 0.17
Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.2
Robust Regression Analysis of Ideological Parameter (n= 26)
Independent Variable B Sb t sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index -0.11 0.17 -0.61 0.55
Severity of Conflict 0.99 1.76 0.56 0.58
Foreign Aid 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.67
GDP change year to year -65.50 39.72 -1.65 0.12
Log o f  Number o f Immigrants as 
Percent o f Population
1.09 1.62 0.67 0.51
Log o f  Number of Strikers Per Strike -6.29 2.14 -2.94 0.01***
Constant 60.09 22.60 2.66 0.02
F(6,19) = 4.33 Prob= 0.Q1114
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
113 28 cases were examined. However, the lack o f  official statistic data on GNP in early years is 
responsible for lowering the analysis to 26 cases.
114 Prob>F (6,19) = 0.01 indicates that the F test, which is a test for the overall linear relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent variable with F(6,19) means six degrees o f freedom in the 
numerator (that’s the number o f independent variables that we have), 19 degrees o f freedom in the 
denominator (that’s n-k-1 or 26-6-1=19), a significant probability for a linear relationship exists (4.33) 
between the x ’s and the y.
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Table 43
OLS Regression Analysis of Number of Coalition’s Seats (n= 26)
Independent Variable B sb t sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index 0.54 0.34 1.60 0.13
Severity o f  Conflict 2 .3  2 3.44 0.67 0.51
Foreign Aid 0.00 0.00 -0.62 0.55
GDP change year to year -16.62 77.54 -0.21 0.83
Log o f  Number o f Immigrants as 
Percent o f Population
-9.18 3.16 -2.91 0.01***
Log o f Number o f  Strikers Per Strike -0.70 4.18 -0.17 0.87
R2 = 0.44 12.73 0.06*
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.4
Robust Regression Analysis of Number of Seats(n= 26)
Independent Variable B sb t sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index 0.53 0.39 1.36 0.19
Severity o f Conflict .2.40 3.93 0.61 0.55
Foreign Aid .-0.00 0 .0 0 -0.51 0.62
GDP change year to year -11.50 88.49 -0.13 0.90
Log o f  Number o f  Immigrants as 
Percent of Population
-8.86 3.60 -2.46 0.02**
Log o f  Number of Strikers Per Strike -1.10 4 .7 7 -0.23 0.82
Constant 36.65 50.35 0.73 0.48
F(6,19) = 1.87 Prob= 0.14m
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Our theoretical formation models were based on various hypothetical propositions 
drawn from the coalition literary traditions (Chapter 2). The first hypothesis predicted
115 Weak linear relationship between the xs and the y.
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large and ideologically wide coalitions corresponding to high coalition competition. We 
found no quantitative evidence for such an assertion as party competition increased after 
1969, and thus we were not able to confirm or reject Mershon’s thesis (1996, 2001). 
This posed a new dilemma for our models, particularly in analyzing whether 
competitiveness had distinct impact on formation before and after 1969. In order to 
examine such a proposition, we must divide our population into two sets of coalitions 
consisting of governments formed before and after 1969. This will leave us with 13 
governments for the first set and 15 for the second. Due to such a small population size 
comparative case study analysis will be necessary to examine such a proposition, an 
approach we will explore in the following chapter.
The second aspect of our coalition formation models proposed that coalitions are 
formed larger and ideologically wider when confronted with mounting domestic and 
external pressures (hypothesis 2, Chapter 2). This proposition was partially contradicted 
by our robust regression analysis where the increase in the number of strikers per strike 
was found to be significantly associated with tight ideological parameters (rejecting 
Robertson; 1984, 1986). The null hypothesis was further asserted in both our OLS and 
robust regressions where increased immigration pressure was significantly associated 
with smaller-sized coalitions. Our hypothesis was only confirmed in OLS analysis with 
regard to increasing external pressure having positive effect on the ideological parameter 
of the coalition. Coalitions’ policy positions, our OLS model suggested, became 
accommodating to various ideological perspectives as external conflict pressure on the 
country mounts. Overall, however, in dealing with ideology, the robust model was quite
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1 4 2
significant, though modestly powerful, and featured the effects of strikes in narrowing 
coalition parameters.
Predicting coalition size in our formation model indicated some validity for the 
combined propositions (including null hypotheses). The size model appeared nearly 
significant, though at a modest level of variance explained (R2=44%) in OLS but not the 
robust regression analysis. Once again, trend analysis revealed shifts in important 
characteristics of Israeli polity, which necessitate careful examination of coalition 
behaviors while taking historic transformations into account. As our annual number of 
strikers per strike and unemployment trends revealed, a dramatic increase began to take 
shape following 1969 (Figure 4.3). This necessitates a qualitative comparative analysis of 
our formation model for the periods before and after 1969.
As for the duration model proposed in Chapter 2, it was suggested that explaining 
ruling coalitions’ duration involves two sets of independent explanatory variables. The 
first set involves systematic structural variables entailing parliamentary competitiveness, 
coalition size, and coalition ideological parameter. It was hypothesized that ‘efficient 
formation,’ i.e., smaller size and tighter ideological parameter; contribute to extended 
duration (Chapter 2, hypotheses 5 and 6). It was also proposed that party system 
competitiveness prolongs duration (Chapter 2, hypothesis 4). The second set of 
independent variables includes event pressure indicators (Chapter 2, Figure 2.3). It was 
argued that pressure upon formation or increasing change in pressure before termination 
shortens the durability of the coalition (Chapter 2, hypothesis 3).
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An OLS analysis of data obtained the first year after government formation 
accounted for a modest 22% of variance in duration (Table 4.5) and with a generally 
insignificant confidence level. Dealing with individual predictors, and implementing 
OLS, no significant correlation was found between the examined independent variables 
and coalition duration.
However, when we use robust regression analysis the overall model appears as 
highly significant, and the dominant party power index emerges as a significant predictor 
of duration. Robust regression shows that a percentage increase in the power index of 
the dominant party was associated with 33.21 days increase in the duration o f the 
government (Table 4.6). This implies that the years of lower party competition saw 
longer duration coalitions. This finding contradicts hypothesis 4, which claimed that 
coalition longevity was associated with higher level of competition. This result also 
supported Grofman and Roozentaal’s (1997) thesis against Mershon’s (1996) view. 
Neither the size nor the ideological parameter appeared to be significantly relevant to 
duration analysis (Hypotheses 5 and 6, Chapter 2). Nonetheless, as has been previously 
discussed, we still must further examine such hypotheses in light of important 
institutional and historic developments as revealed by our trend analysis, which showed a 
dramatic increase in competition as well as changes in coalitions’ size and ideological 
parameters following 1969 national election (Figure 4.1, 4.5, 4.6).
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Robust Regression also reveals the significance of outside aid in prolonging 
governments; each one million U.S. dollars increase in foreign aid is associated with a 
0.21 day increase in the duration of the coalition (Table 4.6). This finding supports 
hypothesis 3 which proposed that government longevity is associated with the decline in 
event pressures or increased resources. In this case, increase of foreign assistance 
indicates a decrease in external pressures (perhaps signaling favorable international 
circumstances), and therefore tended to prolong the duration of the ruling coalition.116 
This finding supports the logic of Browne’s proposition (1984, 86, 88) where duration is 
viewed as a function of declining event pressure. Nonetheless, acceptance of such a 
proposition also requires a qualitative comparative examination to the shifting impact of 
the dramatic increase in foreign aid on duration after 1969 (Figure 4.2).
116 O f course increasing aid opens the way for subsequently increased foreign pressure on Israel as the aid 
donor can conceivably move to withdraw the aid if Israel did not cooperate.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
145
Table 4 5
OLS Regression Analysis of Governm ent’s Days Based on One Year 
After Form ation Data (n= 27)
Independent Variable b sb T sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index 11.17 11.70 -0.66 0.52
Severity o f  Conflict 25.17 101.24 0.96 0.35
Foreign Aid 0.02 0.07 0.25 0.81
GDP change year to year -2802.12 2347.55 0.30 0.77
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as 
Percent o f Population
16.65 126.65 -1.19 0.25
Log o f  Number o f  Strikers Per Strike 125.30 140.38 0 13 0.90
Number o f  Coalition Seats 2.44 7.35 0 89 0 38
Ideological Parameter -6.12 6.91 0 33 0 74
R2 = .22 413.85 0.74
♦Correlation is significant at the 0,1 level (2-tailed). 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.6
Robust Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on One Year 
After Formation Data (n= 27)
Independent Variable b sb T sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index 33.21 8.72 3.81 0.00***
Severity o f Conflict 94.10 75.51 1.25 0.23
Foreign Aid 0.21 0.05 4.00 0.00***
GDP change year to year -1245.08 1751.01 -0.71 0.49
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as 
Percent o f  Population
40.77 94.47 0.43 0.67
Log o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike 172.52 104.71 1.65 0.12
Number o f  Coalition Seats 3.32 5.48 0.61 0.55
Ideological Parameter -3.30 5.15 -0.64 0.53
Constant -3565.44 1152.91 -3.09 0.01
F(8,18) = 4.28 Prob= 0.005
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0 01 level (2-tailed).
Neither the OLS nor the robust regression models revealed significant association 
between events pressures a year prior to government termination and the coalition
117 Strong linear relationship exiting between the xs and the y.
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duration (Table 4.7 and 4.8). Furthermore no significant correlation was evident between 
individual predictors and the dependent variable. Unlike some of the trend or bivariate 
correlation analyses, these results suggested that the last year events (e.g., external 
conflict) did not significantly impact the duration of the coalitions. In both analyses we 
found no strong evidence to support the ‘aging proposition’ stated in hypothesis 3 which 
predicted that the increase in pressures during a coalition’s office term contributed to its 
downfall (Browne, 1982, 84,86). Only in our previous bivariate analysis did we find 
indication supporting such a proposition where the deterioration of external conflict at 
government’s end year was found to be associated with longer duration coalitions.118 It 
appeared logical to conclude that as the coalition ages in power external shocks became 
significantly associated with its downfall, but we find no clear evidence of this in the 
regression analyses (though conflicts were the closest to significance in the regression 
models). Still, however, we need to qualitatively examine such a proposition in order to 
compare corresponding impacts on coalitions’ duration before and after 1969.
118 Deterioration in external conflict can include, as explained in Chapter 3, increase in casualties and/or the 
level o f  hostility with surrounding countries and/or U .N  condemnation to international practices. See table
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Table 4.7
OLS Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on the Year of
Term ination Data (n= 27)
Independent Variable b sb T sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index 7.09 8.75 0.81 0.43
Severity o f  Conflict 177.30 115.66 1.53 0.14
Foreign Aid 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.98
GDP change year to year -1066.79 1329.38 -0.80 0.43
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as 
Percent o f Population
-52.55 92.09 -0.57 0.58
Log o f  Number o f  Strikers Per Strike 62.60 134.09 0.47 0.65
Number o f  Coalition Seats -2.83 6.03 -0.47 0.65
Ideological Parameter -5.90 6.28 -0.94 0.36
R l  = 0.36 374.67 0.32
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 4.8
Robust Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on the Year of 
Termination Data (n= 27)
Independent Variable b sb t sig (2-tail)
Dominant Party Power Index 7.75 9.66 0.80 0.43
Severity o f  Conflict 193.65 128.69 1.50 0.15
Foreign Aid 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.90
GDP change year to year -0.75 1536.22 -0.34 0.74
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as 
Percent o f Population
-110.10 115.13 -0.96 0.35
Log o f Number of Strikers Per Strike 57.14 148.30 0.39 0.71
Number o f  Coalition Seats -3.69 6.73 0.59 0.59
Ideological Parameter -8.07 7.12 0.27 0.27
Constant -992.84 1381.49 -0.72 0.48
F (8 ,17)=  1.22 Prob= 0.35119
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
3.12.
119 Weak linear relationship existing between the xs and the y.
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Discussion
Some event variables appeared to significantly correlate with formation 
and duration analyses. Certain event pressure variables, such as labor disputes, appeared 
to have association with both formation and durational analyses. Labor disputes appeared 
to have driven a wedge between parties and increased the pressure for ideologically 
tighter formations. Also associated with such unexpectedly smaller coalitions was 
immigration pressure. External event pressure involved in conflicts, on the other hand, 
might have undermined policy differences and ideologically united distant parties. The 
structural variables did not reveal significant correlation with either dependent variable, 
suggesting perhaps greater impact of event pressure variables on formation analysis.
Durational analysis provided additional support to the significance of event 
variables in coalition behaviors. In our case, annual increase in foreign assistance 
positively impacted the duration of coalitions. Structural variables also appeared relevant 
to duration outcome. Increase in coalition competition emerged as negatively impacting 
the duration of the coalitions. No significant results were found that other structural or 
event variables significantly impacted coalition duration.
Furthermore, no significant evidence was found to support the aging thesis. Some 
evidences hinted that certain external shocks might have been associated with the 
downfall of ‘older’ or long-duration governments. Yet, dismissing systematic variables
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as well as other event pressure variables is premature before we have thoroughly 
reviewed cases in the following chapter.
Trend analysis suggested that differences exist in coalition behaviors before and 
after 1969. The trend plots showed increase in both foreign aid, unemployment, and the 
number of strikers per strikes over the years. Such increases were significantly sharpened 
after 1969, along with declining party power dominance scores. Other variables showed 
similar differences between the two periods, but in a less dramatic trend. These patterns 
suggested that Israel became further dependent on foreign aid particularly from the U.S., 
and therefore that its coalition behaviors conceivably became more linked with U.S. 
foreign policy. In addition, Israeli coalition behaviors became increasingly “industrial- 
labor” oriented reflecting the industrial growth of the country and the rise of “industrial 
politics” and the globalized, if somewhat more stable economy. Most importantly, 
however, to coalition behavior was the notable decline in dominant party’s power and, 
thus, the fragmentation of the coalition system toward a more competitive arrangement 
particularly seen after 1969. Immigration continued to be a significant aspect of coalition 
formation as well. The flow of immigration has contributed to increasing fragmentation 
in the Israeli system, polling partisanship toward greater ethnic divisions and, therefore, 
tighter alliances.
Other potentially important observations in our trend analysis suggested that, with 
the exception of wartime, the over-sized coalitions, which were the traditional formation 
before 1969, became less of a strategy for post-69 formations. Instead, small or minimum
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winning coalitions became more frequent. Furthermore, though almost all coalitions’ 
ideological parameters were relatively tight, this became more pronounced post-69.
This difference in variable patterns before and after 1969 presents new challenges to the 
proposed models. Perhaps it is the case that our models can be applied to one period 
more significantly than another. The only way to examine such a proposition is to further 
divide the population of governing Israeli coalitions into two sets for case study analysis.
In the following chapter a qualitative examination is, therefore, made. While a 
number of the factors cited in this chapter, such as strikes and immigration, are peculiarly 
relevant to Israeli politics, we will remember the overall categories of variables as 
structural or event based, so that general findings can be developed about the potency of 
these categories in predicting coalition size, ideology and duration in other countries as 
well.
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CHPATER5
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:
SHORT DURATION COALITION GOVERNMENTS
In this chapter a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition 
formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to 
examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ early breakups and 
terminations. The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided 
between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide 
comparative evidence to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred 
following 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include 
economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness 
of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure 
variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and 
the coalition’s ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in 
order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments.
The results of our examination to the four shortest lived Israeli governing 
coalitions reveal that economic pressure is directly associated with coalition formation. 
Coalitions are often formed on consensual basis (large-wide) when faced by high 
economic pressure while formed competitive (small-tight) when confronted by low 
economic pressure. In contrast to post-1969 period, economic pressure appeared to have 
been higher during early years of statehood formation. Such a condition was reflected in
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the different impact of competitiveness on the formation of coalition governments. Early 
coalitions were often formed consensual (large-wide) under conditions of low 
competition in contrast to competitive formation (small-tight) that emerged throughout 
the post-1969 era. Increase economic pressure during the lifespan of the government 
were evident in all short duration governments examined.
Overview
As seen in the quantitative results, Israel’s political history can be divided 
primarily into two distinct periods: the pre-1969 and the post-1969 eras (Arian, 1998). 
The earlier period was marked by the task of state political, economic and social 
formation. The second period, in contrast, was a period of consolidation, expansion, 
industrialization, and conquest (Perlmutter, 1985). The two periods in Israeli history 
resemble human growth from youth to adulthood. The early epoch was faught with 
uncertainties concerning the state of the economy, population demography, security, and 
the structure of government, posing great challenges to Israel’s very existence. When 
looking back to the early period Mosh Felber saw Israel’s history as “a story of recurring 
dangers and crisis threatening to destroy it.” (Felber, 1999). Two decades after its 
establishment, Israel emerged strong and mature. It was able to meet the challenges on 
many fronts achieving dramatic economic progress, meeting the need of a newly founded 
immigrant-based society, fielding the strongest military in the Middle East while 
achieving peace with major surrounding countries, and rooting a strong tradition of 
democratic government.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
From the beginning the greatest task facing the nation was that of governing. 
How could the Zionist parties with all their ideological and constituent differences align 
together and lead a durable government under tremendous foreign and domestic 
pressures? This challenge to the nation was answered by the ability of the different 
Zionist tendencies and factions to form stable and durable alliances while allowing voices 
of dissent to assemble and be heard. Charismatic leadership (example, David Ben 
Gurion) and dramatic events led to stretch coalitions that were inclusive of the various 
Israeli political spectra. National governments were often formed to confront war and 
threats against the State in 1948, 1955, 1967, 1982, and in 2000. Israeli democratic 
tradition was further expressed in its capacity to enhance the environment of political 
pluralism and toleration while reacting to changing environments. Political parties were 
divided among ideological groups forming and breaking alliances in response to 
changing political circumstances. In sum, Israeli democratic tradition was demonstrated 
in alliances’ formation and duration, which responded to changing political and social 
conditions that have confronted the nation.
The question that we aim to examine is how have the changing challenges to 
Israel impacted its political cabinet structure and process (formation and duration)? We 
examine this question while observing a shift in the political discourse of Israeli coalition 
politics from a pre to a post-1969 era. In the quantitative section of this study we noted 
that the making of coalitions in Israel after 1969 became subjugated to a more fragmented 
and competitive Knesset. We also observed that coalition politics in this period became 
less oriented to immediate external military threat. The U.S. political, economic, and
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military support to Israel following 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yum Kippur War 
increased many folds, thus adding to Israel’s regional security and potential for arms 
supplies (with some interruption in 1973). We also found that economic development in 
this period entailed rapid industrial growth, including an arms industry, leading to 
growing activities by labor for better living and working standards. While a major 
immigrant infusion took place first from Ethiopia and then Russia, this period also was 
known for a decline in the number of immigrants relative to the entire Israeli population.
The prospect of the case studies is to examine how these challenges shaped 
political alliances in both composition and dissolution for each period of time. For that 
purpose we discuss these challenges and their prospective consequences on coalitions’ 
formation and duration by comparing four shortest-lived to four longest-lived Israeli 
coalition governments. We further study the differences between both groups for the 
period before and after 1969. The coalition sample that we research is divided into two 
shortest-lived and two longest-lived coalitions for each period of time (Table 3.15 and 
Table 3.16).
In correspondence to the predictive models, the challenges (event pressures) 
examined in this study are related to: the economy, immigration, and external pressure. 
Each is briefly described for every government to answer the question proposed in 
Chapter 3, i.e., how each developed prior to formation, after formation, and at 
termination. Then we discuss for each government the structural dimension in order to 
answer how each coalition formed by size and ideological parameter while considering
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system (Knesset) competitiveness and details of political competition and decision­
making. Finally, we attempt to make association between the event pressures (economy, 
immigration, external pressure) along with structural variable (competitiveness) with 
coalition formation (size and ideological parameter). We compare the relationship by 
two levels: pre-post 1969 level and shortest-longest government duration level. Then, we 
examine the impact of changing event pressure on government duration in order to test 
for the aging thesis.
The 2nd Israeli Government, 1950-51
The 1st Israeli government collapsed as a direct consequence of economic
shortfalls. The introduction of austerity policy in March 1949 with aims of decreasing 
price and wage levels led to black marketeering and profiteering (Lann, 1996). The 
collapse of the 1st government occurred after Prime Minister Ben Gurion attempted to 
reshape the government in order to wage a long-range assault on black marketers. On 
October 3rd Mr. Ben Gurion announced that he had assumed all powers vested in the 
government in order to equip himself with the necessary authority to wage a campaign 
against black marketers. In a broadcast aired on the 3rd of October Mr. Ben Gurion 
warned merchants to surrende hidden stocks and declared severe punishment against 
violators. Ministers of the Religious Bloc withdrew from the coalition government in 
protest against the Prime Minister’s new vested power.120 As a consequence the 1st 
coalition government collapsed and Mr. Ben Gurion resigned on October 15,1950.
120 K eesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
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Mr. Ben Gurion, the head of the major dominant Mapai party in the Knesset, was 
asked by President Weizmann to form a new government on October 15, 1950. Mr. Ben 
Gurion proposed the formation of a caretaker minority administration pending election. 
His request, however, was rejected by the Knesset due primarily to the opposition of the 
Religious Bloc to join such an administration. Finally on October 25 a settlement was 
reached between Mapai and the Religious Bloc to form a coalition government until 
January 1953, when general elections were due to be held. The 2nd government was bom 
on October 30th after it received the confidence of the Knesset. The 2nd government 
resembled the first with the same partner parties. The only important revision, which 
indicated partial concessions by the Religious Bloc in favor of Mr. Ben Gurion, was the 
establishment of the Trade and Industry Ministry under Mr. Jaacov Geeri who was named 
by Ben Gurion.121
Economy:
On November 1, 1950 Mr. Ben Gurion addressed the Knesset declaring that 
economic controls and rationing would continue to be the aim of government policy 
together with measures to raise the standard of living. The new government received a 
vote of confidence by 69 votes to 42, with two abstentions.122 Prime Minister Gurion’s 
statement came amid mounting economic crisis facing the country.
121 K eesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
122 K eesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
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But the major economic difficulty faced Israel following independence was 
inflation. The annual inflation rate was in double digits increasing to 66% in 1952.123 In 
1950 unemployment was approximately at 7% and rising with increasing waves of 
incoming immigrants. Most of the workforce worked in agricultural settlements 
compared to only 3% today. Number of strikes and strikers increased for this period from 
an average of 98 strikers per strike in 1949 to 126 in 1950 and 128 in 1951. In 1951 and 
despite limited economic growth inflation rose by 20% from the previous year (Lann,
1996).
When the second government formed, Mr. Ben Gurion declared his aims for an 
economic reform to boost exports and reduce imports, increase financial and technical aid 
as well as provide larger allocation of raw materials to exporters, form mixed committees 
of workers and employers to supervise productivity, encourage foreign investment, and 
lift duties on capital imports.124 Ben Gurion’s efforts, however, did not succeed in 
reducing inflation. In fact, from 1950, the year the government formed, until 1951, the 
year it dissolved, inflation remained the major unresolved economic problem confronting 
the nation. And, despite government’s strategies to ease price pressures, economic 
circumstances proved to be overwhelming contributing to the 2nd government’s early 
fall. Although the pattern was not as clear-cut quantitatively across all cases, this case 
tends to confirm our hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2 that economic pressure 
undermines the longevity of governmental terms. Furthermore, as will be shown in this 
section, the 2nd government was formed large. This also supports the hypothesis which
123 Israel Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7M AFH0ido01. 2003.
124 K eesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131December 2-9, 1950.
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suggested that economic pressure helps establish a large sized and ideologically diverse 
coalition.
Immigration:
In addition to the economic burden and the high rate of inflation that confronted 
early Israeli governments, immigration added another aspect of economic and social 
burden on the country in general and on the government in particular. From 
independence in 1948 through 1951 a mass immigration of some 687,000 people poured 
in. Presenting the government to the Knesset in November 1950 Mr. Ben Gurion 
declared that his administration regarded immigration as integral to national security. He 
further announced that a total of 510,000 immigrants had entered Israel since the 
foundation of the state in May 1948.125 This large number of immigrants exerted great 
challenge for the newly emerging state.126 By 1951 the country had doubled its Jewish 
population. The number of immigrants arriving in 1950 alone reached 12% of population, 
totaling 170,563 immigrants.127 Immigrants arriving in 1951 rose to 175,279 (Felber,
1997). The immigrants included survivors of the Holocaust, large numbers of Bulgarian, 
Polish and Romanian Jews, and nearly all of the Jewish communities of Libya, Yemen, 
and Iraq.128
Immigration represented a multifaceted problem to the newly emerging state. 
Most of the immigrants were not young or educated. Rather, they were refugees from the
12d Keesing ’s Contemporary Archives, p.11131, December 2-9, 1950.
126 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Century of Zionism” www.mfa.gov.il.
127 Central Bureau of Statistics, JAFI, Jerusalem Post (December 29,2002)
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Nazi death camps in Europe. At that time, Israel did not even have the capacity to feed or 
house the newcomers (Felber, 1999). In addition to the economic burden, immigration 
represented a cultural and integration challenge to Israel. Survivors spoke many 
languages and held traditions that varied along with their national origins. They brought 
diverse political and religious convictions that often clashed with early settlers. 
Incorporating all these aspects into the process of nation building represented the greatest 
challenge of immigration.
Religious versus secular education for the country in general and for the new 
immigrants in particular proved to be among the major divisive policy issues for early 
Israeli coalitions. Such a division fostered polarization among Israel political parties and 
contributed to the downfall of both the 1st and the 2nd Israeli coalition governments.129 
The dissolution of the 2nd government occurred following the Minister of Education’s 
plan for allowing the Histadrut (the trade union movement) to supervise the religious 
education of child immigrants in work camps. Mr. Ben Gurion argued that parents 
should determine for their children the type of education they should receive (religious or 
secular) after they move from reception camps to work camps. The Religious Bloc 
rejected Gurion’s proposition on the ground that religious education should be 
compulsory for all immigrant children in work camps. The opposition of the Religious 
Bloc to secular education along with its rejection to government’s economic policy led to 
the collapse of the ruling alliance and consequently to the resignation of Prime Minister
128 Israel Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, “Century o f  Zionism: Aliya and Absorption”: 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7M FAH00upQ. 1999.
129 Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make Up”:
w w w.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng histl s.htm. 2003.
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Gurion.130 Thus, in addition to economic pressure that faced the 2nd Israeli government, 
immigration pressure was an additional factor that played a role in its early downfall. 
Economic as well as immigration pressure also appear to have been associated with the 
government’s rather ideologically broad formation as predicted by our model describe in 
Chapter 2.
External Pressure:
The 2nd Israeli government declared in its policy guidelines its commitments to 
peace and international law. It announced that Israel foreign policy would be formed on 
the basis of “loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter...striving towards a 
Jewish-Arab covenant within the framework of United Nations Organization...support of 
every measure to strengthen peace, ensure the rights of man and the equality of peoples 
the world over, and strengthen the authority and competence of the Untied Nations
5 13 1Organization.”
These declarations of principle were announced the first year after independence 
that followed two bloody years of war with Arab armies. Israel not only won the War of 
Independence but also gained international support recognizing its legitimate foundation. 
Although tension with Arab states remained high, 1950 was the first year of peace for 
Israel.
130 K eesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11348, March 17-24, 1951.
131 Israel Governm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949. The Second Israeli government adopted the 
principle guidelines o f  the previous coalition.
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Under these circumstances the 2nd Israeli government was established. A year 
after it was formed, a relative low escalation of external tension had emerged. Among 
the most notable escalations were border skirmishes erupting on the Syrian borders and 
the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan in the A1 Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.132 
Despite these escalations, favorable international developments helped maintain Israel’s 
sense of national security. In 1950 and 1951 the United Nations did not pass any 
resolution criticizing or condemning Israel. On the contrary, the Security Council passed 
three important resolutions supporting ceasefire (Resolution 92, 93) and free passage in 
the Suez Canal (Resolution 95).533
External circumstances of the 2nd Israeli government, therefore, do not appear to 
have been factors in its duration, since the coalition collapsed early while low external 
pressures were present. Furthermore, external pressures do not seem to have been a 
reason for large government formation. Contrary, to our hypothetical expectations the 2nd 
government formed large and fell early while external pressures were low.
Coalition Structure:
A. Size:
In October 1950 the 2nd Israeli government was established under high economic 
and immigration pressures . As our model proposed, economic and immigration pressure 
were aspects forcing the government to form on a national consensual basis, where
132 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron Medzinin, 
2001.
lj3 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “Security Council R eso lu tions” www.us- 
israel.org/isource/UN/sctor.html. 2001.
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parties from opposing ideological camps unite together in order to confront threats to 
nationhood. The government was formed as an alliance of various left, center, and 
religious parties controlling the following seats: Mapai 46, United Religious Front (XJRF) 
16, Progressive Party 5, Sephardim and Edot Mizrah 4, and the Arab List 2 (Table 
5.1).134 This government was a model of the early governments that dissolved due to 
differences about religious education, and in this case also about the Prime Minister’s 
demand for the cancellation of Supply and Rationing Ministry.
The coalition formed with three “excessive” parties (Progressive, Sephardim, and 
Arab) having 11 seats more than the necessary minimum winning majority seats of 62 
which Mapai and URF alone controlled. This situation suggested that the coalition was 
formed on consensual basis due, perhaps to the high immigration and economic pressures 
that the country was facing. Consensual formations are often prompted by national or 
international pressures where, for example, deteriorated economic conditions require 
sacrifice of the various social cleavages or principles in order to safeguard the economy 
and the entire nation from total collapse. Under such circumstances, larger (consensual) 
alignments appear necessarily to maintain national harmony and overcome threatening 
events.135
Both economic and immigration pressure seem to have been aspects of the large 
formation of the 2nd government, as proposed by our theoretical model. Furthermore, the
134 Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make Up”: 
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng histl s.htm, 2003.
13d Exceptions rarely occur when neither o f the two dominant parties in the Knesset is capable o f capturing 
the necessary vote to form a winning ruling coalition. In such a situation, as it occurred following the 1983
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2nd government’s short duration also confirms our proposition that large coalition 
formations (inefficient) reduce cabinet’s durability, especially in the face of continued 
environmental pressures.
B. Ideological Parameter
The principal guidelines of the 2nd government established a wide range of 
ideological positions ranging from religious to secular and from favorable private 
economic policy to workers rights and control. It declared that the State shall observe the 
Sabbath and Jewish Holy Days. Among its objectives was the encouragement of private 
capital while providing an economic nationalization plan. It spelled the right of free 
enterprise; at the same time stressing labor’s rights of minimum wage, collective 
bargaining, and strike.136
The government was ideologically established between left, center, and religious 
parties that controlled 73 seats.137 Budge coded this coalition 3 on the ideological 
closeness scale. In Budge’s scale a coalition would score 1 for being ideologically very 
tight and score 6 for being ideologically very wide. The ideological variety of this 
coalition was evident in having various parties of different ideological backgrounds. 
Along Budge’s characterization of the 2nd government, we confirm that the ruling 
coalition was established with somewhat wide ideological parameters. Such parameters 
coincide with its over minimum size, as expected.
election, both dom inant parties may seek each others alliance and form a grand coalition being forced by 
electoral necessity rather than by event pressure.
136 Israel Government Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949. The Second Israeli government adopted the 
principle guidelines o f the previous coalition.
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C. Competitiveness
Mapai, with 46 seats (38%), was the dominant party of the First Knesset. 
Although it did not control the majority of seats in the Knesset (61) it was realistically 
impossible for any coalition to have been established without its leadership. A rival 
coalition to a Mapai-led alliance was virtually impossible. Any rival coalition that 
excluded Mapai would have to have included religious, right, and left parties while being 
led by Mapam (a far left-secular party), the second largest party in the Knesset (19 seats); 
such an alliance was practically impossible.
Another indicator of low competitiveness in the 1st Knesset and leading to the 2nd 
was the maintenance of parties’ ranks throughout the Knesset life. Only four seats were 
lost by defections before the election to the 2nd Israeli Knesset (Table 5.1). As has been 
discussed in previous chapters, high party competition encourages defection from party 
ranks as potentially highly rewarding.
The 2nd government was terminated after the Knesset rejected an education bill 
proposed by the Minister of Education and Culture regarding the registration of children 
in schools. Religious partner parties opposed the legislation and as a consequence the 
government collapsed on October 1951, lasting only 342 days.138 Thus contrary to what 
was proposed by our model, coalition competition for this government does not appear to
137 Ideological categorization o f parties and government is established according to Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs “The Governments o f  Israel”. www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7M FAH0hyd0.
138 K eesing’s Contemporary Archives: p .!1348A , March 17-24, 1951.
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have been a factor in its duration or demise.. Furthermore, low competition, contrary to 
our theoretical expectation, did not lead to an especially small sized cabinet formation
Table 5.1: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the First Knesset 
Political Parties First Knesset Before Next Knesset Election
Mapai 46 46
Mapam 19 20
United Religious Front 16 16
Herut Movement 14 12
General Zionists 7 7
Progressive Party 5 5
Maki 4 4
Sephardim and Edot Mizrah 4 3
Arab Parties 2 2
Fighters List 1 1
WIZO 1 1
Yemenite Association 1 1
Ari Jabotinski 1
Hillel Kook 1
Source: Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make Up”: 
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng histl s.htm. 2003.
The 12th Israeli Government, 1964-66
The 12th government was established under Levi Eshkol, formed on 22 of 
December 1964 after the 11th government resigned a week before, owing to a domestic 
controversy within Mapai on the ‘Lavon Affair’. The controversy within Mapai began by 
Mr. Dayan, a leading figure within the party and the Minister of Agriculture, who 
resigned his post in November 4, 1964. The Israeli press reported that Mr. Dayan’s 
resignation was primarily due to his deepening differences with the Prime Minister on 
Mapai’s continued cooperation with Ahdut Avoda, as well as his reported demand for the 
abolition of farm subsidies and ether disagreements. However, the dispute within the 
Mapai leadership reached its climax on November 7th when supporters of Mr. Pinhas 
Lavon decided to split with Mapai after Mr. Eshkol hesitated to nominate the former in
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the parliamentary and trade union elections. Worse, the dispute within Mapai led to the 
resignation of Mr. Ben Gurion from the party’s central committee on November 15th, 
after he had taken a hard position against any role of Mr. Lavon in the party and 
demanded a new inquiry into his affairs.139
In December 14, 1964 Mr. Eshkol resigned from the Premiership after being 
unable to establish a unified position among the party’s leadership in regard to the 
Levon’s issue. Mapai’s central committee, however, reinstated Mr. Levon as the party 
leader on December 17 and the Levon’s question was left to Mapai’s ministers to 
resolve. President Shazar asked Mr. Eshkol on Dec. 20 to form a new government, and 
on Dec. 22 Mr. Eshkol announced his new administration, which was identical with its 
predecessor except for the appointment of Mr. Akiva Govrin, previously Minister without 
Portfolio, as Minister of Tourism, a new post. Mr. Eshkol told the Knesset that his new 
government would continue to act on the basis of the same principles and coalition 
agreements that were in force during the previous administration. The new cabinet 
received Knesset’s vote of confidence and decided in its first meeting not to institute a 
new inquiry into the Lavon affair.140
139 “Defection of Lavon Group from Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central 
Committee. - Resignation o f  Eshkol Cabinet. - New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol.” 139 
Keesings Contmeporary Archive, January 1965 - Israel.
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Economy:
The 12th government’s economic policy was an extension of previous 
governments’ programs of the 5th Knesset whose aims were to stabilize the economy.141 
The means were proposed to stabilize prices and set a single exchange rate.142 In its 
guiding principles, the 12th government promised a wide range of economic incentives to 
local industry and foreign capital amid higher productivity and imports. The government 
guidelines further emphasized the role of technology toward efficient productivity. The 
final aim of government’s economic policy was expressed as: “the speeding up of 
progress toward the achievement of economic independence and a vigorous effort to 
obtain Jewish and international capital from abroad for the development of the 
country.”143
In 1964, the year before the inauguration of the 12th government, the economy 
(GDP) scored a relative rate increase of .05. Despite noticeable economic progress over 
previous years, economic pressure remained, however, during the government’s 
formative period. Economic “crises” emerged prior to the formation of the government 
following the economic regulation of 1962, which led to the devaluation of the Lira, the 
cancellation of subsidies, and the increase in prices and taxes (Lann, 1996). GDP growth 
rate also declined from .05 in 1964 to .04 in 1965, the government’s first year in office. 
Although there was also a decrease in average strikers per strike in 1965, the number of
140 “D efection of Lavon Group from Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central 
Committee. - Resignation o f Eshkol Cabinet. - New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol.” 140 
Keesings Contmeporary Archive, January 1965 - Israel.
141 Levi Eshkol, “Statement to the Knesset” Israel Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1963.
142 Israeli Knesset, “The M ain Events and Issues During the Fifth K nesset” : 
w w w .knesset.gov.il/h istorv/eng/eng hist5.htm . 2003.
143 Israeli Knesset Archives, “Basic Principles o f  Government Program” December 17, 1959.
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strikers increased, and unemployment increased slightly from 3.3% in 1964 to 3.6% in 
1965. At the time of the government’s termination in 1965 economic pressure had 
increased with inflation reaching 7% after it had been reduced to 4.4% in the previous 
year (Lann, 1996).
The 12th government operated in similar economic circumstances as those faced 
by the 2nd government. Indeed most governments of Israel’s first two decades formed 
under conditions of high inflation and economic instability, though the GDP growth rate 
was relatively stable. A decline in the economic situation was evident during the life of 
both the 2nd and 12th governments, yet no dramatic economic deterioration occurred 
before their formation, during their tenure, or as they were terminated. The GDP growth 
rate indicated low decline during the terms of both governments. Yet both governments’ 
failure to resolve the problem of inflation and to instigate economic growth may have 
contributed to their respective short duration in power. As predicted by our model, both 
governments were formed relatively large in response to high economic pressure. The 
gradual but continued deterioration of economic conditions seems to have been 
associated with short duration, as expected.
Immigration:
For the 12th government the ingathering of the Jews remained among the 
government’s prime objectives, though the rates of arrival slowed.. The guiding policy 
principles of the 12th government spelled out theses aims by declaring its effort for 
bringing to Israel ... Jews from countries where they are in distress, and the
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encouragement of immigration from other countries.”144 Yet, the number of immigrants 
coming in the 60s dropped tremendously relative to early years. By 1964 immigration 
hardly exceeded 2% relative to the population. The total number of immigrants entering 
the country in 1964, before the 12th government formed, was 55,036. The number 
dropped in 1965 to 31,115 and to only 15,957 in 1966. Thus immigration tides had 
begun to recede.
For the 12th government immigration and settlement problems were much more 
manageable relative to early years of statehood. While the number of immigrants 
entering the country during the formation of the 12th government still remained 
significant and required allocation of resources for settlements, in contrast to the 2nd 
government, immigration did not exert much political pressure. Theoretically the 
decline of the number of immigrants while the 12th government was in power should 
have contributed to a decrease in events’ pressures and, in turn, to longer government 
duration. It did not. Thus, while immigration pressure might still have contributed to a 
relatively large sized cabinet coalition, it did not extend the endurance of the government.
External pressure:
Prime Minister Eshkol prioritized the task of strengthening the security of Israel, 
to repulse Arab hopes of defeating Israel, and consequently convince enemies that the 
only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was through negotiation. In his remarks to the 
Knesset upon introducing the 11th government, whose policy principles were adopted by 
the 12th government, he declared, “in a sincere desire for peace in the world and in our
144 Israeli Knesset Archives, “Basic Principles of Government Program” December 17, 1959.
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own area, and in order to preserve it, the Government will give first priority to the 
strengthening of security. It will endeavor to acquire and develop the most modem 
equipment required of the security of the State and its people.. .”145
In 1964 defense Budget constituted 49% of Mr. Eshkol’s 11th government 
expenditures and 44% of his 12th government’s spending.146 1964; as reflected in this 
decline the year before the 12th government inaugurated saw low external tension. 
Although the PLO was formed following the Arab Summit in January, it was kept under 
firm Egyptian control and no serious confrontations occurred. No United Nations 
resolutions were passed and foreign aid to Israel was high. As of 1965, the government’s 
first year in office, the situation remained calm with little noticeable escalation. A few 
shooting incidents on the Syrian borders occurred and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
raided various West Bank areas. Arab positions toward Israel gradually hardened with 
Syria declaring that the only solution to the Palestine problem was the elimination of 
Israel.
The Arab summit conference in Casablanca intended to divert Jordan River 
headwaters. Also during the year two United Nation Resolutions (2002, 2052) criticized 
Israel for not acting on its resolution 194 in regard to Palestinian Refugees. West 
Germany also suspended its arms sales to Israel; thus 1965 presented increasing 
challenges to Israel in terms of its foreign relations though the inter-Arab “cold war”
145 Levi Eshkol, “Statement to the Knesset” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1963.
146 Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics.
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tended to divide Israel’s adversaries, while forcing some of them toward more anti-Israeli
• 147militancy.
The 12th Israeli government was formed amid low external pressure throughout 
1964. There was no immediate threat or a major military confrontation with Arab 
countries. Hostilities remained confined and Israeli casualties in the minor skirmishes 
did not exceed a dozen. External pressure would not have been a reason for wide 
coalition formation. On the contrary, such a low pressure should have freed coalition 
making from such a burden, while providing the dominant party with greater 
maneuvering room to form close alliances. This situation does not comply with our 
theoretical expectations that low external pressure yields small-sized cabinets. Perhaps 
other variables were prominent in determining the large coalition formation, as we will 
discuss later. However, by the time the government terminated in January 1966 external 
pressure was escalating as evident throughout 1965. This deterioration constituted 
additional stress on the ruling coalition and accelerated its downfall as projected by our 
hypotheses.
Coalition Structure:
A. Size
12th Government was the third government formed within the 5th Knesset, 
controlling 66 seats and supported by outside votes that included the minority lists
147 Kerr, Malcolm “The Arab Cold War ‘Abed Al-Nassir and His Rivals,’ 1958-1970” 3d ed. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971.
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(Kimah Ufituah and Shituf Ve’ahvah).148 The 12th government was actually the 
extension of the 10th government formed in the 2nd of November 1961. It included the 
same partners as that of the 10th and 11th coalitions: Mapai 42, National Religious Party 
12, Ahdut Ha’avodah 8, Po’alei Agudat Yisrael 4 and the minority lists 4 (Table 5.2). 
This coalition was not a minimalist since it included extra parties (Po’alei Agudat Yisrael 
and Ahdut Ha’avodah) in addition to outside supporters (the minority list associated with 
Mapai).
Two variables appeared to have been prominent factors in determining coalition 
size: economic and immigration pressures. As suggested by our model, both factors 
were associated with large coalition formation. The cabinet’s large size along with 
economic as well as external pressures, also were associated with the short duration of 
the 12th government, as projected by our model.
B. Ideological Parameter
The cabinet again emerged as an alliance between the left and religious parties. 
The National Religious Party took three government ministries while Mapai and Ahdut 
Ha’avodah controlled 13. Ideologically the coalition was inclusive of religious and leftist 
policy orientations. The guidelines reaffirmed religious authority in major aspects of 
Jewish society. At the same time, the proposed policies affirmed the leftist orientation by 
maintaining government’s major role in economic affairs, providing national health care 
and social welfare, confirming labor rights and the leading role of the Histadrut in
148 Minority lists were associated with labor, often supporting labor-led governments in the Knesset, but 
not officially part of the ruling coalition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
Israel.149 Budge considered the coalition to rank as 3 on the ideological closeness index. 
This suggests that the coalition, as In the second government, was somewhat wide in its 
ideological parameter. Both the size and the ideological parameter of the government 
reflected its consensual orientation as a necessary formation required to confront extreme 
economic and immigration pressure exerted on the country as a whole.
C. Competitiveness
Mapai (42) was the dominant party in the 5th Knesset making any realistic 
coalition impossible without its full leadership (Table 5.2). A rival coalition would have 
had to have been led by either Herut (17) or the General Zionists (17). Such a Right-led 
alliance of both Herut and the General Zionists could have established a minimum 
winning status if it were able to attract, in addition to the National Religious Party (12) 
and Agudat Yisrael (4), 10 additional seats from at least two far left-parties .It was 
highly unlikely, if not impossible, for either Mapam or Ahdut Ha’avodah to have 
accepted an alliance with the Right-parties. This made rivalry and competition with 
Mapai virtually absent.
Indication of increasing competition, however, was noticeable throughout this 
Knesset. By the time the government was terminated and a new election was called a 
split in Mapai occurred leading to the formation of Rafi (Table 5.2). Also, a merger into 
Gahal (27) occurred between the Right parties of General Zionists and the Herut 
Movement. Opponents to the merger established the Independent Liberals (7).
149 Israeli Knesset Archives, “Basic Principles o f Government Program” December 17, 1959.
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Israeli parties were undergoing more of the periodic splits and metamorphoses that came 
to characterize the political system over the years.
The coalition collapsed in January 1966, after a dispute between Prime Minister 
Eshkol and Ben Gurion over Mapai’s leadership leading to an early election. The dispute 
within Mapai continued to divide the party between minority support to Mr. Gurion and 
majority support to Mr. Eshkol. The differences within the party remained unresolved 
throughout government’s term, which centered on whether the government’s re­
investigate the Lavon affair or whether Mapai allow an electoral merge with Ahdut 
Avoda. Mr. Ben Gurion’s faction demanded investigation in the Lavon affair and 
opposed the merger with Ahdut Avoda. The dispute led eventually to Mr. Ben Gurion’s 
defeat and his formation of Rafi confronted by a Mapai-Ahdut Avoda electoral bloc. An 
early election was called for on November 2nd, 1965 and the 12th government was 
terminated on the 12th of January 1966 after serving 383 days in office.150
Economic and immigration pressure faced by Israel seemed to have been 
associated with Mapai’s effort to form large alliances as well as wide policy oriented 
coalition. Despite the rifts within Mapai, its virtual dominance over the Knesset appeared 
to have given the party a leading role in forming large alliances. Yet, the deterioration of 
both economic conditions and rising external pressure during the coalition’s reign as well 
as having large size cabinet and low competitive Knesset seemed to have fueled inter­
150“Cabinet Changes. - Electoral Agreem ent between Mapai and Ahdut Avoda. - Continuing Dispute 
between Mr. Eshkol and Mr. Ben-Gurion. - Mr. Eshkol's London Visit. - Peace Appeal to Arab States.” 
K eesing’s Record of World Events, July. 1965, Israel.
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party dispute and fostered the conditions for government’s early termination. These 
associations support our hypothetical propositions.
Table 5.2; Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Fifth Knesset
Political Parties 5th Knesset Before next Election
Mapai 42 34
General Zionists 17 0
Herut Movement 17 0
United Religious Front/NRP 12 12
Mapam 9 9
Ahdut Ha'avodah 8 8
Maki 5 5
Agudat Yisrael 4 4
Kidmah Ufituah 2 2
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha 2 2
Shituf Ve'ahvah 2 2
Gahal 27
Rafi 8
Independent Liberals 7
Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist5.htm. 2003.
The 16th Israeli Government. 1974
The 16th government, third in our chronology of short duration cabinets, was 
formed in March 1974 and lasted only until June of the same year (90 days). This was by 
record the shortest-lived Israeli cabinet. Following the 1973 Israeli election, President 
Katzir asked Mrs. Golda Meir, the head of the largest emerging party (Mapai), to form 
the government. However, Mrs. Meir mission was proven difficult rocked by the 
National Religious Party’s (NRP) opposition to join a government that did not strictly 
adhere to the halacha.151 Negotiation with the NRP to join a coalition government broke
“General Election. - Political Developm ents. - Mr. Ben-Gurion excluded from Mapai after Formation of 
New Party.” Keesing’s Record of World Events, Nov. 1965, Israel.
151 Halacha is the religious coda under which, to be recognized as a Jew, an individual must either have a 
Jewish mother or have been converted to the Jewish faith by an Orthodox rabbi.
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down on February 1974 and Mrs. Meir’s attempts to establish a minority government 
without the participation of the NRP was rejected by Mapai. Finally, on March 6 Mrs. 
Meir succeeded to form an alliance with the NRP who accepted a compromise position 
that the whole question of the halacha be shelved for 12 months or two years while a 
Government commission draft new proposals aimed at a settlement of the “who is a Jew” 
controversy.152 The new governing coalition received a vote of confidence in the Knesset 
on March 10, 1974 and the new coalition consisted of Labor, the Independent Liberals, 
and the NRP.
Economy:
The 16th government was the second administration headed by Prime Minister 
Golda Meir and adopted the same principle guidelines of its two preceding cabinets. The 
government was formed following Yum Kippur War; thus security and peace were at the 
top of its agenda. Yet, economic issues also remained relevant. The government 
established in its principles and objectives of “guaranteeing the constant, steady growth
153of the economy” and controlling inflation by revising fiscal and monetary policies.
Before the formation of the 16th government, the country was facing a low GDP 
growth of .01, increase in average strikers per strike from 519.70 the previous year to 
1274.46, and a decline in unemployment from 2.8 to 2.6. Severe inflationary problems 
emerged with 1973’s extreme oil price increase causing “stagflation” (or both recession
152 “New Coalition Government formed by Mrs. Meir after Prolonged Ministerial Crisis” Keesing’s Record 
of World Events. April 1974, Israel.
133 The Basic Principles of the Government, Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, 1969. Note: 16th government 
adopted the principles of the 14th government.
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and inflation). Inflation reached 20% and defense budget rose significantly (Lann, 1996). 
By the 1974 the situation worsened despite the declared aim of the government. 
Stagflation led to another devaluation of the Lira, which reached six to the U.S. dollar. 
The government cancelled subsidies on basic goods and the inflation rate doubled to 40% 
(Lann, 1996). The government’s economic achievement was notable only in the lowest 
level of unemployment in comparison to the 60s and 50s.
The 16th government appeared typical of the pre-1969 short-duration 
governments, which underlined economic deterioration from the time of their formation 
to a worsening situation at termination. Despite these similarities it is important to note 
the differences between the economic wellbeing of Israel throughout the 70s in contrast 
to earlier periods. In comparison to the 60s and 50s Israel’s 1970s economy was not 
faced with comparable difficulties. Israel had been transformed into an industrial state 
and most laborers became industrial rather than agricultural. Foreign aid in 1970s 
amounted to $29 billions in contrast to $6.5 billions in the 60s in total. GNP rose from 
$2.5 billions in the 60s to $6.8 billions in the 70s. Israel also tripled its exports in the 70s 
(Table 5.3).154 Therefore, in comparative analysis, we consider the 16th government to 
have experienced a lower level of economic pressure upon formation than governments 
of earlier periods. Yet the economic conditions again worsened by the time the 
government was terminated.
It appeared that economic deterioration during government’s term in office acted 
as an important determinant of its early termination, as our duration hypotheses proposed.
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The formation of a tight 16th government in association with relatively low levels of 
economic pressure agrees with our propositions that low economic pressure help the 
dominant party form tight alliances.
Immigration:
Following the 1967 War Israel’s immigration policy focused on boosting efforts 
to increase and maximize the recruitment of Jews from abroad. In its basic principles the 
government declared its top priorities were “the ingathering of the dispersions of the 
Jewish people in its homeland; stepping up immigration from all countries and from all 
strata of the people; encouragement of immigration from the affluent countries; 
stimulation of pioneering immigration.”'55 Acting on this policy Israel attracted 54,886 
immigrants in 1973 or about 2% of its Jewish population. However, the number of 
immigrants began to decline the following year, with 31,981 immigrants arriving 1 
increasing the Jewish population by 1%. Immigrants coming to Israel in the years after 
the Six-Day War were predominantly from the West. They were mostly idealist Zionists 
who came with the mission to defend the State. Furthermore, they hardly represented the 
economic or domestic burden as that of earlier Alyiah.156 These immigrants were coming 
to Israel without active government planning in contrast to earlier mass migrations.
However, the nature of settlement activities after!967, in contrast to that of pre- 
1967, became more polarizing. The reason can be highlighted by the deepening division
154 Israel M inistry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel at 50: A Statistical Glimpse”: 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH00mx0, 1999. Amount adjusted to 1995 prices.
155 The Basic Principles o f the Government, Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, 1969. Note: 16th government 
adopted the principles of the 14* government.
156 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Aiyah” w w w .m fa.gov.il.. 1999.
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in Israel over settlement expansion into the newly Occupied Territories. The 
establishment of Gush Emunim, a movement calling for such expansion, was confronted 
with an opposite ‘peace’ camp calling for a halt to settlement activities. Settlement 
expansion was no longer nationally consensual. A less prominent division between 
earlier immigrants and newer immigrants began to emerge in competition for jobs and 
other resources as well as cultural and religious identities. These divisions led to the rise 
of territorial movements within the traditional Zionist parties, further splitting the Knesset 
and polarizing Israel’s political landscape.
Our examination of the 16th government, therefore, reveals that its coalition was 
formed amid moderate but gradually increasing immigration policy pressure. However, 
overall immigration does not appear to have been a major factor in the determination of 
either the formation or the duration of the 16th government, , at least not to the extent of 
earlier governments. Other variables, as we will discuss, appear to have had a more 
prominent role in such determination.
External Pressure
The year 1973, before the 16th government formed, was a rocky one for Israel in 
term of external threats. Following the prolonged and sometimes tense “War of 
Attrition” along the Suez Canal after 1971, in October 1973 Egyptian forces crossed the 
Canal and the Yom Kippur War began. Syrian forces also attacked in the North opening 
a second front against Israel. On the 17th of October Arab oil producing states began a 
halt to oil production in protest of U.S support to Israel, and the Nixon administration 
temporarily delayed resupply of arms to Israel in hopes of promoting peace talks. Arms
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resupply from Washington soon resumed after Israel took major losses against Egyptian 
forces and Prime Minister Meir pleaded for U.S. support.157 This Arab-Israeli conflict 
extended to major powers, with a Soviet threat of direct Intervention and with the U.S. 
order of worldwide alert in response.138 In the same year, the UN General Assembly 
passed three resolutions criticizing Israel in regard to both the refugee question and the 
Palestinian ci vilian population under occupation (3089, 3090, 3092).159
Amid these developments, and with growing domestic pressure to investigate the 
decision-making that seemed to have allowed a surprise Egyptian attack initially to 
succeed, the 16th government declared in its basic principles its intention to achieve a 
permanent peace with each neighboring state and the utilization of all peace possibilities 
and prospects expressed in the Geneva Conference.160 Indeed, with greater mutual 
respect between Egyptian and Israeli forces, several achievements were made in the 
peace process. The year 1974 began following the Geneva Peace Conference on the 
Middle East; Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria separation of forces agreements were signed, 
and Arab States lifted oil embargo on the U.S. Israel’s foreign aid, primarily U.S. aid, 
increased from $1395.7 million in 1973 to $5145.2 million in 1974. U.S. military aid to 
Israel increased by 800%.161 Thus, while the 16th government was formed following a 
year of intense external pressures, it was terminated while severe external tensions had 
been contained. External pressure did not appear to have been a major determinant of
157 Dorf, Matthew “Remebering the Yom Kippur War: D ecision to resupply arm s solifiy U.S.-Israel ties” 
Jewish Telegraph Agency, San Francisco: September 25, 1998.
158 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron Medzinin,
2001 .
159 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “General Assembly Resolutions” www.us- 
israel.org/isource/IJN/sctor.html. 2001.
160 The Basic Principles o f the Government, March 10, 1974. Israel Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs.
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1 f t  9government formation or duration, as our model has predicted. Since, the coalition 
government was established as a tight alliance while facing high level of external 
pressure, contrary to what we would have predicted. Furthermore, the coalition was 
terminated early despite a decline in external pressure amid separation of forces and 
peace negotiation. Such an early termination contradicted our expectation, suggesting 
perhaps other relevant environmental variables that may have been associated more 
significantly with its termination. Inter-party disputes and/or failure in government’s 
performance may have been important reasons contributing for the coalition’s early 
breakup.
Coalition Structure:
A. Size
The 16th government was established following the election of the 8th Knesset in 
December 1973.. The government was formed in March 1974 and commanded 65 
Knesset Seats. Coalition members included the Alignment163 51, National Religious 
Party 10, and Liberals 4 (Table 5.3). Two seats were lost by the Alignment following 
election, thus establishing a government of mini mum-wining proportions . Every party 
became indispensable for the government to maintain its majority over the Knesset. Any 
withdrawal of any partner party would have led to a lost majority, and consequently to a 
government collapse.
161 Zunes, Stephen “Why the U.S. supports Israel” Palestine Chronicle, June 1, 2002.
152 While Mrs. Meir Meir resigned following the Agranat Com m ission, which faulted the government for 
failing to predict the Egyptian surprise attack, her decision is often attributed to inter-party power struggle 
particularly between Mapai, Raft, and Ahdut Avoda factions o f  the Labor Bloc.
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Compared to early statehood governments, and despite high inflation rate, the 16th 
government was established amid great economic prosperity. Economic achievements 
appear to have been associated with tight political formation, relieving the dominant 
party from sharing power with an extended list of parties.
B. Ideological Parameter
The government was formed as a left-religious alliance. It expressed its 
ideological policy guideline as an extension to that of the 14th government established 
under Eshkol. The guidelines of the government enforced its leading and dominant role in 
major economic planning, education, and social spheres. It emphasized the leading role 
of labor and civil rights. At the same time, it preserved the authority of religious 
institutions in various aspects of Israeli society. Its foreign policy advocated the 
importance of establishing a permanent peace with neighboring states. It aimed at 
establishing a strategic alliance with the United States and advocated the freedom of 
Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel. It called for a peace treaty with Jordan in which a 
Palestinian-Jordanian federation may be realized.164
Budge scaled the ideological closeness of the parties in the coalition at 2. Thus, 
ideological parameter was somewhat tighter than the previous governments we have 
examined. This is particularly reasonable to accept since partnership in the coalition was 
very small and the dominant party had no reason to compromise policies with such
163 The Alignment (Maarakh) represented the merger o f Mapai, Ahdut HaAvodah, and Raft. Following  
1969 election, Mapam also joined. The Alignment lasted until 1984 representing Labor-left parties.
164 The Basic Principles o f  the Government, March 10, 1974. Israel Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs.
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limited number of coalition members.165 Our model predicts the ideological tightness of 
this coalition concord with the minimal size formation.
C. Competitiveness
Although the Labor Alignment was a very dominant bloc with 51 seats, it lost 2 
seats following election; its coalition partners were limited, and its ability to form 
alternative formations was reduced (Table 5.3). Rakah (4) and Ratz (3) were considered 
anti-system (left and anti-Zionist) parties and not acceptable in any ruling coalition. This 
left the United Torah Front (5), the Kidmah Ufituah (2), Moked (1), and the Arab Parties 
(1) parties without any leverage in shaping the Alignment-NRP alliance. It was essential, 
therefore, that the NRP remain part of the Alignment-led government in order for a 
minimum winning majority to be maintained. Without the NRP the Alignment would 
have had to establish a coalition with the Liberals (4), United Torah Front (5), Kidmah 
Ufituah (2), and Arab Parties (1) and/or Moked (1). Such an alliance would have held the 
government hostage to the will of the very small parties (Kidmah Ufituah (2), the Arab 
Parties (1), or Moked(l)), and could have been the true nightmare of the Alignment 
making an early election a better alternative.
Rivalry between dominant parties increased amid the relative electoral gain 
achieved by the Likud (39) in the 8th Knesset. Likud’s gain in the election was achieved 
following the failure of the Meir government to effectively respond to the attacks of Arab 
armies in the Yom Kippur War. In addition, the increasing dispute within the rank of the
165 The governm ent clearly advocated the peace process which posed its program relatively in 
contradiction with the opposition o f the rightwing Likud Bloc.
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left parties on the future of the Occupied Territories strengthened the Likud’s electoral 
position, which was able to attract more “tenitorialists.” Likud’s potential to form a 
winning coalition increased, particularly after it won another additional seat to its rank 
following the election and after a wedge began to emerge between the Labor parties and 
the Religious bloc, the latter began to lean against territorial concession while 
establishing biblical rights to Judea and Samaria. For the first time a serious challenge to 
the Labor’s traditional power dominance emerged. The Likud was potentially capable of 
forming a rival winning alliance consisting of Likud (40), NRP (10), United Torah Front 
(5), the Independent Liberals (4), and any other small party. The rising challenge of 
Likud to Labor’s traditional monopoly over power introduced to the Knesset a serious 
sense of competitiveness. This situation became evident in the increase of defection and 
realignments throughout the life of the 8th Knesset (Table 5.3). At least nine Knesset 
seats switched party ranks.
The coalition was terminated following the resignation of the Prime Minister Meir 
on the eve of the publication of the ‘Agranat Commission’. This report examined 
reasons responsible for late-responsiveness of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) following 
the Yom Kippur War. Meir considered herself partially responsible and resigned as a 
consequence. The government had lasted only 90 days.
For the 16th government, and as predicted by our model, the declined economic 
pressure along with the increased competitiveness were reflected in the formation of a 
minimum winning coalition with tight ideological parameter. The reason for its short
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term, as our model would have predicted, appears to have been associated with being 
formed with limited number of partners operating in a competitive Knesset.
Table 5.3: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Eighth Knesset 
Political Parties 8th Knesset Before Next Election
Alignment 51 49
Likud 39 40
National Religious Party 10 10
United Torah Front 5 0
Rakah 4 3
Independent Liberals 4 4
Ratz 3 2
Kidmah Ufituah 2 0
Moked 1 1
Arab Parties 1 1
United Arab List 3
Social-Democratic Faction 2
Agudat Yisrael 2
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael 1
Mordechai Ben Porath 1
Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist8 s.htm. 2003.
The 26th Israeli Government, 1995-1996
tliThe 26 Israeli Government, another short-lived government, was established 
under painful circumstances. The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on 
November 4, 1995 by a Jewish extremist while addressing a peace rally in Tel Aviv. 
Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres became the Prime Minister. The new government 
under Prime Minister Peres promised to continue Rabin’s path of peace while 
accelerating the country’s economic developments.166 Opposition Likud’s leader 
Benyamin Netanyahu accepted Peres succession, and on November 6, Peres ruled out
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early general election until its scheduled date on November 1996. On November 21, 
1995 the leaders of the outgoing coalition that included Labor, Meretz, and the Yiud 
faction signed a new agreement. The new coalition was officially inaugurated by the 
Knesset on November 22.
Economy
Among the new government’s economic objectives were: “the continuation of the 
momentum of growth and development; the broadening of the international and regional 
economic relations; the prevention of unemployment...”167
In contrast to the 16th government, the 26th was established amid remarkable 
period of economic prosperity. In 1995 the GDP marked a .04% growth, average strikers 
per strike declined form 1413.96 to 1067.49, so did unemployment from 7.8 to 6.3%. 
Between 1991 and 1996 investment in Israel averaged a 13.5% increase per year. In 
1995 foreign direct investment totaled $2 billions.168 Exports also increased by 8.6%; 
tourism doubled in comparison to 1990 reaching 2,214,000.169 The inflation rate, 
however, soared to 14.7%.
166 Basic Policy Guidelines o f  the Israel Governm ent, 22 November 1995. Israel Ministry o f  Foreign 
Affairs.
167 Basic Policy Guidelines o f  the Israel Government, 22 November 1995. Israel Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs.
168 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6 -1 6 ,1996.
169 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
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In 1996, the year the government was terminated, inflation was 13.7%. This 
decline, however, confronted an increase in number of strikers per strike, a rise in 
unemployment rate, and a decline in growth.170
In contrast to the previous epoch, remarkable economic growth was achieved in 
the 1990s. Israel reached an economic growth that allowed its standard of living to 
equalize that of most industrially advanced nations. Its GNP increased to $98.5 billions 
with a population of less than 6 million. Exports, particularly in military industry, rose 
tremendously, reaching $22.5 billions, or about a third of the GNP. Foreign aid to Israel 
also increased reaching a total of $42 billions in the 90s compared to about $30 billions in 
the 70s.171 Thus the 25th government was formed in a situation of economic prosperity.
Following formation, economic pressure remained low as indicated in growth. 
When the government terminated the economic situation remained healthy though with 
some notable deterioration. Both the 16th and the 26th governments were established with 
relatively low economic pressure. As a consequence, and in line with party competition, 
both were formed as tight alliances, as our model would have predicted. They performed 
under situations of economic health, though notable deterioration can be observed at their 
dissolution. Economic deterioration, while both governments were in office, appears to 
have been a factor for their short durations, as proposed by our hypotheses.
170 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel at 50: A  Statistical Glimpse”: 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7M FAH00mx0, 1999. Based on 1995 prices.
171 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel at 50: A  Statistical Glimpse”:
w w w.m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M FAH00m x0. 1999. Based on 1995 prices.
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Immigration
The 26th government was formed while facing the biggest wave of mass 
immigration in Israeli history. Within a six- year period (1990-1996) 737,000 Soviet 
immigrants arrived to Israel. This influx was similar to that of early statehood, 1948- 
1951 when 688,000 immigrants arrived (Table 5.4).172 It was estimated that the new 
immigrants increased Israel’s Jewish population by 10% between the years 1990-1996,173 
and to an extent eased fears of rising Arab birth rate. In 1995, 76,361 immigrants arrived 
and in 1996, 70,605 (Table 5.4).
These new immigrants constituted an immense political and economic pressure 
on the government. The impact was felt with the rabbinic authority questioning the 
authenticity the new immigrants’ Jewishness. The new immigrants’ distinctiveness was 
manifested in their establishment of an independent secular political party “Israel 
Ba’aliya” rather than necessarily merging with traditional Israeli parties. Other segments 
of the emigres chose the path of the Likud, joining the Right in reaction to the hated 
Soviet communist experience. The Soviet immigrants further contributed to the 
fragmentation of Israeli electoral system pushing ethnic politics in Israel to challenge the 
ideological tradition of party politics. Such a fragmentation appears to have been closely 
associated with short duration coalitions as projected by our theoretical model.
172 Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, “Aiyah” w w w .m fa.go.il.. 1999.
173 Departm ent o f Jewish Zionist Education, “Israel and Zionism: Aliya from  the U SSR ” ww w.iaz-ed.org.il,
2002 .
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Table 5.4: Immigration to Israel During Short Durational Israeli Governments
Government
2
12
16
26
Pre-Year 
170563 (1950) 
55036(1964) 
54886 (1973) 
76361(1995)
First Year 
170563 (1950) 
31115(1965) 
31981(1974) 
70605(1996)
Last Year 
175279 (1951) 
31115(1965) 
31981 (1974) 
70605(1996)
Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics.
External Pressure
The year of 1995 was a year of peace negotiations and achievements. Despite the 
Palestinian Intifadah and various suicide attacks against Israel, Prime Minister Rabin 
continued the path of negotiation with the Palestinians and the Syrians throughout the 
year until his assassination. Israel and the Palestinians signed the Taba Interim 
Agreement.174 The U.S. Congress approved a bill calling for the transfer of the U.S. 
embassy to Jerusalem. Israel reestablished its normal relations with several countries and 
began a diplomatic offensive to achieve economic and political relations with the Arab 
countries.175 Israelis seemed to envision a new technological leadership role in the 
Middle East in collaboration with neighboring Arab states once the Palestinian issue was 
settled. At the same time, the UN General Assembly passed various resolutions that 
criticized Israel in regard to Palestinian rights under occupation, settlements, and nuclear 
programs. However, the General Assembly applauded the achievement of peace
174 The Taba Interim Agreem ent or Oslo II A greem ent was signed on 26 September 1995. It divided the 
West Bank and Gaza into 3 geographic areas A, B, and C. Both A and B areas consisted of approxim ately 
29% o f the Occupied Territories and included about 90% o f  Palestinian population. The agreement 
established the transfer of both areas A and B to Palestinian Authority while. See 
http://www.dac.neu.edU/polisci/d.sullivan/peacequest/documents/osloprocess.html.
175 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron Medzinin, 
2001.
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negotiations.176 Foreign aid to Israel stood at $5 billions in 1995, almost all from 
Washington.
Throughout 1996, the last year of the government, Israel witnessed dramatic 
developments. The rate of suicide bombing rose dramatically.177 Prime Minister Peres 
delayed redeployment in Hebron. Israel launched operation “Grapes of Wrath” in 
Lebanon against Hizbullah.178 The UN General Assembly passed 30 resolutions mostly 
criticizing Israel.179 Foreign aid remained around $5 billions (Table 5.6). Thus, external 
pressure had again worsened.
Despite the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the 26th Government was 
established in relatively favorable external conditions of low pressure. In association 
with low external pressure, and in accordance with our theoretical expectations, the 26th 
government was formed tight. However, the deterioration of external circumstances 
during the cabinet’s office term appears to have been a factor, along with the economic 
decline, in its early termination, as expected.
176 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “General A ssem bly Resolutions” www.us- 
israel.org/isource/U N /sctor.html, 2001.
177 In February and March 1996, 59 Israelis were killed as direct consequence o f four suicide bombings. 
http://www.aish.com/Israel/articles/Suicide_Bombings.asp
178 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron Medzinin, 
2001 .
179 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “General Assem bly Resolutions” www.us- 
israel.org/isource/UN/sctor.html. 2001.
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Coalition Structure:
A. Size
The 26th Government was headed by Shimon Peres and formed under the 13th 
Knesset. It included 44 Labor seats, 12 for Meretz, and Yi’ud originally had 2. The 
government controlled 58 seats with outside support of 5 Arab Knesset Ministers (Table 
5.5). This coalition was practically the extension of the 25th government that was headed 
by Prime Minister Rabin and commanded not even a minimum required majority seats in 
the Knesset. Nevertheless, the outside support of 5 Arab Knesset members, inspired by 
the prospect of peace negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, helped the 
government survive motions of no-confidence. Yet, government’s peace negotiation with 
the Palestinians and its proclamation for Palestinians’ statehood rights in part of the 
West-Bank in Gaza was responsible for its isolation from most Zionist parties in the 
Knesset. Labor’s traditional ruling allies, particularly the religious parties, were critical 
of government’s course and preferred to remain in the opposition along with the Right.
The small size of the coalition, according to our model, emerges in association 
with low external and economic pressures. Despite the small size of the coalition, that 
was expected to contribute to long duration, the deterioration of both economic and 
external conditions while the cabinet was serving office appear to have been associated 
with early termination.
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B. Ideological Parameter
The 26th government was among the most ideologically tight coalitions that were 
formed in Israel. The coalition was an alliance of left parties supported by an outside 
bloc of Arab Knesset premiers.180 Traditionally, nationalist Arab parties in the Knesset 
aligned themselves with the Communists and the anti-Zionist (anti-system) parties. 
However, their support to the Labor ruling coalition was due to the government’s 
declared aim of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. This coalition was among the very few 
Israeli governments that were formed without the participation of religious parties. 
Although the coalition was left-oriented, its economic and social policies were moderate. 
Government supervision over economic affairs was deemphasized in favor of private 
entrepreneurs. Rather than establishing economic independence, that was a typical 
objective of early left-leaning Israeli governments, the 26th government demanded 
liberalization and global integration. The Basic Policy Guidelines explained that “the 
government will continue the implementation of reform in the capital market, including 
the reduction of Government intervention in this market; the development of a risk- 
capital market; and the supervised opening of the Israeli capital market to international 
fluctuations.”181
Scoring coalitions on the ideological closeness index, Budge did not include 
governments formed after 1991. However, we can readily consider the 26th government 
as ideologically very tight, scoring 1 in closeness. Both Meretz and Labor were Left
180 These Arab Knesset members were not part of the ruling government coalition, yet they provided 
essential support to the government by voting in its favor whenever a confidence vote was placed on the 
Knesset’s floor.
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parties committed to the peace process and to a similar economic and social liberalization 
programs. We consider the 26th government, with primacy to peace initiative, to have 
been very tight in ideological parameter. The ideological parameter of the coalition 
synchronizes its size, as expected: tight ideological parameter corresponds to small 
coalition size.
C. Competitiveness
The 26th government was under continuous threat of losing the confidence of the 
majority in the Knesset. It was practically held hostage to a few outside Arab votes. This 
situation indicated that coalition competition in the Knesset was very high and evident in 
Labor’s rivalry with the Likud. Competition was elevated with the increased partnership 
options for the opposition to form a ruling alliance and to command a majority in the 
Knesset (Table 5.5). It was hypothetically possible for the Likud to form a right-center- 
religious winning coalition. A Likud-led coalition could have included: Likud (32), 
Tsomet (8), United Religious Party (6), Shas (6), Yahadut Hatorah (4), Moledet (3), and 
Gesher (2). Another less likely scenario — due to religious-secular pressure between 
Meretz and religious parties— could have been an alliance between the Likud (32) and 
Meretz (12) that attracts Tsomet (8) and either United Religious Party (6) and/or Shas 
(6). Yet the Likud was not given the opportunity by the President to form a government 
since it ranked second to Labor in term of number of Knesset seats that it controlled 
(Table 5.5). For the Likud to be named by the President to form a government would
181 Basic Policy Guidelines o f  the Israel Govenrm ent, 22 November 1995. Israel M inistry of Foreign
Affairs.
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have been possible if Labor, with most seats, had failed to form a coalition (see previous 
discussion in Chapter 3 about procedure in coalition formation).
Evidently, the distribution of Knesset seats increased the number of potential 
ruling alliances, which made it very difficult for any dominant party to assure its firm 
grip on power. This situation inflamed coalition competition throughout the 13th Knesset 
leading to defections and realignments among several MKs. Most notable was the split 
from Labor by the Third Way (Derch Hashishit). The Third Way was led by Avigdor 
Kahalani, a hero of the Yom Kippur War, and was formed in opposition to the
1 R?concessions made in the peace talks by Rabin and Peres governments. In total, parties
183in the Knesset lost over 13 seats to new or rival parties and factions.
182 Weiner, Rebecaa, “The Third W ay” The A m erican-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, www.us- 
israel.org/isource/Politics/TheThirdWay.html. 2003.
183 Israeli Knesset, “The Main Events and Issues During the Thirteenth Knesset”: 
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist!3 s.htm. 2003.
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Table 5.5: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Thirteenth Knesset
Political Parties 13th Knesset Before Next Election
Labor 44 41
Likud 32 29
Meretz 12 12
Tsomet 8 5
United Religious Party 6 6
Shas 6 5
Yahadut Hatorah 4 4
Moledet 3 1
Hadash 3 3
Arab Democratic Party 2 2
Agudat Yisrael 2
Degel Hatorah 2
The Third Way 2
Gesher 2
He'atid 2
Yi'ud 1
Ymin Yisrael 1
Yossef Aztran 1
Ephraim Gur 1
Nav Arad 1
Yossef Ba-Gad 1
Source: Israeli Knesset, w w w.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist 13 s.htm . 2003.
The 26th government collapsed after increasing defections that occurred among 
the rank of the Labor. Most notable was the loss to two MKs who formed the Third Way 
(Table 5.6) leaving Labor totally dependent on Arab votes. This situation led Prime 
Minister Peres to call for early election in hope that Labor will bring a sweeping victory. 
The cabinet was terminated in June 17, 1996 surviving only 206 days.
Our model correctly predicts the tight formation of the 26th government, 
particularly with circumstances of low economic and external pressure. However,
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competition appears to have had the opposite effect to our hypothetical expectations. In 
this coalition, competition emerged as the prime responsible factor for tight formation. 
Considering the high level of competition between the Labor and the Likud blocs, were 
each was practically capable of forming a winning alliance, our model would have 
predicted that such competitive pressure would have led to the dominant parties 
extending partnership to smaller parties while making policy concessions. Such a 
strategy, our model suggested would have been necessary for the dominant party to 
maintain power.
Summary of Results
Economic Pressure
All four short duration governments examined confirmed our theoretical 
expectations that economic pressures and alliance formation are directly related. In other 
words, governments established under circumstances of high economic pressures were 
widely formed (consensual formation: Gov. 2 and 12). In contrast, governments were 
established tight while economic pressures were at low (Gov. 16 and 26). Coalitions 
established after 1969 (Gov. 16 and 26) appear to have been formed amid low level of 
economic pressure, contrary to prior governments (Gov. 2 and 12). This difference in 
economic circumstances between the pre-1969 and post-1969 eras may underline the 
decline in national economic pressures in the later period. As predicted by our model, 
pre-1969 governments’ economic pressure was high leading to large sized and 
ideologically wide parameter-based coalitions (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.6: Economic Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government Economy Formation* Economic Pressure Change
Short Duration Governments
2 high i-w Elevated
12 high i-w Elevated
16 low s-t Elevated
26 low s-t Elevated
* s-t: small-tight, 1-w: large-wide.
Economic pressures, after government formation, are found not to have a direct 
association with duration. Short duration governments examined experienced both high 
economic pressure (Gov. 2, 12) and low economic pressure (Gov. 16, 26). Change in 
economic pressure, however, is found to be significant to durational analysis. In all cases 
of short duration coalition governments studied, deterioration in economic condition is 
found to be inversely related to duration. In other words, an increase in economic 
pressure during the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic deterioration 
from the year the government assumes office to the time it dissolves, was found to be 
associated with shorter duration governments (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26).
In all governments examined evidence to the “aging thesis” was found. This was 
most apparent where economic deterioration led to coalitions fast downfall (Gov. 2, 12, 
16, and 26). This suggested that governments established under situations of economic 
hardship were unable to last long in power while economic pressure continued to shock 
them (Table 5.6).
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Immigration
In our methodology chapter we considered a high immigration pressure to occur 
when number of immigrants exceeded 40,000 a year; otherwise it was considered low. In 
our examination of the shortest lived Israeli governments immigration pressure was not 
found to have an association with coalition formation. Coalitions were formed large 
(consensually) with high annual immigration (Gov. 2, 12) and formed tight (non- 
consensual) with high annual immigration (Gov. 16, 26). This suggests no consistent 
association pattern between immigration pressure and formation. However, immigration 
pressure must be considered within the relative impact of other variables (later examined) 
since immigration had clearly some effect on coalition formations (Gov. 2 and 12).
As for duration, an inverse association was seen between coalition annual 
immigration and government longevity. Governments confronted with high immigration 
pressure upon their formation tended to have difficulty maintaining power. All of the 
short duration sample governments were formed after large waves of immigrants poured 
into the country (Table 5.13: Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26).
There were no consistent patterns to show that changes in immigration pressure 
during government’s life impacted durability. Nor was there evidence to suggest that 
immigration shocks led to ‘aging’ and termination. This result suggested that although 
the immigration pressure variable was found to be inversely associated with duration, it 
remained a weak determinant of government durability; since, in two examined situations
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short duration governments had immigration pressure decreasing rather than increasing 
(Gov. 12 and 16) and remaining the same in two other cases (Gov. 2 and 26).
Table 5.7: Immigration Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government Immigration Formation* Immigration Changes
Short Duration Governments
2  high I-w Same
12 high I-w Reduced
16 high s-t Reduced
26  high s-t Same
* s-t: small-tight, 1-w: large-wide.
External Pressure
External pressure was found to have a low direct association with coalition 
formation in the sampled cases (Table 5.8). Three cases were found to have an inverse 
association (Gov. 2, 12, and 16) and only one government’s formation was directly 
associated with external pressure (Gov. 26). In other words, support to the hypothesis 
that projected low external pressure to lead to tight coalition formation is contradicted in 
two examined short duration coalitions (Gov. 2,12). Support to the hypothesis that 
projected high external pressure to lead to wide coalition formation is also contradicted in 
one examined short duration government (Gov. 16). Thus, suggesting perhaps other 
relevant variables in the respective circumstances of short duration governments to have 
had determined their formations, an issue that we will further explore.
In relation to duration no clear association can be made with external pressure. 
Three governments of short durations were established at low level of external pressure 
(Gov. 2, 12, and 26) and only one case (Gov. 16) supports the proposition that high
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external pressure undermine the duration of the coalition. In two cases (Gov. 12, 26) 
elevated external pressure (positive change) is found to be associated with short duration.
It is interesting to suggest, following our analysis, that coalitions not rationally 
formed, i.e., small-tight when external pressure was high (Gov. 16) and large-wide when 
external pressure was low (Gov. 2,12), shortly dissolve. This finding, and its implication, 
will be further explored in the Chapter 7.
Table 5.8: External Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments
External Pressure Formation* External Pressure Changes
2 low I-w Same
12 low I-w Elevated
16 high s-t Reduced
26 low s-t Elevated
* s-t: small-tight, 1-w: large-wide.
Coalition Structure
Our examination of four short duration Israeli governments produced the same 
result which suggest that competitiveness of the electoral system determined to a large 
extent the formation of the coalition. Two coalition governments (Gov. 2,12) were 
formed at low level of competition. Another two coalition governments (Gov. 16, 26) 
were established small by size and tight by ideological parameter under condition of high 
coalition competition. The result also indicated that the size and ideological parameter 
variables were directly related. Whenever the size of the coalition increased beyond 
minimum winning requirement we expect that coalition’s ideological parameter to be a 
wider, more accommodating, and of consensual policy space.
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These results additionally demonstrated that formation was significantly different 
between coalitions formed in the pre-1969 than the post-1969 era. The early period 
demonstrated a large degree of political consensus leading to larger structural formations, 
while the later period provided less ground for national consensus leading to tighter 
formations. Another important observation can be made from our analysis that no 
apparent difference existed between the durability of coalitions that varied in structural 
formations. Consensual (1-w) and competitive (s-t) formations produced different 
government duration with no apparent pattern (See table 5.9). No support was found to 
our hypothetical proposition that efficient formation (small-tight) leads to longer duration 
contrary to large-tight formation. This conclusion suggests that structural variables may 
need to be examined in light of other event pressure variables in the process of 
determining government’s duration, an issue which we will undertake in the following 
chapter.
Table 5.9: Structural Formation o f Israeli Governments
Government 
Short Duration
Size Ideology Competition
2 large wide low
12 large wide low
16 small tight high
26 small tight high
How does our result compare with long duration governments? In the following 
chapter we will examine four long duration governments. We will apply the same 
procedure we have undertaken in studying short duration governments as to reveal 
comparative differences and similarities in coalition formation and duration.
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CHAPTER 6
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:
LONG DURATION COALITION GOVERNMENTS
In this chapter a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition 
formation and duration. The longest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to 
examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ longevity. The sample 
examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969 
periods. This selection provides evidence of whether variables associated with coalitions 
of long duration changed or remained the same following 1969 general election in Israel. 
Explanatory variables examined include economics, immigration, and external pressure 
and structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition 
government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of 
the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and the coalition ideological parameter are further 
examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the long 
durability of the governments.
Our comparative analysis to longest vs. shortest duration governments provides 
support to the hypotheses on economic pressure and system competitiveness as 
determinants of coalitions’ structural formation. Furthermore, analysis shows that 
changes in economics, immigration and external pressures are inversely related to cabinet 
duration. Proper structuring of government formation that responds to changing external 
pressure is found to relate positively to government duration.
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The 7th Israeli Government, 1955-57
The outgoing 6th Israeli coalition government was headed by Prime Minister 
Shared and collapsed following the Dr. Israel Kastner's scandal.184 The coalition’s 
disagreement over the Kastner’s trial erupted after the government, with “unnecessary 
haste,” appealed the case to the Supreme Court. In protest to the government position, 
The General Zionists, the second largest coalition partner in the government, abstained 
from voting in a no-confidence vote brought by the opposition. Mapai considered the 
position taken by the General Zionists as a breach in the coalition covenant and a 
violation to the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility. This situation rendered the 
four General Zionist Ministers as resigned and Mr. Sharett submitted the resignation of 
his government to President Ben-Zvi on June 29.183
On July 26 a general election was held which brought back Mapai once again as 
the largest dominant party to the Third Knesset (Table 6.1). Taking on the responsibility 
of forming a ruling coalition, Mapai decided to form a large alliance consisting of various 
political parties, particularly that of the left. Among the possible motivations to form 
such an alliance could have been the increasing foreign threat, represented by the Soviet- 
Egyptian alliance as well as other considerations such as overcoming the Kastner’s case 
controversy. Yet, Mapai decided to punish the General Zionists for violating previous 
coalition’s unity and excluded them from the new Cabinet. On November 2nd 1955 the 
7th government was inaugurated in the Knesset under the premiership of Mr. Ben Gurion.
184 Dr. Israel Kastner was high civil servant, a member of Mapai, and a former leader of the Hungarian 
Jewish community. O n June 22 the Jerusalem District Court, after 18 months of deliberation, found Dr. 
Kastner guilty for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The court found evidence which supported the
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The new Mapai-ied alliance included all left-Zionist parties as well as the centrist-leaning 
Progressive party and the Hapoel Hamizrachi of the National Religious Party. The entry 
of the left-Zionist parties into the coalition government was motivated by the return of 
Mr. Ben Guidon to the leadership of Mapai as well as their large acquired shares of the 
government’s ministries.186 Mr. Ben Gurion's return came after his inter-party struggle 
with Mr. Sharett, which led to the resignation of the later form the party's leadership.
The coalition only collapsed after a partner party, Ahudat Ha’avodah, leaked in its 
newspaper details about the secret arms agreement Mr. Ben Gurion was trying to 
conclude with Western Germany. Ben Gurion considered the leak a breach in the 
coalition agreement and demanded that Ahdut Ha’avoda pull out of the government. 
After the latter refused, Mr. Ben Gurion dissolved the government in January 1958. The 
government lasted 796 days in power and was among the longest lasting coalitions.
Economy
Economic tasks were among this government’s priorities. In its policy guidelines 
the government declared its intention to achieve full employment, raise the standard of 
living, attract private capital, balance the budget, and most importantly hold inflation in 
check.187
claim  that he had consciously taken part in the sending of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews to their 
death at Auschwitz. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308.
185 See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308.
186 Ahdut Avoda acquired ministries of Interior and Transport, Mapam received the ministries of 
Development as well as Health. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, November 5-12, 1955, p. 14520.
187 Basic Principles of Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
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For the 7th Government economic conditions were difficult upon formation. 
Inflation was in double digits and economic growth declined from 30% in 1951 to 14% in 
1955; unemployment was 7.2%.188 In 1956, the first practical year of the government,
1 SOemphasis on industrial developments led to the beginning growth of the economy. By
1957, the last year for the government in power, and despite the violent strike of “Ata”
100textile factory workers, unemployment was reduced to 7% and economic growth was 
exceeding 9%.191 The average annual strikers per strike was also reduced to 63 compared
192to 155 in the previous year.
The 7th government achieved many of its intended economic policies. Reducing 
unemployment and controlling inflation in addition to attaining economic growth which 
marked important economic progress for the government. This government was a 
predictable case in our theoretical model where high economic pressure contributed to 
larger coalition formations. At the same time, the improvement of economic 
circumstances, throughout the life of the government, played an important determinant 
factor, as expected in our model, in prolonging its duration.
Immigration
Like many others, the 7th Israeli government established immigration as a major 
policy objective. However, the government’s task was concentrated on immigrants’ 
integration and absorption. It was urgent to mobilize “all internal potentialities and
188 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
189 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
190 Israeli Knesset, “The Main Events and Issues During the Third Knesset”: 
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist3.htm, 2003.
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special resources... to absorb the masses of immigrants in work and settlement, to house 
them and integrate them in Israel.”193 The massive immigration that followed 
independence represented a major challenge to the country’s absorptive ability. An 
estimate of 825,000 new Jewish immigrants entered the country between 1948 and 1957. 
By December 1957 it is estimated that the Jewish population had increased from a total 
of 650,000 to 1,770,000 due primarily to this immigration.194
By the mid-50s European immigration into Israel was declining and the Zionist 
effort was turning to North Africa. In 1955, during the first year term of the government 
only 37,528 immigrants came. In the second year immigration increased to 56,330, and 
the figure continued to reflect the success of the government in attracting more 
immigrants by raising the number in 1957 to 72,634 immigrants. The 7th government 
was established at the end of 1955 while the country was experiencing a dramatic drop in 
the number of immigrants relative to earlier years. Yet, in the last year of the 7th 
government, immigration from North Africa was once again on the rise.
According to our model, immigration does not appear to have been a factor in the 
initial formation of the coalition. The coalition was formed large, yet immigration 
pressure was low. However, initial low immigration pressure may have been a factor that 
contributed to longer duration government.
191 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
192 See “Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics.
193 Basic Principles o f Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
194 Riemer, S. “Israel Ten Years of Economic Dependence” Oxford University Press, p. 141, 1960.
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External Pressure
Many urgent tasks confronted the 7th government, particularly that of external 
relations. Upon its formation the government’s foreign policy objective was centered on 
strengthening Israeli military preparedness while observing the Armistice Agreements 
between Israel and its neighbors.195 Related to such matters were the “feda’eyeen” 
attacks from Gaza and Israel’s formation of demilitarized zones.
In 1955, when the 7th government was bom, external threat to Israel was 
mounting. The Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal was announced while Egypt and Syria 
signed a mutual defense treaty. Raids from Gaza intensified and the DDF responded with 
attacks on the Egyptian military installations. "Eventually the Sinai War broke out in 
1956 against Egypt with Israel fighting alongside France and Britain. Israeli forces 
conquered the Sinai Desert. The Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the conflict. In 
the same year the Security Council and the General Assembly criticized Israel for 
violating the General Armistice Agreement (UN General Assembly-UNGA and UN 
Security Council -  UNSC).
By 1957, the government’s last year in office, the Suez crisis was over and 
external pressure on Israel was greatly reduced. The IDF withdrew to armistice lines. 
Serious clashes on Israel-Syrian borders continued; however, they were limited 
skirmishes which did not represent a major threat to the country. U.N peacekeeping 
forces began to patrol the Sinai and continued in Lebanon.
195 Basic Principles of Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
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Thus, the 7th government was preceded by high intensity of external pressure. 
This pressure was further exaggerated after it was formed. By the time it was dissolved,
hTiexternal pressure had been greatly reduced. In the case of the 7 government external 
pressure appears to have been a factor in the formation of larger sized coalition as our 
model has predicted. Furthermore, the breakout of the war with Egypt appears as an 
additional factor contributing to the proliferation of the government. The eventual 
reduction in external pressure appears to contradict the 'aging thesis' which predicted 
collapse of coalitions at shocks.
Coalition Structure
A. Size
The large 7th government was established under the 3rd Knesset in November 
1955. The government controlled 80 Knesset seats. Its partners consisted of Mapai 40, 
National Religious Party 11 , Mapam 9, Ahdut Ah’avodah 10, The Progressive Party 5, 
and the minority list 5 (Table 6.1). This government was a large coalition consisting of 
many excess parties. Beside Mapai every party in the coalition was potentially 
replaceable.
Surrounding threats, immigration and integration, and economic difficulties were 
among the pressures leading the various Israeli parties to establish and maintain a large 
national alliance that pulled together the various ideological groupings in Israel. As 
predicted by our model, events’ pressure can be associated with large coalition
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formations as demonstrated by the 7th government. The coalition's long duration can be 
associated with ‘proper’ coalition formations responding to pressures. Furthermore, as 
our hypotheses projected, the decline of certain pressures might be also associated with 
government longevity.
B .Ideology
The coalition was ideologically left-center and although basically secular, 
included religious partnership. Whether in economic or social welfare policies the 
government was instructed to take on a dominant role in planning and management. The 
guidelines expressed the need for the government to provide housing, national health 
care, and jobs for all Israeli citizens. At the same time, the guidelines were founded 
mostly on national building and integration of the immigrants. Thus, it emerged as a 
consensus document expressing the national aspirations of most Zionist parties.196
Budge coded ideological closeness among partners as level 3, indexing the 7th 
government ideologically as somewhat wide. This is further supported by the fact that a 
large number of cabinet partners held diverse policy agendas, yet joined together under a 
general wide governmental policy umbrella.
Both size and ideology appeared to have been stretched to accommodate a range 
of partners. As our model predicted, among the factors that emerged to have been 
responsible for this wide formation include immigration, economic and external
thpressures. The 7 government also confirms our hypothetical expectations that reduction
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or resolution to economic and external pressure contributes to longer duration.197 Large 
size and wide ideological formation, however, which responded to pressures, seem to 
have gone along with longer duration in this case, contrary to our expectations.
C. Competitiveness
This was another government formed during the ‘Mapai dominance era’ where 
challenges to party rule were virtually non-existent. Virtually no alliances were practical 
without Mapai (Table 6.1). Mapai controlled 40 Knesset seats along with four Arab seats 
associated with Labor. Only 45 seats were left to religious and right wing parties. A 
Herut-led coalition could only have been formed if it captured all right and religious seats 
(45) in addition to at least two other left-wing parties —Ahdut Ha’avoda (10) and Mapam 
(9). Such an alliance would have been unrealisitc at that time between such ideological 
antagonists. This situation left Mapai with the real power leverage to form and break 
coalitions.
We consider coalition competition to have been very low. The implication of low 
competition could be observed in the strong party discipline during the Third Knesset. 
Party discipline was best captured in the absence of factional defections or re-alignments 
occurring in the Knesset (Table 6.1).
196 Basic Principles o f G overnm ent Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
197 Aspects of external pressure may have been elevated as for example the problem o f Palestinian refugees, 
which drew negative international condemnation while Israel refused their return. Yet, other aspects of 
external pressure, particularly in term o f severity o f  external conflict that reflects the number o f casualties,
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Table 6.1 Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Third Knesset
Political Parties 3rd Knesset Before Next Election
Mapai 40 40
Herut Movement 15 15
General Zionists 13 13
National Religious Party 11 11
Ahdut Ha'avodah 10 10
Mapam 9 9
Maki 8 6
United Torah Front 6 6
Progressive Party 5 5
Arab Parties 2 2
Kidmah Va'avodah 2 2
Hakla’ ut Ufituah 1 1
Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng hist3 s.htm. 2003.
Contrary to our proposed model, low competition was not associated with narrow 
cabinet formation in the 7th government. Low competition also was not associated with 
short duration as our model predicted. Quite the contrary, this seems to confirm the null 
hypothesis which proposes that low competition widens coalitions and prolongs their 
duration.
The 13th Israeli Government 1966-1969
The second longest durable cabinet in the pre-1969 period was the 13th 
government. It was inaugurated in January 1966 following a national election. The 
government was formed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and lasted 1162 days in power. 
The formation of the new coalition government followed a bitter inter-party struggle over 
Mapai’s leadership. The outgoing 12th coalition government had collapsed in January 
1966 owing to the dispute between Prime Minister Eshkol and Ben Gurion over the 
Lavon case and Mapai’s electoral merger with Ahdut Avoda. The dispute led eventually
skirmishes, and attacks have declined. It is in our assessment, that despite the refugee problem, the overall 
external situation for the government had been improved by the last year the coalition's term.
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to Mr. Ben Gurion's exit from the party and his formation of Rafi. Levi Eshkol claimed 
Mapai’s leadership and reestablished electoral alignment with Ahdut Avoda.198 On 
November 2nd, 1965 the Mapai-Ahdut Avoda electoral alignment (Alignment) captured 
45 Knesset seat while Rafi won 10 seats.199
On November 28, following the national election and after consulting with party 
leaders, President Shazar asked Mr. Eshkol to form a new government. Coalition 
negotiation was complicated by the religious parties' demands for an agreement calling 
for a new legislation providing stiff penalties for transgressions of the Sabbath. A 
compromise agreement was reached on January 6, 1966 whereby strict Sabbath 
observance was adopted as public policy by the coalition with exception under “special 
circumstances” to be determine by a committee composed by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Labour and Religious Affairs. The new coalition excluded Rafi200 while 
including, in addition to the Alignment the National Religious Party, Mapam, the 
Independent Liberal, Po'alei Agudat Yisreal and the minority lists. The coalition was 
inaugurated by the Knesset on January 12.201 The coalition controlled 73 Knesset seats, 
having 12 extra seats than the needed minimum majority of 61. On June 5, 1967 (the day
198 A Left wing labor Zionist party. Following the Six Day W ar m any o f its members, including the party's 
spiritual leader Yitzhak Tabenkin, supported the idea o f  Greater Israel; however, another leader, Yigal 
Allon, advocated the return o f  some o f the administered territories which would not endanger Israel's 
security.
199 Israel Knesset, “ Factional and Government Make-Up o f  the Sixth Knesset”, 
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng zhistb s.htm, 2003. Also see “Defection o f Lavon Group from 
Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central Committee. - Resignation o f  Eshkol Cabinet. - 
New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol” K eesing’s Record o f  World Events, January 1965- 
Israel.
200 Rafi (Israel Labor List) was established by David Ben-Gurion for the 1965 elections as a protest against 
Mapai’s action in the Lavon Affair. Rafi gained ten seats in the next elections. Shimon Peres served as its 
secretary general and was instrumental in bringing Rafi and Mapai together to form the Labor Party in 
1968.
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of the outbreak of the Six Day War), the coalition government was further expanded to 
include Gahal and Rafi. The government ceased to exist when Eshkol passed away on 26 
February, 1969.202
Economy
The 13th government's guiding principles emphasized the coalition’s initial leftist 
orientation by providing the government with major tasks in planning and economic 
development. This was seen as a means to control inflation while providing full 
employment, increase capital production, expand product export, import foreign capital, 
and achieve economic independence.203
The government was formed in 1966 while the country faced economic recession. 
The impact of the 1962 government economic policy of devaluation and tax increase 
presented major challenges for the new government. A year prior to its formation, 
inflation had been doubled from 4.4% in 1964 to 7% in 1965. The situation even 
worsened after the government was established. In 1966, the year following 
government’s formation, economic pressure was rising. Israel faced a bigger recession 
forcing the closure of factories, cutting government spending, canceling subsidies, 
reducing local demand, and resulting in heavy unemployment. Inflation was at 8% and 
the growth rate was less than 1%.204
201 “New Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol. - Mr. Eban succeeds Mrs. Meir as Foreign 
Minister” Keesing’s Record o f  World Events, February 1966, Israel.
202 Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make-Up o f the Sixth Knesset” 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng hist6 s.htm, 2003.
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The economic situation, however, dramatically changed following the 1967 War. 
In 1968, the government's last year in office, major economic difficulties were resolved, 
economic growth increased to 12%, inflation fell to 4%, and unemployment was greatly 
reduced to 6.1 compared to 10.5 in 1966.205
Both pre-969 long duration governments (7th and 13th) were thus formed under 
daunting economic difficulties. Inflation and unemployment presented major challenges 
to both. From the time they were formed until they terminated, major achievements in 
reducing economic pressure can be noted in term of controlling for inflation, reducing 
unemployment, and providing economic growth.
Governments formed before 1969 were established under tremendous economic 
pressure. Such situations prompted larger formations as evident in governments 2, 12, 7 
and 13. Duration of these coalitions appear to have been associated with the decline in 
economic pressure. To the extent economic pressure declines, governments last longer in 
power. Both results confirm our hypothetical expectations. Furthermore high economic 
pressure (Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13) appear to be associated with large coalition formation 
while low economic pressure can yield tighter formations (Gov. 16, 25, and 26).
Immigration
Immigration to Israel remained a central task for the 13th government, “...the 
ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish people in its Homeland; speeding up aliya from all
203 Basic Principle o f the N ew  Government’s Programme, Israeli Knesset Archives, 12 January 1966.
204 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
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countries and all classes, encouragement of aliya from the countries of prosperity, 
stimulation of pioneering aliya.”206 And Israel was prepared by the mid-60s more than 
earlier years to absorb new waves of immigration. There were 448 new settlements and 
25 new towns partially occupied. Agriculture and industry were thriving. Immigrants 
were taken directly to apartments rather than transit camps.207
The task of attracting more Jewish immigrants into Israel, however, became more 
difficult. First, there was no immediate threat to Jews around the world typical to the 
experience of WWU. Second, many Jewish communities found in the west, particularly 
in the U.S., enjoyed a permanent and thriving home. This reality was reflected in the 
decline of immigration to Israel during the 60s. The number of immigrants dropped from 
31,115 in 1965, to 15,957 in 1966, and to 20,703 in 1968. Low immigration pressure
thdoes not appear to have been associated in the formation of the 13 government. 
Immigration issue began to lose significance in the political dynamics of coalition 
behaviors.
In July 28, 1969 at a ceremony in Jerusalem, which was attended by Mrs. Meir, 
Mr. Aryeh Pincus, chairman of the Jewish Agency asserted the declining immigration to 
Israel. The information given by Mr. Pincus was supplemented by statistics that was later 
issued by the Jewish Agency. Mr. Pincus pointed out to the problem of attracting 
Algerian Jews whose attachment to the French culture undermined Israel's attraction. He
206 Basic Principle o f the N ew  G overnm ent’s Programme, Israeli K nesset Archives, 12 January 1966.
207 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, “Aiyah” www.m fa.go.il., 1999.
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also explained that the remaining number of potential Jewish immigrants from the "lands 
of distress" outside the Soviet Union amounted to less than 250,OOO.208 These factors 
were significant, in his assessment, to the decline of immigrations by the end of the 60s. 
Evidently, this situation undermined the importance of immigration in national political 
mobilization that characterized the early years of State formation.
External Pressure
The basic principles of the 13th government established the task of advancing 
peace in the region and strengthening defense as a primary objective of the government 
along with the aim of ingathering. “Foreign policy,” the basic principles advanced, “will 
be designed to safeguard the full independence, sovereignty, welfare and security of the 
State, the integration of its territory and boundaries, its internal freedom, the welfare of 
its citizens, and the enhancement of Israel’s status in the family of nations.” For that 
purpose, the statement stressed, the government was to pursue avenues that can lead to
1 1 flpeace negotiation with Israel’s neighbors.
In 1965, the year before the government assumed office, external pressures 
remained low, though with noticeable escalation in tension compared to 1964. In 1966, 
however, pressure between Israel and its neighbors was on the rise after a U.S. sale of jet
208 " Immigration since Independence" Keesing’s Record o f World Events, August 1969.
209 Basic Principles o f  Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, January 12, 1966.
210 This policy went along the position taken by Mr. Eshkol who repeatedly expressed Israel's intention for 
peace negotiation. His position was best captured in his speach on May 17, 1965 at the opening o f the last 
term in the life o f the 5th Knesset, Mr. Eshkol made a statement on international affairs in which he 
appealed for talks between Israel and the Arab countries to bring about a peaceful settlement o f the Arab- 
Israeli dispute.
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fighters to Tel Aviv. The American administration's justification for the transaction was 
that the planes were needed to maintain the arms balance in the face of large Soviet arms 
shipments to the United Arab Republic and Syria and, to a lesser extent, to Iraq. Serious 
clashes between Israel and Syria broke out following a military coup in Damascus. 
Egypt and Syria signed mutual defense treaty with a joint command.211 The UN Security 
Council passed resolution 228 holding Israel responsible for violating the General 
Armistice Agreement by its military action in Southern Hebron against Jordan (UNSC). 
The following year the Six Day War broke out with Israel defeating Arab armies and 
conquering new territories including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
By 1968, the year the government dissolved, tension with the Arab countries 
remained high. The Jordan border became a stage for Palestinian attacks on Israeli 
settlements and military posts. Nasser’s heated rhetoric against Israel continued and 
fighting along the Suez Canal erupted. Israeli aircrafts attacked Iraqi artillery units in 
Jordan and raided Beirut airport destroying thirteen airliners. Palestinians attacked an 
Israeli airliner in Athens. The U.S. announced sale of Phantom jets to Israel.212 The UN 
General Assembly’s resolution 2443 criticized Israel for its treatment of civilian 
populations under occupation. The UN Security Council in its resolutions 248 and 256 
condemned Israeli military action against Jordan as violation of UN Charter and cease­
fire resolutions. The Security Council passed a similar resolution (262) with respect to 
Israel’s attack on Lebanon.
211 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
212 Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.
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External pressure appeared evident prior to the formation of the 13th government. 
This pressure was further escalated after formation, peaking in the war, and remained 
relatively high at the time of termination. It should be noted, however, that with the 
exception of persistent dispute over free passage in the Suez Canal and compared to the 
1967 war, severity of external pressure at the time of termination in 1968 slightly 
decreased with no major military threat against Israel evident. Initial external pressure 
appeared to have had contributed to the establishment of a large sized coalition as our 
model predicted. Furthermore, the persistent of external pressure throughout the term of 
the 13th government appeared to have been associated with its longer duration. As the 
case of the 7th government demonstrated, the large size of the coalition may evidently 
become relevant to duration at times of severe external pressure. Coalitions formed large 
when pressures are high (war and severe conflict) may be associated with long coalition 
duration.
Coalition Structure
A. Size
The 13th Government was formed as the first government under the 6th Knesset. 
It was originally established as a coalition with partners controlling 73 seats. With the 
outbreak of the Six Day War the coalition was enlarged to include most parties in the 
Knesset including the right wing parties. Original partners included the Alignment with 
45 seats, Mapam 8, NRP 11, Liberals 5, Po’alei Agudat 2, and Kidmah Ufituah 2 (Table 
6.2). On June 5, 1967 Gahal and Rafi joined the government extending its control to a
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109 Knesset seats. Both economic and external pressures were associated with the reason 
of forming a larger than minimum winning coalition, as our model had predicted. The 
coalition was initially formed with 12 extra seats and three additional parties than 
necessary to have a minimum winning coalition. External pressure, however, became the 
sole reason for extending the size of the coalition to become a grand alliance of all 
Zionist parties. This occurred in June 1967 on the eve of the Six Day War where the 
government was further extended to include all Zionist parties in the Knesset.
The formation of a large government was associated with high economic and 
external pressure that surrounded the 13th Cabinet. The slight declined of these pressures 
may have helped prolonging government's duration, as projected by our model. 
However, the large size of the government did not appear as a factor for short duration, as 
we would have expected. It appears that the formation of large coalitions during 
situations of high external pressures can contribute to longer government's duration.
B. Ideology
The alliance initially represented a coalition between left and religious parties that 
controlled 73 seats. When the Six Days War broke out the alliance was extended to 
include Rightist parties. Ideologically the coalition was formed wide but with the war it 
turned into a national alliance reflecting the entire spectrum of the Knesset. Thus, the 
ideological parameter was originally wide but stretched even wider after the right parties 
joined the government. Budge indexes the ideological closeness of the initial coalition 
partners as 3. However, it could be argued that with the war, and after the coalition was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 0
extended to Gahal, that closeness was increased to level 5. Whatever the case we 
consider the coalition to have been formed as ideologically somewhat wide and it became 
even wider on June 5, 1967.
Competitiveness
Coalition competition increased noticeably throughout the 6th Knesset. Although 
the dominance of the Alignment remained indisputable with 45 Knesset seats, Gahal 
became a significant political force in Israel (26 seats). Gahal (Gush Herut-Liberalism) 
was a-right wing party formed in 1965 as a merger of two right-wing groups: Herat and a 
splinter group of the Liberal party.213 Still, the level of competition remained low, 
preventing any coalition from being formed without the participation of the Alignment 
(Table 6.2). A rival coalition to that of the Alignment would had to have been led by the 
right-wing Gahal (26) in alliance with the NRP (11), Rafi (10), Liberals (5), Agudat 
Yisrael (4). But such a coalition would have required five more Knesset seats which 
would have been potentially impossible to get out of either MAPAM (8) or other extreme 
left-wing parties such as Rakah (3) or Hadash (1). Such a highly unlikely scenario helped 
maintained the dominance of the Labor alliance and undermined any serious challenge to 
the ralership.
Throughout the 6th Knesset the electoral position of the Alignment even 
improved with Rafi rejoining labor ranks, thus making the Left the indisputable ruler of 
the Knesset (Table 6.2). In addition, the successful conclusion of the Six Days War
213 The American Cooperative Enterprise, w w w.us-israel.org/isource/Politics/Gahal.html.. 2003
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brought to the Alignment great electoral and political rewards.214 Israel emerged as 
indisputable military power in the region proving itself capable of defeating several Arab 
armies at the same time. Conquest of new territories containing vast labor and natural 
resources also proved indispensable for Israel's growing industry. The strategic military 
significance of the new conquest elevated Israel’s military edge to a higher level and 
attracted great powers to seek alliances and strategic positioning in the region. The 
government was terminated following the death of Prime Minister Eshkol on February 
26, 1969. Prime Minister Golda Meir headed the following 14th Government.215
According to our predictive model, the case of the 13th government confirms two 
important aspects of coalition formation. Both economic and external pressures seem to 
be highly associated with large formation. Again, our null hypothesis is confirmed with 
regard to competition where it seems that low competition contributed to large formation 
and long duration. The presence of high levels of external and/or economic pressures, 
low competition, and a large coalition formation appear to have been associated with long 
government’s duration.
214 Although the Labor em erged electorally pow erful, the capture o f  the new territories with Arab majority 
opened new sources o f divisions and splits into the rank o f  the left parties (territorialists vs. peace 
advocates) and eventually helped strengthen the position o f  the Right Likud bloc.
215 Israel Knesset, “ Factional and Government Make-Up o f  the Sixth Knesset”,
w w w .knesse t.gov .il/h is to rv /eng /eng  zhistb s.htm. 2003.
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Table 6=2: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Sixth Knesset 
Political Parties 6th Knesset Before Next Election
Alignment 45 63
Gahal 26 22
National Religious Party 11 11
Rafi 10 1
Mapam 8 0
Liberals 5 4
Agudat Yisrael 4 4
Rakah 3 3
Kidmah Ufituah* 2 2
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha 2 1
Shituf Ve'ahvah* 2 1
Ha'olam Hazeh-Koah Hadash 1 1
Maki 1 1
Hamerkaz Hahofshi 4
Ahvah Aravit 1
Druze Faction 1
Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng hist6 s.htm, 2003.
The 18th Israeli Government. 1977-81
The 18th government was among the post-1969 longest-lived Israeli alliances. It 
also come clearly after the rise of electoral competition had become firmly established in 
the early 1970s. Prime Minister Menachem Begin formed the government in June 1977 
and it lasted until August 1981, the sum of 1507 days. The outgoing 17th government of 
Mr. Rabin had witnessed a series of internal party disputes and divisions marked by the 
split of Mr. Arieh Eiav from the Labor party and his merger with Civil Rights Movement 
to form a new “super-dove” Yaad party, which continued under the leadership of Mrs. 
Shulamit Aloni. Further cracks in the Rabin’s 17th government emerged amid a power 
struggle with the National Religious Party. The latter abstained from voting in a no- 
confidence vote against the government following a dispute over the Prime Minister’s 
non-observance of the Sabbath. This prompted Mr. Rabin on December 1976 to invoke a
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1962 law that permitted the Prime Minister to dismiss cabinet ministers of parliamentary 
factions that voted against the government or abstained on issues of confidence. Mr. 
Rabin's dismissal of the NRP from the coalition provoked the Independent Liberal party 
to quit the coalition, thus reducing the government command of Knesset seats to 53. Mr. 
Rabin was forced to resign his government and the Knesset decided for an early 
election.216
Prior to the national election, which brought victory to the Likud, the Labor 
Alignment was undergoing leadership power struggle. It began first with the narrow 
election of Mr. Rabin as the party leader against Mr. Peres in February 1977 (1,445 votes 
against 1,404). A scandal concerning Rabin soon emerged following the publication of a 
report by the daily Ha'aretz on March 15 revealing secret U.S. bank accounts held by Mr. 
And Mrs. Rabin. In April Mr. Rabin resigned his post as the party leader and Prime 
Minister. On April 11 he was ordered by the Finance Ministry to pay a fine of £115,000 
and on April 17 Mrs Rabin was found guilty of contravening currency regulations by the 
Tel Aviv district court and sentenced to a fine of £1, 250,000 or 12 months
217imprisonment.
Against this background of Labor internal turmoil the general election was held 
on May 17 leading to the victory for the right wing Likud bloc. The new election enabled 
the Likud leader, Mr Menahem Begin, to form a centre-right coalition Cabinet on June 
19, thus ending an era of labor dominance over every established government since the
216 “Resignation of Rabin Governm ent” K eesing’s Record o f World Event, March 1977, Israel.
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foundation of the state in 1948. Following the election the Likud began negotiations 
primarily with primary three parties, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) and 
the two main religious parties (i.e. the NRP and Agudat Israel), with a view to forming a 
centre-right coalition. Negotiation with the dovish DMC proved difficult particularly 
because of Likud’s initial hawkish position on the question of peace and the Occupied 
Territories. Negotiation was further complicated by the fact that Likud’s leader 
Menachem Begin insisted in having Mr. Dayan as Foreign Minister, an issue that proved 
unacceptable to the DMC. Thus, DMC's initial position was to oppose joining the Likud 
government. Religious parties, on the other hand, accepted the Likud invitation on the 
ground that great religious concession would be provided. The coalition agreement 
asserted religious parties' demand promising a sweeping reform in favor of applying 
halacha to the Law of Return in addition to a greater role of religious authorities in civil 
affairs.218 On June 1977, a narrow Right-Religious coalition was established and 
inaugurated by the Knesset. On October 20th the DMC also decided to join Begin’s 
coalition. The DMC, however, underwent various divisions and splits that forced it to 
withdraw from the Likud led coalition in 1978 and 1980.219
Economy
The principle guidelines of the 18th government were the shortest and most 
summarized versions that have been written by any Israeli coalition. With regard to 
economic objectives, the guidelines emphasized the need to achieve “restraint of
217 “Developments preceding Elections - Resignation o f Mr Rabin as Labour Party Leader - Succession of 
Mr Peres - Financial Scandals” Keesing’s Record o f World Event, September 1977, Israel.
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inflation, stabilization of the currency, and assurance of a decent standard of living for all 
residents of the state.”220
The government assumed office in 1977 while another devaluation of the lira had 
taken place, growing tolO to the U.S. dollar. Inflation was high, reaching 39.1%.221 
Inflation continued high, doubling annually and reaching 56.8% in 1978. By 1980, 
economic pressures were tremendous. The inflation rate was 131% and the shekel 
replaced the lira as Israel's official currency. In 1981 Yoram Aridor became the Finance 
Minister and his policy to lower taxes on imported goods led to another jump in the 
inflation rate, reaching 120%. In February 1981 the Tel Aviv bourse collapsed with a 
15% drop in total stocks’ values.222 Economic growth rates of the national product also 
declined an average of 3.6% after mid-70s and 3% in the 80s.223
Although the 70s represented a period of major economic achievements in 
contrast to the 60s, no sign of economic health was evident throughout the life of the 18th 
government. The government insisted that the reason was a global recession. However, 
the Labor opposition stressed that since the Likud-led coalition assumed power in 1977, 
consumer prices had risen 1,200 %, unemployment increased sharply, and industrial
218 “Formation o f Begin Cabinet - Controversy over Nomination o f  Mr Dayan as Foreign Minister - 
Portfolios left Open for Democratic Movement for Change” K eesing’s Record o f  World Event, September 
1977, Israel.
219 “Cabinet Changes” ” Keesing’s Record of World Event, December 1980, Israel.
220 Basic Guidelines o f the Government, Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977.
221 Statistical Abstract o f  Israel: www.cbs.gov.il
222 Shlomit Lann “History Lesson: Israel’s Economy” Globes, Vol. 23, No. 5. pp. 6-16, 1996.
223 Moshe Filber, “Israel at 50: Economic Achievements” Israel Ministry o f Froeing Affairs: 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7M FAH00uc0.
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production stagnated.224 Economic deteriorations were evident from the time the 
coalition assumed office until it was dissolved. Economic distress ran contrary to the 
government’s declared objectives that were stated in the Basic Guidelines, where 
controlling inflation and achieving higher productivity were the aims.
Contrary to our expectation, however, economic pressure did not lead to the 
formation of a large initial coalition. The 18th government was formed tight while 
encountering such pressures. Furthermore, economic pressure and deterioration were not 
found to have been associated with short governmental duration. Despite economic 
difficulties, the 18th government was among the longest-lived Israeli coalitions. We must 
look elsewhere for the explanation.
Immigration
The Basic Guidelines of the 18th Government announced that, “the Government 
will make the encouragement of aliyah a chief national task.”225 Furthermore, the 
government established in its aims a “constant campaign for the return to Zion of all who
yearn for her in the Soviet Union, and for the rescue of the Jewries of Syria and the Arab
, . ??226 states.
As has been previously discussed, post-1967 immigration issues gained greater 
polarizing impact than in the pre-1967 period. Particularly the question of the location of 
immigrants' settlements gained unprecedented attention. Whether settlements to
224 Keesings Contm eporary Archive, “General Elections” Vol 27, Israel, October 1981.
225 This was unusual for post-1969 governments to prioritize aliyah above other national priorities.
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accommodate immigrants should be built in the newly Occupied Territories or within 
Israel’s “green line” borders became a polarizing issue to the various Israeli parties. 
Statements such as “the Government will plan, establish and encourage urban and rural 
settlement on the soil of the homeland”227 became disputable. While the right-wing and 
most religious blocs considered the Territories part of the ‘homeland,’ the left-wing and 
center parties disputed such a claim.
Nonetheless, experience in immigration absorption and settlement by successive 
Israeli governments helped the 18th government avoid major obstacles in the process of 
integrating the new arrivals, primarily from the Soviet Union.228 Problems associated 
with housing and cultural integration encountered by the Yemenites in the 50s and the 
North Africans in the 1960s, for example, were avoided in the assimilation of Ethiopians 
and Russians in the 80s and 90s.229 Still immigration continued to decline throughout the 
duration of 18th government’s. In 1977 the year before the government was formed only 
21,429 immigrants arrived. This number slightly increased the first year following 
government formation and reached 26,394 in 1978. By the time the Likud-led coalition 
terminated in 1981 the number of immigrants had declined to 12,599. Low immigration 
pressure, upon formation, appears not to have a significant association with coalition 
formation or duration through out the life span of this government.
226 Basic Guidelines o f the Government, Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977.
227 Basic Guidelines o f  the Government, Israel Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977.
228 In  the early 1970s, the Soviet Union permitted sign ifican t number o f Jews to emigrate to Israel. At the 
end o f the decade, a quarter o f  a million Jews had left the Soviet Union; 140,000 immigrated to Israel.
2/9 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, “Aliyah” www.m fa.go.il., 1999.
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External Pressure
Prior to the formation of the 18th government foreign policy pressure was low. 
Despite a few skirmishes on the Lebanese border, external tensions were hardly observed. 
United Nation resolutions continued to be negatively worded against Israel in relation to 
the Arab population in the Occupied Territories (UNGA). However, no serious 
resolution ever emerged from the Security Council. In 1978 serious efforts were made to 
end the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning with the first peace agreement between Israel and 
an Arab state (Egypt). This stunning success may have contributed to extending the 
government longevity.
The 18th Israeli government was the first to be led by the Right. Despite Likud's 
hawkish principles regarding the Occupied Territories, the achievement of peace with 
Egypt was difficult to ignore. The coalition government emphasized in its Basic 
Guidelines the objective of achieving peace, declaring that “the government will place 
the aspiration for peace at the forefront of its concerns, and will strive actively and 
constantly to achieve permanent peace in the region.”230 In fact, this ‘hawkish’ 
government dedicated most of its guiding principles toward the objective of achieving 
peace with its Arab states while avoiding direct discussion of a Palestinian State or 
national rights for self-determination. The Camp David Accords substituted "autonomy" 
for the discussion of a Palestinian State; a solution that was ultimately rejected by the
230 Basic Guidelines of the Government, Israel M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977. Although 
common to all Israeli governments to declare their intention to achieve peace, the emphasis varied by the 
subsequent administrations. The em phasis can be measured by the number of statements dedicated to this 
issue relative to other priorities.
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Palestinians. The objectives of the 18th government appeared to aim at achieving peace 
with the Arab states while delaying negotiation or comprehensive solution to the 
Palestinian issue. The latter would have required constant pressure from Egypt and the 
U.S., which was not to be.
The Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt were concluded in 1978 and 
the state of war between them was terminated. However, serious clashes occurred with 
the PLO on the Lebanese border and the PLO attacked a bus in Haifa leaving 37 dead. 
The IDF retaliated against the PLO by invading South Lebanon and establishing the 
"Security Zone." Thus, by 1981, and prior to the fall of the 18th government, serious 
external tensions were present. On the Lebanese borders Katyusha rocket attacks 
increased. Israeli warplanes attacked various targets in Southern Lebanon. Worse, 
Israeli air attacks shot down two Syrian helicopters in Lebanon and Syria retaliated by 
introducing surface to air missiles into the Bekka Valley. The most serious escalation, 
however, was the raid carried out by Israeli Air Force into Iraq, which led to the 
destruction of the Ossiraq nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Many tensions between Israel, 
Europe and the U.S. emerged in the aftermath, leading to the suspension of U.S. arms 
transfers to Israel. American aid to Israel also temporarily declined. Several U.N 
resolutions emerged from the General Assembly condemning Israel’s attack on Iraqi 
nuclear installations (36/27) and demanding a freeze on nuclear weapons including those 
of Israel (36/87, 36/98 UNGA). The Security Council also condemned Israel's action 
against Iraq in resolution 487 and against Lebanon in resolutions 488, 490, and 498 
(UNSC).
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The 18th government was established following a situation of low external 
pressure. Following formation, external pressure was dramatically reduced with the 
signing of the Camp David Accords. By the time the government terminated external 
pressure had been notably elevated. Our model predicts that low external pressure leads 
to tight cabinet formation, as in the case of the 18th government. Furthermore, our 
duration hypothesis is confirmed where relatively low external pressure is projected to 
have prolonged government durability.
Coalition Structure
A. Size
The 18th Government lasted throughout the 9th Knesset. It was the longest-lived 
Israeli government ever and the first under with the Labor parties as the opposition group. 
While the Likud became the dominant bloc in the Knesset, it operated under fierce 
competition from its ideological rivals. Likud’s initial coalition controlled a narrow 61 
Knesset seats and consisted of Likud 43, NRP 12, Agudat 4, Sshlomzion 2, and Moshe 
Dayan 1 (Table 6.3). Four months after its formation the Democratic Movement for 
Change (DMC), with 15 seats joined the government, increasing the coalition’s size to a 
more comfortable 76 seats. The DMC was composed of several left-leaning secularist 
parties including Shinui which was led by Yigal Yadin in 1976.231 The DMC soon 
dissolved in 1979, due to Shinui’s opposition to join the Likud’s government, thus 
reducing the size of the government once again to a minimum-winning stand. Thus, with
231 Weiner, Rebecca “Democratic Movement for Change” The American Cooperative Enterprise. 
www.israeltour.org/isource/PoliticsDMC.html. 2003.
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the exception of a brief period of time the 18th government was a minimum winning 
coalition.
The case of the 18th government confirms some of our hypothetical propositions 
while it contradicts others. The establishment of a tight coalition amid low external and 
immigration pressures supports our hypotheses. However, high economic pressure seems 
to contradict the prediction of large formation. Furthermore, high economic pressure did 
not seem to be associated with shorter duration. This could have been compensated by 
peace accords and lower immigration pressure along with efficient or tight formation, 
which with fewer partners to please helped the government live longer.
B .Ideology
Ideologically, the coalition was a right-center-religious alliance. Budge coded the 
coalition as ideologically very tight, scoring 1 on his scale. Ideological tightness of the 
coalition stems from the very close agreements between the parties over the main policy 
issues facing the government. Coalition members were united in the support of 
settlement activities, including extended activities in the Territories. The government 
expressed this uniting goal during Mr. Begin’s address to the Knesset where he stated, 
“the government will plan, establish and encourage rural and urban settlement on the soil 
of the homeland.”232 Although vague about whether “homeland” included Territories, it 
asserted that settlements must be expanded into the Territories. In a further 
demonstration of unity among the ruling parties the guideline rejected the demand of 
Arab countries to any condition for peace negotiations that included the returning of the
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Territories or a comprehensive agreement.23^  Mr. Begin declared, “the government will 
invite each and every one of Israel’s neighbors ... to conduct direct negotiations... 
without preconditions on the part of either side and without formulae prepared by outside 
elements.”234
Table 6.3: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Ninth Knesset 
Political Parties 9th Knesset Before Next Election
Likud 43 38
Alignment 32 33
Democratic Party for Change 15 0
National Religious Party 12 12
Hadash 5 5
Agudat Yisrael 4 4
Shlomzion 2 1
Mahaneh Sheli 2 0
Ratz 1 1
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael 1 1
Flato Sharon 1 1
Liberals 1 1
Arab Parties 1 1
Shinui 5
Telem 4
Tehiya 2
Ahva 2
Ihud 1
Yisrael Ahat 1
Ya'ad 1
State List 1
Shivyon Beyisrael 1
Yossef Tamir 1
Yigael Yadin 1
Binyamin Halevy 1
Shmuel Tamir 1
Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/jiistorv/eng/eng hist9 s.htm. 2003.
232 Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel Lorch, University Press of America, p. 2088, 1982
233 There is no reference in Camp David to a Palestinian State or the unconditional return of the Territories 
to Arabs. In reference to the Palestinians, Cam p David spells out the right of the W est Bank and G aza’s 
inhabitants for autonomy (or self-rule) under Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian supervision. The future of the 
Territories is kept for future negotiation determined after the conclusion of various peace settlements with 
Arab states. See “The Camp David Accords” the U.S. Department of S tate’s Office of International 
Information Programs (usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/cdavid.htm), September 17, 1978
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Throughout its stay in power, all government parties supported the signing of the 
Camp David Accords (a major reason for the DMC to join the government), settlements 
in the Territories, and the conduct of war in Lebanon.235 With the exception of the DMC, 
strong agreements between coalition members were evident in the support of the religious 
institutions as well. The Likud considered the clauses in the coalition agreement not 
necessarily to undermine secularist principles but having to do more with the cultural 
Jewishness of the state. The coalition emerged ideologically tight, reflecting its original 
small size.
C. Competitiveness
The coalition operated within a very competitive Knesset session and period. 
Both Right and Left parties were potentially capable of forming a winning majority in 
alliance with the Religious parties (Table 6.3). The left Alignment (32) hypothetically 
could have formed a winning majority in alliance with Democratic Movement for Change 
(15), National Religious Party (10), and Agudat (4). The plausibility of this formation 
could have become real if either religious party, in addition to the DMC, defected from 
the ruling coalition. The fragmentation of the Knesset, through defections and 
realignments among parties and MKs, evidenced the high competitiveness of the period. 
Before the Knesset’s dissolution there were 20 parliamentary groups and four non-
pq f .
affiliated MKs (Table 6.3). In fact, defection, alignments, and realignments finally led
234 Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel Lorcfa, University Press of America, p. 2088, 1982.
235 Israel Knesset, “ Factional and Government Make-Up of the Ninth Knesset”, 
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist9 s.htm. 2003.
236 Israel Knesset, “ History of the Knesset”, www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist alk.htm. 2003.
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to the loss of government's commanding majority over the Knesset forcing an early 
election.237
Supporting our null hypothesis high competition in the 9th Knesset led to the 
formation of a tight coalition government. Yet, such a high level of competition was 
associated with a long-duration government as our hypothesis would have predicted.
T he 25th Israeli Government, 1992-95
The 25th government was another extremely durable coalition one; lasting 1194 
days from the time it was formed on July 1992. It was preceded by a Likud-led cabined 
that was dissolved due to internal coalition divisions. The dispute within the outgoing 
Likud coalition was sparked by autonomy negotiation with the Palestinians in 
Washington. On January 19, 1992 two nationalist right-wing coalition members 
(Moledet and Tahiya parties) quit the coalition to protest a perceived territorial 
concession in favor of the Palestinians, which was thought by the renegade parties to 
endanger Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories. The departure of the two parties 
from the coalition reduced Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir's command over the Knesset to
-5 0
a minority position and forced him to call for an early national election.
Israeli parties convened their national conventions in preparation for election set 
to be held on June 23, 1992. Evidence of a split within the Likud emerged following the
237 Keesings Contemporary Archive, “Formation o f  New G overnm ent by Mr. Begin” Vol. 27, Israel, 
October 1981.
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defeat of Mr. Levi's list in favor of Mr. Shamir. In protest, Mr. Levi, who represented a 
large Sephardi following within the party, resigned his post as a Foreign Minister in 
Shamir's cabinet. The national election brought the Labor party back to a dominant 
position in the Knesset with 44 seats against 32 for the Likud. Labor promised a swift 
move in the negotiation process with the Palestinians with the aim to end the Arab-Israeli 
conflict.
On June 28 President Chaim Herzog formally asked Rabin to form a government 
within 21 days. Two religious parties, United Tora Judaism and the NRP, were pressing 
Labor to enter into a coalition with them to the exclusion of Meretz (a secularist party). 
Shas240 also offered to participate in a coalition, which would include Meretz, provided 
that an accommodation could be reached between Labor and the other two religious 
parties.241 On July 13th, Mr. Rabin was able to assemble a coalition that included Meretz 
and Shas providing the first with the Ministry of Education and the latter with Ministries 
of Interior and Defense. This tight coalition was able to receive the confidence of the 
Knesset only with the support of the Arab non-coalition parties who were inspired by Mr. 
Rabin's peace policy.242
238 "Departure of Tehiya and M oledet from coalition Budget security issues Foreign affairs" Keesings 
Record of World Events, January 1992, Israel.
239 "Announcement of Levi's resignation" Keesings Record of World Events, March 1992, Israel.
240 Is a Sephardic-religious party equivalent to Aguddat Israel (Shom rei Torah Sephardim-Sephardi Torah 
Guardians).
241 " Likud general election defeat" Keesing's Record of World Events, June 1992, Israel.
242 " Coalition government New Cabinet" Keesing's Record of World Events, July 1992, Israel.
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Economy
Among the new government's top priorities was the establishment of a peace- 
oriented economy. This economy was envisioned as to eliminate unemployment, open 
the prospect of high-tech producing industry, and privatize the public sector.243 There 
were hopes of market development in the Middle East.
In contrast to the ‘70s and ‘80s, the ‘90s was a decade of economic miracles for 
Israel. The 25th government was established as a ‘peace coalition’ following the Madrid 
Peace Conference, the end of the first Palestinian Intefadah, and the conclusion of the 
Gulf War I. By 1992 the peace economy was in the making, resulting in the high rate of 
foreign investment, tourism, and export. Defense expenditure declined tremendously 
relieving the economy from a major burden. Between 1984 and 1994 defense expenditure 
fell by over 70%; as proportion of the GNP the relative decrease approached 300%.244 
Inflation was also declining by 11.2%.243 A year later the peace economy was proceeding 
at a growing pace. The last year of the government witnessed an annual GDP growth rate 
of 4%, a decline in the average strikers per strike form 1414 in 1994 to 1067 in 1995, 
and a decline in the unemployment rate from 7.8 to 6.3% for the same years. Investment 
in Israel rose on average of 13.5 % a year after 1991 and foreign direct investment totaled 
$2 billion in 1995.246 Exports also doubled reaching an 8.6% increase, tourism doubled
243 Principle Guidelines of the Government of Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992.
244 Sherman, Martin “Trends in Israe l’s Defense Budget” in Arieh Stav, “Israel at the Cross Roads” (Israel: 
Ariel Center for Policy Research) 1997.
245 Statistical Abstract of Israel: www.cbs.gov.il
246 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16,1996.
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in comparison to 1990 reaching 2,214,000.247 The inflation rate was relatively under 
control at 14.7%.
Contrary to the 18th Likud-led government of 1977, the 26th government 
experienced a period of economic growth and prosperity from the time it was established 
until the time it was terminated. The termination of the government came as Prime 
Minister Rabin was assassinated. The case of 25th government fits our hypothetical 
predictions where low economic pressure seemed to have contributed to a tight coalition 
formation. Furthermore, the association between low economic pressures and 
government's long duration in office provides further support to our proposition.
Immigration
Formed by Prime Minister Rabin, the 26th government faced the biggest 
wave of mass immigration in Israeli history. Over quarter of a million immigrants 
entered the country while the 26th government was in office. Yet, the government’s 
immigration and settlement policy experienced a significant change. The government 
made it clear that settlement activities needed to be shifted from the Territories toward 
the 1948 Green Lines. In its policy statements this orientation was expressed under 
“Changes in the Order of National Priorities” which stated that “the map of developing 
areas and cities will be made as to prioritize the settlements on the Green lines and the 
developing areas furthest from the center of the country; other than the eras of Judea, 
Samaria, and the Gaza Strip that are close to the center of the country.”248 The coalition
247 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
248 Principle Guidelines of the Government of Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992.
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was formed in 1992 with 77,057 Soviet immigrants entering the country. Immigration 
pressure held steady through out the government life. In 1993, 76805 immigrants arrived 
and 76,361 in 1995 when Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated (Table 6.4).
The settlement policy signaled a shift toward accommodating Palestinian and 
international demands as conditions for regional peace. At the same time, it inflamed the 
settlement movements against the regarded concession policy of Prime Minister Rabin, 
and eventually led to his assassination. Thus, in a sense immigration and settlement 
policy was a factor that ended the government.
Immigration pressure did not lead to a large coalition as our formation model 
predicted. Nor did such a pressure lead to early termination. Contrary to our prediction, 
here immigration pressures were associated with tight formation and long duration. 
Despite the large number of immigrants, it seems that such a factor for coalition politics 
was not as stressful as earlier years. The modem capacities of the country to 
accommodate a large wave of immigrants seemed to have rendered such a factor to a 
secondary relevance in coalition formation if not duration.
Table 6.4: Immigration to Israel during Long Durational Israeli Governments
Government Pre-Formation First Year Last Year
7 37528 (1955) 56330 (1956) 72634 (1957)
13 31115(1965) 15957 (1966) 20703 (1968)
18 21429 (1977) 26394 (1978) 12599 (1981)
25 77057 (1992) 66805 (1993) 76361 (1995)
Source: Statistical Abstract o f Israel
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External Pressure
Prior to the formation of the 25th government the Iraq War was successfully 
concluded and new efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict were underway. In October 
1991 the Madrid Conference was accomplished and bilateral talks between Israel and its 
neighbors began. The 25th government was the first Israeli government to recognize the 
Palestinian political right for independence. It asserted in its policy guidelines intentions 
to negotiate with the Palestinians an interim plan “for the establishment of the 
independent Palestinian authority in Judea and Samaria” while refraining “from actions 
and policies that will slow the process of negotiation.”249
With its commitment to peace, the government survived amid a climate of low 
external pressure. In 1992, when the government was formed, U.S. aid to Israel 
increased. No changes in U.N resolutions wording occurred in criticizing Israel over its 
treatment of population under occupation or in demanding a nuclear free zone in the 
Middle East (UNGA). Beside the dispute over the deportation of Palestinian activists to 
the Lebanese border and minor skirmishes with Hizbullah, 1992 was a year of peace 
negotiations and agreements. The following year witnessed a relative escalation of 
attacks against Israel, primarily in the Gaza Strip where Palestinian groups opposed to the 
peace talks killed several Israelis through attacks. The Lebanese border caught fire at 
various times, most seriously in the “Operation of Accountability” which involved an 
assault on Hizbullah bases in Southern Lebanon. However, major peace achievements 
concluded in 1993; most notable was the Oslo Agreement which for the first time brought
249 Principle Guidelines o f  the Government o f  Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992. Note that the principle 
of “independence” remained vague throughout the various declarations o f the 25th government. The
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mutual recognition between the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership. In addition to 
Oslo, Israel concluded a peace settlement with Jordan and began a path of normality with 
the Arab countries. U.S. aid to Israel increased to $5 billions with additional loans and 
loan guarantees, a two billion U.S. dollars increase from the previous year.
The 25th government was terminated following the assassination of Prime 
Minister Rabin.250 Despite this fact, and as has been previously discussed, 1995 was a 
year of peace negotiations and achievements. External threats against the state were 
greatly reduced.
The 25th Israeli government was essentially a peace government. It was 
established following a situation of low external pressure. Major peace agreements and 
achievements followed its formation leading to the decline in external pressure. The case 
of the 25th government supports the hypothetical claims which suggest that low external 
pressure provides the dominant party with greater maneuvering capacity to form tight 
coalitions. Furthermore, this case agrees with the proposition that low and declining 
external pressures tend to prolong duration.
‘extent’ o f independence remained a subject o f  negotiation. A Palestinian State as well as its authority, 
territorial extension, capital, and refugees’ return w ere issues to be later defined and agreed upon.
250 The death of a Prim e Minister does not constitute a necessary termination o f  government. The 
dominant party can elect a new leader or appoint the vice in the position o f  the Prime Minister with the 
Knesset’s approval. However, because leaders’ personalities and charisma are important characteristics in 
Israeli party tradition, it is often the case that a new government will be called forth to be inaugurated by 
the Knesset.
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Coalition Structure
A. Size
The 25th Government was formed as the first government of the 13th Knesset. 
The coalition was established as a minimal winning coalition controlling 62 Knesset 
seats. It originally consisted of Labor with 44 seats, Meretz 12, and Shas 6. On 
September 1993 Shas defected and on January 9, 1995 Yi’ud joined with 1 seat. Shas 
defection came following a Sept. 8 Israel's Supreme Court ruling that demanded the 
ousting of Shas leader Der'i and his Shas colleague, Deputy Religious Affairs Minister 
Raphael Pinhasi, from the Cabinet because of accusations of corruption against them. 
Shas' ministers in the cabinet resigned the coalition in protest. The government 
maintained the support of 5 MKs from the Arab parties (Table 5.5). With the defection 
of Shas, however, the coalition became even less than minimalist. The only reason for its 
continuation in power was the outside support of primarily Arab parties. The peace 
process proved very controversial.
B. Ideology
The central policies of the 25th government focused on achieving peace. 
Government guidelines envisioned a Middle East of economic, cultural, and scientific 
cooperation. Regional cooperation was seen as the essence of peace.231 The growth of 
high tech industry was a major reason driving the government to invest in the path of 
regional cooperation and a greater economic role. The impact of globalization on politics, 
in its momentum to liberate economies from national boundaries toward international 
integration, appears to have been a factor in Israel’s push toward ending the Arab-Israeli
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conflict. Acting on these principles the 25th government signed peace agreements with 
both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.
Budge data did not include governments formed after 1991. However, we can 
readily consider the 25th government as ideologically very tight, perhaps scoring 1 or 2 on 
Budge ideological closeness index. Both Meretz and Labor were left parties committed 
to the peace process. Shas was the ethnic-religious party of Sephardim whose ideological 
impact on the coalition was limited to issues related to religious education. Its impact 
was further diminished by its withdrawal from the coalition one day after the Oslo 
agreement was signed in September 1993.252 Shas' withdrawal added further ideological 
cohesion to the ruling left-coalition. We consider the 25th government to have been very 
tight in ideological parameter responding to its limited and small partnership.
C. Competitiveness
The 25th government operated under very competitive circumstances in the 13th 
Knesset. Rivalry between the Labor and the Likud was evident in giving either the 
potential leverage to form a ruling alliance (Table 5.5, see also previous discussion of the 
13th Knesset). Labor was named to form the coalition because it had the largest number 
of Knesset seats. Had the Labor party failed the task of forming the coalition, the 
President would have named the second largest party (the Likud in this case) to form the
2,1 Principle Guidelines o f  the Government o f  Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992.
232 Shas did not oppose nor support the Oslo Agreement and chose to remain outside the government, yet it 
restrained from joining the opposition or voting against the government. See Behar M oshe, “The Peace 
Process and Israeli Dom estic Politics in the 1990s” Socialism and Dem ocracy, No. 32, Summer/Fall 2002.
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government. Thus, the 25th government was clearly formed under the condition of high 
competition.
This government was dissolved following the assassination of Prime Minister 
Rabin. Mr. Peres assumed the formation of a new government which maintained the 
same alliance. The case of the 25th government supports the hypothetical claim that 
increasing competition leads to longer duration governments. However, this case the null 
perception, which suggests that increase competition can be associated with wide 
formation. This may indicates that other factors, particularly low economic and external 
pressures, weigh more in determining the tight formation of such a government.
Qualitative Case Comparative Analysis
Economic Pressure
Seven out of eight governments studied in chapter 5 and 6 confirmed our 
theoretical expectations that economic pressures lead to consensual coalition formations. 
In the pre-1969 period, economic pressures in all the four government cases examined 
had a direct relationship with formation (Gov. 2,12, 7, and 13) compared to three 
governments in post-1969 (Gov 16, 26, and 25). In other words, governments established 
under circumstances of high economic pressures were widely formed (consensual 
formation: Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13). In contrast, governments were established tight while 
economic pressures were lower (Gov. 16, 26, and 25). Coalitions established after 1969 
(Gov. 16, 26, and 25) appear to have been formed amid generally low level of economic 
pressure, contrary to prior governments (Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13). As predicted by our 
model, higher pre-1969 governments’ economic pressure apparently led to large sized
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and ideologically wide parameter-based coalitions (Table 6.5). For governments 
examined in this study after 1969, with the exception of the 18th Government, economic 
pressure was low leading to small-sized and ideologically tight parameter based 
coalitions (Table 6.5).
Change in economic pressure is found to be significant to durational analysis. In 
seven out of eight cases studied, change in economic pressure is found to be inversely 
related to duration. In other words, an increase in economic pressure during the lifespan 
of the government, as expressed in economic deterioration from the year the government 
assumes office to the time it dissolves, was found to be associated with shorter duration 
governments (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). In contrast, a decline in economic pressure during 
the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic improvement from the year the 
government is formed to the year it terminates, tended to prolong durability (Gov. 7, 13, 
and 25: Table 6.5). Only in the 18th government we noted its long duration despite rising 
economic pressure.
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Table 6.5: Economic Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments
Economy Formation* Economic Pressure Change
2
12
16
26
high l-w
high l-w
low s-t
low s-t
Elevated
Elevated
Elevated
Elevated
Long Duration Governments
7
13
18
25
high l-w
high l-w
high s-t
low s-t
Reduced
Reduced
Elevated
Reduced
* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.
In five of the government cases studied evidence to the “aging thesis” was found. 
This was most apparent in the short duration governments where economic deterioration 
led to their fast downfall (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). This suggested that governments 
established under situations of economic hardship were unable to last long in power 
while economic pressure continued to shock them (Table 6.5). In contrast, long-duration 
governments often experienced improved economic conditions while in office. This was 
found to be the case for most examined durable governments (Gov. 7, 13, and 25) that 
operated under circumstances of improved economic circumstances (Table 6.5).
Immigration
In our methodology chapter we considered a high immigration pressure to occur 
when number of immigrants exceeded 40,000 a year; otherwise it was considered low. In 
our examination of eight Israeli governments immigration pressure was not found to have 
clear association with coalition formation. Coalitions were formed large (consensually) 
with under condition of initial high annual immigration pressure (Gov. 2, 12) and with 
initial low annual immigrations (Gov. 7, 13). Coalitions were formed tight (non-
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consensual) with initial high annual immigration (Gov. 16, 25, 26) and consensual with 
low annual immigration (Gov. 18). Hence there may be some residual effect of such 
pressure in tightening coalition ideology (3 of 4 cases), but further analysis would be 
necessary to confirm this overall pattern (see table 6.8). However, immigration pressure 
must be considered within the relative impact of other variables (later examined) since 
immigration had clearly some effect on coalition formations (Gov. 2 and 12).
As for duration, an inverse association was seen between coalition annual 
immigration and government longevity. Governments confronted with high immigration 
pressure upon their formation tended to have difficulty maintaining power. All of the 
sample governments of short duration were formed after large waves of immigrants 
poured into the country (Table 6.6: Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). In contrast, three of the long 
duration governments studied (Gov. 7, 13, and 18) were formed after low number of 
immigrants entered the country (Table 6.6).
There were no consistent patterns to show that changes in immigration pressure 
during government’s life impacted durability. Nor was there evidence to suggest that 
immigration shocks led to ‘aging’ and termination. This result suggested that although 
the immigration pressure variable was found to be inversely associated with duration, it 
remained a weak determinant of government durability, since, in two examined situations 
short duration governments had immigration pressure decreasing rather than increasing 
(Gov. 12 and 16) and remaining the same in two other cases (Gov. 2 and 26). 
Furthermore, we witnessed government of long duration having an increase in
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immigration pressure during their reign (Gov. 7 and 13) rather than having a decrease in 
immigration as predicted (Table 6.6).
Table 6.6i Immigration Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government immigration Formation* Immigration Changes
Short Duration Governments
2 high l-w Same
12 high l-w Reduced
16 high s-t Reduced
26 high s-t Same
Long Duration Governments
7 low l-w Elevated
13 low l-w Elevated
18 low s-t Reduced
25 high s-t Same
* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.
External Pressure
External foreign policy pressure was found to have a low direct association with 
coalition formation in the sampled cases (Table 6.7). Five studied cases established a 
direct association between external pressure and formation as predicted (Gov. 26,7,13, 
18, and 25) while three cases were found to have an inverse association (Gov. 2, 12, and 
16). In other words, evidences for the hypothesis that projected high external pressure 
leading to large coalition formation are found in two cases (Gov. 7 and 13). Support for 
the hypothesis is also found in tight governments formed during low external pressure 
(Gov. 26, 18, and 25). The other governments examined contradicted our hypothesis, 
suggesting perhaps other relevant variables in their respective circumstances to have 
determined their formations, an issue that we will further explore.
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In relation to duration no clear association can be made with external pressure. 
Three governments of short duration were established at low levels of external pressure 
(Gov. 2, 12, and 26) while two long duration governments were established at high 
pressure (Gov. 7 and 13). This result tended to refute the proposition that external 
pressure has an inverse relationship with duration. Only three cases support such a 
proposition (Gov. 16, 18 and 25).
Change in external pressure, however, showed better association with duration. 
Five cases examined conformed to the inverse relationship between changes in external 
pressure and duration (Gov. 12, 26, 7, 13, and 25). Decline in external pressure, during 
government’s term, contributed to longevity as predicted (Gov. 13 and 25). In contrast, 
negative change (accumulative shocks) led to short duration (Gov. 12 and 26). Two 
cases contradicted this proposition (Gov. 16 and 18) suggesting that such an association 
was weak (Table 6.7).
It is difficult to infer from our studied cases a strong conclusion in regard to the 
‘aging thesis’. In four cases evidence may support that external shocks were factors in 
termination (Gov. 2, 12, 26, and 18). However, in four other cases the result provided a 
contradictory conclusion (Gov. 16, 7, 13, and 25).
It is interesting to suggest, following our analysis, that coalitions rationally 
formed, i.e., large-wide when external pressure was high and small-tight when external 
pressure was low, last longer in power (Gov. 7, 13, 18, and 25). Alternatively, those
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alliances that are not rationally established, in reaction to external pressure, with the 
exception of one case (Gov. 26), shortly dissolve (Gov. 2, 12, and 16). This finding, and 
its implication, will be further explored in the Chapter 7.
Table 6.7: External Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government External Pressure Formation4 External F
Short Duration Governments
2 low l-w Same
12 low l-w Elevated
16 high s-t Reduced
26 low s-t Elevated
Long Duration Governments
7 high l-w Reduced
13 high l-w Reduced
18 low s-t Elevated
25 low s-t Reduced
* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.
Coalition Structure
The answer to the question “how the coalition structurally formed? (Size, 
Ideology, and Competitiveness)?” is shown in our case study. Our examination of eight 
Israeli governments produced the same answer, i.e., competitiveness of the electoral 
system determined to a large extent the formation of the coalition. Four coalition 
governments (2,12,7, and 13) were formed at low level of competition. These coalitions 
were formed large by size and wide by ideological parameter. Another four coalition 
governments (16, 26, 18, and 25) were established small by size and tight by ideological 
parameter under condition of high coalition competition. The result also indicated that 
the size and ideological parameter variables were directly related. Whenever the size of 
the coalition increased beyond minimum winning requirement we expect that ideological 
parameter becomes wider, more accommodating, and consensual in policy space.
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These results additionally demonstrated that formation was significantly different 
between coalitions formed in the pre-1969 than the post-1969 era. The early period 
demonstrated a large degree of political consensus leading to larger structural formations, 
while the later period provided less ground for national consensus leading to tighter 
formations. Another important observation from our analysis is that no apparent 
difference existed between the durability of coalitions that varied in structural formations 
(short: 2, 12, 16, and 26 vs. long: 7, 13, 18, and 25). Consensual and competitive 
formations produced different government duration with no apparent pattern (See table
6.8). No support was found for our hypothetical proposition that efficient formation 
(small-tight) leads to longer duration contrary to large-tight formation. In other words, in 
our examination of eight Israeli governments we found no evident relationship between 
structural variables and government durability. This conclusion suggests that structural 
variables may need to be examined in light of other event pressure variables in the 
process of determining governments' duration, an issue which we will undertake in the 
following chapter.
Table 6.7: Structural Formation of Israeli Governments
Government Size Ideology Competition
Short Duration
2 large wide low
12 large wide low
16 small tight high
26 small tight high
Long Duration
7 large wide low
13 large wide iow
18 small tight high
25 small tight high
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Qualitative vs. Quantitative Comparative Summary of Results
Quantitative as well as qualitative analyses were conducted in order to examine
our theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2. Various hypotheses were advanced 
suggesting that coalition formation, in both size and ideology can be determined based on 
the level of parliamentary competition as well as events’ pressure. It was suggested that 
increase in coalition competition leads to coalitions of larger size and wider ideological 
parameter. Furthermore, the model predicted that increased economic, external, and 
immigration pressures contribute to larger, consensual or accommodating coalition 
formations. Duration of the coalition was generally predicted to be determined by both 
structural systematic as well as event pressure variables. Higher competition and tighter 
coalition formations were thought to help prolong government’s life, while increasing 
events’ pressures undermined its durability.
The results of our analyses were mixed, suggesting the need for theoretical 
refinement. Our quantitative result suggested that some economic pressure variables 
were significantly associated negatively with both formation and durational analyses. 
Labor disputes appeared to have driven a wedge between parties and increased their 
polarization into ideologically tighter camps. Associated with such a pressure was 
immigration pressure, which was also found to drive alliances into smaller formations. 
Internal event pressures, so it seemed, fragment alliances into smaller and ideologically 
tighter formations. Contrary to our theoretical expectation, quantitative results supported 
the null hypotheses, which suggested domestic events’ pressure to be associated with 
greater polarization and, therefore, tight formations (non-consensual). External pressure,
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on the other hand, appeared to undermine policy differences and unite ideologically 
distant parties, supporting our hypothetical expectations.
Contrary to our quantitative result, our qualitative analysis supports the 
proposition that event pressure forces accommodation (larger-sized wider-ideology) 
formations, particularly in the economic domain. This result appeared qualitatively very 
significant for the pre-1969 period. All governments sampled for this period of low party 
competition provided association between high economic pressure and large coalition 
formations (Table 6.8). In fact, our qualitative analysis of Israeli coalitions revealed a 
permanent economic pressure throughout the pre-1969 period at the time where most 
coalitions formed large. Yet, our qualitative examination revealed that this association 
was weakened in post-1969 period due, perhaps, to the increasing competition between 
parties for government control and the decline in governments' economic priorities. 
Israel’s industrial growth in post-1969 period, as we have discussed, may have further 
contributed to the growth of labor force, and consequently to the increase in the number 
of reported labor disputes. Such a post-1969 development may have been responsible for 
a greater weight in the negative quantitative association existing between coalition 
formation and economic pressure. Thus, we adopt the conclusion that confirms the 
strong qualitative evidence of positive association existing between economic pressure 
and the size-ideological structure of coalitions through pre-1969 period. This association, 
we further believe, has been reversed to a negative association through post-1969 Israeli 
coalitions, as our quantitative analysis asserted.
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Table 6.8: Table of Qualitative Formative Structural and Event Pressure Variables
Government
Before 1969
Size* Ideology* Competition Economy Immigration External Duration
2 large wide low high high low Short
7 large wide low high low high Long
12 large wide low high high low Short
13
After 1969
large wide low high low high Long
16 small tight high low high high Short
18 small tight high high low low Long
25 small tight high low high low Short
26 small tight 
* Dependent Variable.
high low high low Long
In regard to immigration pressure, our qualitative analysis supported our 
quantitative findings particularly for the post-1969 period. Both revealed a negative 
association between immigration pressure and coalition size-ideological formation. As 
for the prior period of time, we were unable to make a strong qualitative confirmation to 
the whether an association existed between immigration pressure and coalition formation 
(Table 6.8).
Both our qualitative and quantitative analyses provide evidence for the 
proposition that external conflict undermines partisan differences and necessitate the 
establishment of accommodating governments. With the exception of ‘war cabinets’, 
most Israeli governments were established relatively larger in pre-1969 than in post-1969. 
This pattern leads us to believe that a positive association existed between external 
pressure and coalition accommodation in the earlier period. At the same time, our 
qualitative analysis revealed that in the post-1969 period external pressure did not
253 In our quantitative analysis 13 governments formed before 1969 and 15 governments formed after 1969 
were included in the analysis. This situation may have led to a bias in favor o f 1969 coalition formation 
pattern, since there were more governments formed during this period.
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broaden government formation (Table 6.8). On the contrary, lower external pressure 
during post-1969, with the exception of wartime and severe external threat, was 
associated with increasing polarization among political parties and small coalition 
formations (Example, 18th government). The fact of increasing party competition may 
have conditioned the impact of external events in this period. This leads us to conclude 
that external pressure was positively associated with the structural formation of pre-1969 
governments (asserting our quantitative result) and negatively associated with post-1969 
governments (asserting our qualitative result).
Relevant to formation analysis, coalition competition also appeared highly 
significant. This significance was marked by the shift to a post-1969 competitive Israeli 
Knesset, a comparative difference that the quantitative analysis could have not accounted 
for with a pre-post sample of coalitions. Our qualitative result suggested that coalitions 
before 1969 were consistently formed large while having low level of competition (Table
6.8). The situation changed after 1969 with coalitions consistently forming tight while 
experiencing high level of competition.
Quantitative durational analysis provided additional support to event variables 
having significant impact on coalitions’ behaviors. As we expected, annual increase in 
foreign assistance positively impacted the duration of coalitions. Structural variables also 
appeared relevant to duration analysis. However, contrary to our expectation, increase in 
coalition competition was quantitatively found to impact negatively the duration of the 
coalitions.
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Our qualitative duration analysis supports aspects of our theoretical expectations, 
particularly that increase in event pressures during the coalition's life span (economic, 
immigration, external) undermine the durability of the government. The significant 
quantitative positive association found between foreign aid and government duration also 
supports this assertion. Structural variables also appeared relevant to duration analysis. 
However, based on the. case studies of eight Israeli coalition governments examined we 
were enable to asserts qualitatively our quantitative finding which suggested that high in 
Knesset competition contributes to shorter duration governments (Table 6.8).254 We 
affirm the quantitative conclusion because of the larger number of cases examined. No 
apparent qualitative difference was noted in the duration of coalitions through the periods 
before and after 1969.
With respect to other structural variables, our qualitative analysis further 
supported the proposition, that large coalition structure corresponding to particular 
external pressure is positively associated with government duration. This was 
qualitatively found with respect to coalitions forming large when faced with severe 
external threat (Table 6.7). Our quantitative analysis was unable to account for such 
phenomena due to rarely occurring cases of large national alliances forming in response 
to severe external threat (only 7 national governments out of 28 governments).
254 One reason for this discrepancy can be in our sample selection o f governments o f extreme duration 
cases in the qualitative analysis. This may have biased our qualitative analysis in favor of variables of 
severe implication on duration and undermined other explanatory variables. For example, severe external 
pressure such as war may have becom e the dominant factor in prolonging governments (7 and 13) and 
undermined other factors that may prove significant under normal circumstances.
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Evidence on the aging thesis was also found in the qualitative analysis, which 
associated short duration governments with economic and foreign policy deterioration. 
Our quantitative bivariate analysis supported such perception by revealing significant 
bivariate association between severity of external shocks and aging governments. The 
qualitative results also suggested that the duration of the coalition can be associated with 
both structural as well as event pressure variables. Deteriorations in economic and 
external circumstances while the government is in office accumulate shocks that 
undermine durability. The structural formation of the coalition becomes significantly 
important at time of external pressure. Larger coalitions appear to cope more durably 
with external threat than tight formations (supporting Warwick, 1992).
Table 6.9: Summary Table of Structural and Event Pressure Change Variables
Government Formation Competition Economic Changes Immigration Changes External Changes 
Short Duration
2 l-w low Elevated Same Same
12 l-w low Elevated Declined Elevated
16 s-t high Elevated Declined Declined
26 s-t high Elevated Same Elevated
Long Duration
7 l-w low Declined Elevated Declined
13 l-w low Declined Elevated Declined
18 s-t high Elevated Declined Elevated
25 s-t high Declined Same Declined
In the following chapter we revisit the literary discussions and explain the 
contribution of our findings to coalition theories as well as proposed refinement of our 
initial theorization. Further Interpretation to the significance of these results within the 
evolution of Israeli coalitions are elaborated. The Shortcomings and limitations of our 
study are evaluated and prospective research is proposed.
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CHAPTER 7
ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS 1949-1999: FORMATION AND DURATION
CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the findings of our quantitative and qualitative data 
analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings 
support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward tighter 
ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets, resulting in short duration coalitions, 
particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. Economic and 
external pressures, which were responsible for the formation of large coalitions before 
1969, had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many contemporary 
minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 period also 
appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition formations. 
Supports for our duration hypothesis were found in the significant negative association 
existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government duration. 
While competition was found to contradict long-duration proposition, large-sized and 
wide-ideological coalitions were found to have conditional impact, contributing to 
government longevity in situations of external threat. Supports to the ‘aging’ thesis 
demonstrated negative associations between economic as well as external ‘shocks’ and 
government duration.
Our comparative examination of Israeli coalitions revealed a significant 
behavioral shift following 1969’s Knesset election. Increasing parliamentary 
fragmentation and coalition competition mark the transformation. Throughout the ‘post­
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national’ period, with the exception of grand alliances forming to repel external threat, 
coalitions have gown more competitive and less tolerant to policy differences, forming 
narrow agendas and smaller sized cabinets in response to domestic and external 
pressures. This transformation appears to instigate shorter duration governments, and 
consequently, instable polity.
The limitations of our proposition are due to the small number of cases studies 
and to the cultural and political peculiarities of the country examined. The contribution 
to the general coalition theory, however, shows that coalitions need to be examined in 
light of important historic-national transformations. Theoretical models must take into 
consideration the country’s level of national fragmentation arising as a consequence of 
global transformation to reveal proper conclusions about coalition behaviors. Future 
studies can analyze countries of similar ethnic-cultural-political attributes, clustering 
them into levels of national fragmentation while taken global developments into 
consideration. The significance of such a proposition lies in forecasting the formation of 
durable and stable post-national governments.
The Political Relevancy of Event Pressure Variables
It is important to note that this study focuses on variables widely debated in 
theoretical literatures, and that these variables are relevant to Israel’s political and 
cultural peculiarities. Many other variables remain relevant and may often prove to have 
explanatory significance in the determination of coalition formation and duration. 
Prospective research may undertake the examination of other explanations, such as the
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impact of leadership charisma and personality in the formation of alliances. Leadership 
personality may also prove significant in the management of conflict among coalition 
partners, and thus help prolong duration of the coalition. Personal rivalry within the 
parties, as well as religious preferences and beliefs, may fuel disagreements and 
undermine the inclusiveness and/or duration of the coalition. Scandals and unexpected 
political developments may reshape coalition formation and undermine duration. This 
study does not claim to have discovered “the ultimate theory” of coalition formation and 
duration. Instead, this research represents a modest attempt to shed light on issues that 
seem to have reemerged, sometimes presenting a persistent pattern and at other times 
showing significant association with Israeli coalition formation and duration.
This study also attempts to reveal the significant level of association that may 
exist between the independent event variables and the dependent coalition behaviors. It 
is important, therefore, to note that association does not necessarily imply causation, but 
simply establishes the frequent occurrence of a particular set of events with a particular 
set of behaviors. Moreover, two reasons underlie the choice of studying particular 
independent variables rather than others. The first has often been established by previous 
research works that determine the importance and relevancy of particular independent 
variables in shaping a specific institution. The second is the examiner’s own intuition 
and research work. Both reasons were present in this study for selecting economic, 
external policy, and immigration event pressure variables. The political relevancy of 
these events and their significance in alliance behaviors may become further apparent 
when one follows the daily political developments in the country. In this section we
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follow the issues debated in the 13th Knesset election campaigns leading to the formation 
of the cabinet as covered by the daily Jerusalem Post. This is done in order to 
demonstrate that Israeli political party behaviors are often driven by the pressure 
variables which we claim to be significant in coalition politics.
The 13th Knesset election was a landmark in Israel political history. It revealed 
the fundamental issues that divide Israeli political parties and continue to shape their 
political alliances. Both the Likud and the Labor parties advanced fundamentally 
opposite programs and visions for peace, security, immigration, and economic policies. 
The following political debate that proceeded to the formation of the 25th government 
illustrates our point.
Foreign Policy Debate
Prime Minister and Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir, pronounced that, “Labor’s 
politicians are being driven out of their minds when they see the peace process pressing 
and the expansion of Israel’s international ties.” He was reacting to a statement by Labor 
campaign media chief Haim Ramon which undermined the peace effort being made in 
Washington by the current administration. In Ramon’s assessment, “It is quite obvious 
the negotiations have reached a dead end and the Likud is treading water. But the 
[impending] hasty return home of the Israeli delegation, despite the request of the Arab 
delegation, demonstrates the lack of any real desire to talk.”255 The accusations between 
the Labor and Likud parties was preceded by a heated campaign in which each portrayed
255 Jerusalem Post, May 1, 1992, p. 2.
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the other as an obstacle to peace and security. One ad posted by the Likud associated 
Labor Leader Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO’s Yasser Arafat.256
Underlining the disagreement over the peace process, Likud rejected concessions 
that could have yielded a Palestinian state, while the Labor party and the “peace camp” 
appeared willing to consider such a possibility. “A few more years of Likud rule, and no 
one will talk again about the possibility of a Palestinian state. That will be a totally 
unrealistic idea... There will no longer be the possibility of founding [a Palestinian state] 
in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, where hundreds of thousands of Jews will be living... the 
notion of territorial compromise will fade away like a bad dream,” said Shamir during a
n e n
Likud election campaign while Labor supporters demonstrated outside the hall. 
Meretz championed the opposite Zionist vision of peace. Author Amos Oz spoke at a 
Meretz campaign and announced that he would vote for Meretz “because its positions 
represent the most responsible Zionist options. [It is time] to give Palestine to the
T C O
Palestinians and receive Israel in return at long last.”
The electoral rhetoric continued to heat up between the competing parties. On 
June 1st, 1992, Likud represented the Labor platform as an ad, putting the country up for 
sale by promising wide territorial concessions to the Palestinians if they won the election. 
A statement by the Likud party described the Labor declaration as having “put Eretz 
Yisrael on an end-of-season sale when it published a defeatist platform which advocates
256 Jerusalem Post, May 1, 1992, p. 2.
257 Jerusalem Post, May 4, 1992, p. 2.
258 Jerusalem Post, May 4, 1992.
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far reaching territorial concessions.”259 Labor had declared in its electoral platform that 
“a peace process must be based on territorial compromise, in accordance with U.N 
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, while ruling out a return to the 1967 lines.”260
Immigration Policy Debate
During this period of time Israel received one of the largest waves of immigrants 
who arrived primarily from the Soviet Union. The immigration and absorption policy of 
the Shamir government was fundamentally linked with its vision of territorial expansion 
in the West Bank. This policy was opposed by the Bush administration and drove a 
wedge between the U.S. and Israel, leading to a freeze on loans to Israel that were 
formerly guaranteed by Washington. Immigration declined in 1992, but its massive 
burden was still felt in Israeli society. The pressure was manifested in the debate 
between the Likud government and the opposition and became a significantly divisive 
issue in the election campaign.
Reacting to the growing burden immigrants were placing on hospitals, Labor 
Histadrut spokesman David Tagar demanded that the government allocate funds to allow 
the building of facilities, the purchase of equipment, and the hiring of staff for an 
additional 1,000 hospital beds. Health Ministry spokesman Hagai Elias countered by 
saying that arrangements were being made to accommodate the serious crowding and 
overburdened staffs.261 In an editorial, Rabin accused the Shamir government of 
having done nothing for the immigrants. He described their situation upon arriving in
259 Jerusalem Post, June 1, 1992.
260 Labor’s electoral platform in Jerusalem Post, Supplement-Election 1992.
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Israel as having “no food to eat and no jobs to go to,” and he placed the blame on the 
administration as being a ‘‘good-for-nothing government [that] stands helplessly as the 
new immigrants lose what is most important to any human being -  their dignity.”262 
Rebuffing Rabin’s accusation at a meeting of the Likud ministers, Sharon described the 
current wave of immigrants as “spoiled”, yet he blamed the Labor party for the 
slowdown in Russian immigration by disseminating false information among the 
immigrants.263
240,000 of the country’s 3.4 million eligible voters were recent immigrants from 
the Soviet Union. A survey conducted by Tatzpit Research Institute found up to 190,000 
were expected to turn up at the polls, with enough electoral strength to determine at least 
eight Knesset seats. Most Russian immigrants leaned to Labor because of a general 
feeling that the Likud government was falling short of providing basic support for the 
newcomers. The Tehiya party began to emerge as an ethnic political group.264
Economic Policy Debate
The political division between Israeli political parties maintained the Left-Right 
positions in which each camp proposed opposite economic visions. Labor drew its 
support from the Histadrut and leaned toward advancing the interest of the Israeli labor 
unions. The Likud, on the other hand, pressed toward programs supporting economic 
liberalization and a free market economy. Meretz stood closer to Labor in its support of
261 Jerusalem Post, M ay 12, 1992, p. 2.
262 Jerusalem  Post, June 1, 1992, p. 12.
263 Jerusalem  Post, June 11, 1992, p. 2.
264 Jerusalem Post, June 5, 1992, p. 2.
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a welfare state with a mixed economy. Tsomet was closer to the Right and established 
the need for privatizing the public sector as a means of attracting foreign investment.
The debate between the Shamir Right wing government and the Left opposition 
continued, with each blaming the other for the country’s economic problems. The 
electoral platform of Likud finally spelled out the position of the party as aiming to 
“shape a free economy with the government merely providing the outlines of economic, 
monetary and fiscal policy, while cutting down state involvement. All government 
companies will be sold off; likewise all shares in state hands.'"(footnote?) This position 
was countered by that of Labor, which expressed a more cautious, Histadrut-oriented 
free market economy. In its Platform it declared that “the private, governmental and 
Histadrut sectors should all coexist in a mixed, competitive economy; conducted without 
any discrimination along business principles, offering equal opportunity for all.”265
Coalition Formation
Rabin declared, following Labor’s victory in the 13th Knesset, that his “strategy 
will be to change policy, to change the order of national priorities, to change the way the 
government functions and hopefully to change the electoral system...We will be shifting 
all government financing from what I call the political settlements to unemployment and 
other social and economic problems,” he said; “ we will freeze all the incentives and all 
the benefits that are given at the expense of the Israeli taxpayers to the political 
settlements.” He went on to state that economic and political pressures had been 
responsible for the decline in immigration: “the sharp reduction in the number of
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immigrants from Russia is related mainly to the economic problems, which are 
influenced by the political climate in Israel.”
Labor pursued formation of a broad coalition while initially ignoring negotiating 
with the NRP, who supported the Likud, particularly in relation to settlements and 
immigration. Labor Knesset faction leader Haim Ramon opened the door for a broad 
coalition that would exclude Likud and NRP but negotiate with Tsomet, Meretz, Shas, 
and United Torah Jerusalem.267
Tsomet leader Rafael Eitan, who won 8 seats in the Knesset, declared that Tsomet 
“will not deviate from its principles,” and rejected Rabin’s definition of “political 
settlements” which he believed could undermine settlements in the Territories.268 He 
further opposed the government policy guidelines as set forth by Labor. Meretz, from the 
Left, also rejected the guidelines since “it makes no mention of substantive and basic 
issues such as UN resolution 242, a settlement freeze, full autonomy and [Palestinian] 
election in the territories.”269 To avoid a split with Meretz, Rabin offered the party the 
Education Ministry. Giving the ministry to a secular party meant a breach with religious 
groups. United Torah Jerusalem criticized this offer and broke away from the 
negotiation. Shas, on the other hand, decided to join after its Council of Sages gave 
party leader Aryeh Deri the go-ahead to enter the coalition based on the promise that the
265 Labor’s electoral platform in Jerusalem Post, Supplement-Election 1992.
266 Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1992, p. 1.
267 Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1992, p. 2. Tsomet is a right nationalist party with strong ties to settlers. 
Meretz is a dovish social-democratic party. Shas is an Orthodox-Sephardic party. United Torah Jerusalem 
is a religious party. NRP is a religious party with strong ties to settlers.
268 Jerusalem Post, June 30, 1992, p. 2.
269 Jerusalem Post, July 2, 1992, p. 2.
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party would receive the Interior Ministry and two deputy ministers.270 Shas’ position was 
also dependent upon Rabin temporarily holding the religious affairs portfolio.
Meretz finally joined the coalition on the condition of preserving its position 
regarding the Palestinian question and the inclusion of another principle in the 
government guidelines, in which the PLO would be recognized as a partner in peace 
negotiations. On July 10, the new coalition was formed and was among the narrowest of 
labor-led alliances.271 The partners were Labor, Meretz, and Shas. Tsomet and Likud’s 
opposition to the Labor coalition’s economic, immigration-settlement, and foreign policy 
principles were among the major reasons for their exclusion. Thus, the consequence of 
economic, immigration, and foreign policy pressures were felt in the political debate 
leading to the formation of a tight coalition.
Findings and Discussion:
a. Coalition Formation
Several hypotheses were initially advanced in this study in order to examine 
coalitions’ behaviors in both formation and duration. The first hypothesis suggested that 
“high coalition competition presses toward wider-ideological parameter and larger-sized 
cabinets ” (Figure 2.1). Our trend analysis of twenty-eight Israeli governments revealed a 
consistent increase in coalition competition over time, particularly following the 1969 
Israeli Knesset election. This trend was evident through the decline in the dominant 
party’s power index over the years indicating greater fragmentation and, therefore,
270 Jerusalem Post, July 9, 1992, p. 2.
271 Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1992, p. 1.
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competition within the consecutive Israeli Knessets (Figure 4.1). Nonetheless, our 
analysis of coalitions’ size and ideological parameters did not reveal a similar inverse 
pattern as to confirm our hypothesis (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). On the contrary, our 
case studies of eight Israeli governments suggested that the null hypothesis was correct. 
This conclusion agrees with Mershon (1996, 2001) in the sense that the cost of coalition 
membership increases with competition. The result of the qualitative analysis supports 
the trend analysis in showing that smaller coalitions established after 1969 encountered 
higher levels of coalition competition than larger government formed before1969 (Table
6.8). Our conclusion supports the null proposition that high coalition competition presses 
toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets.
The rationality of this conclusion is based on two foundations. First, that greater 
coalition competition is the consequence of the declined power of the dominant party. 
This situation instigates a multi-polar parliamentary system, rather than a monopole, with 
each pole hardly capturing the minimum-required seat for a majority coalition. The 
second rationale can be made in the required efficiency (small-tight) for a coalition under 
multi-polarity to maintain rank and discourage splinter parties from defection to an 
opposite pole. Efficient formation provides maximum benefits among smaller numbers of 
coalition partners in terms of government resources and portfolios, and hence reduces 
defection opportunities (Mershon, 1996, 2001). This conclusion leads us back to confirm 
Riker’s classical proposition that minimum winning formation is the rational aim of 
coalitions (Riker, 1962). However, our conclusion presupposes conditional structural 
variables represented by the level of parliamentary competition. Riker’s classical thesis,
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our study proposes, is confirmed to the extent to which parliamentary competition over 
government formation is elevated. Likewise, Riker’s thesis is contradicted whenever 
parliamentary competition declines (confirming Liphart; 1977, 1984).
The other aspect of coalition formation analysis is the impact of domestic and 
foreign event pressures on the ways coalitions formed. It was initially hypothesized that 
“events’ pressure moves a coalition toward consensualism and therefore a larger 
formation and wider ideological parameters.” The trend analysis revealed that two 
pressure variables have consistently increased over the years: foreign aid and annual 
number of strikers per strike (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3). It was expected that while 
increase in foreign aid reduced external pressure, the annual number of strikers per strike 
increased domestic pressure on government formation. In our quantitative analysis, we 
found that the increase in the number of strikers per strike was correlated with the 
decrease in the ideological parameter, contrary to our expectation (Table 4.2). 
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis revealed that increased immigration pressure is 
associated with smaller sized cabinets (Table 4.4). Both of these findings supported our 
null hypothesis in suggesting that “events’ pressures polarize coalitions toward tighter 
formations.”
Our case analysis, which combined the various internal and external pressure 
variables, provided a result contrary to our quantitative analysis, revealing that the 
combined internal and external pressures were often associated with the formation of 
large coalitions with wide ideological parameters. Such a relationship was found to be
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particularly strong before 1969, where economic pressures positively impacted the size of 
the coalition (confirming Robertson, 1986). Immigration pressure appeared to be 
negatively associated with coalition formation, particularly in the post-1969 era. Modem 
Israeli immigration policy seems to have been creating a greater wedge between Israeli 
political parties. This is the case particularly when we recognize the various polarizing 
religious, ethnic, and settlements aspects associated with Jewish immigration. Likewise 
when we considered the external policy domain we found that external pressure, which 
was positively associated with the structural formation of pre-1969 governments 
(asserting our quantitative result), appeared to have been negatively associated with the 
post-1969 governments (asserting our qualitative result). Thus, based on our analyses of 
Israeli coalitions we conclude that our hypothesis was largely confirmed in regard to pre- 
1969 coalition formations (Figure 7.1), but strongly contradicted in the post-1969 period 
(Figure 7.2). After 1969, coalitions appear to have emerged less accommodative to minor 
pressures, producing an exclusive formation pattern that supported our null hypothesis. 
Our hypothesis is confirmed for governments formed before 1969 while our null 
hypothesis is confirmed for the period thereafter, with formation becoming negatively 
sensitive to additional pressure variables.
Emerging as a newly formed state and isolated by hostile borders, economic 
development became by far the most important task for Israeli governments. It was the 
economy that threatened the fundamental foundation of Israel as a nation. Despite the 
various international treaties that guaranteed the protection of Israeli borders, such as the 
Armistice Agreements, the U.N. charter, European and U.S. assistance, Israel remained
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hostage to Arab threats of its annihilation. Accommodating massive waves of 
immigrants, establishing a national economy, and achieving national security were 
crucial tasks forcing political parties to seek unity and coalition accommodation. Thus, 
the rationale for the tremendous economic, social, and external pressures that existed 
before 1969, and their significant positive association with the structural orientation of 
the Israeli coalitions, can be observed from this perspective. Early Israeli governments 
were established large, accommodating a wide range of parties representing the national 
spectrum of Israeli society (confirming Robertson, 1984, 86; Lipjhart, 1977, 84).
The post-1969 period witnessed tremendous economic, social, and security leaps. 
Israel emerged as an economic and military regional superpower, thus undermining prior 
national alliances. Post-1969 coalitions grew more competitive and less tolerant to minor 
internal and external circumstances, hence forming smaller and ideologically tighter. In 
response to pressures, and with the exception of national governments established to 
repel severe external threats, we observed that coalition governments formed after 1969 
to have been narrowly established (contrary to Robertson, 1984 or Lipjhart 1977, 84). 
Thus we conclude that our hypothesis that stated “events’ pressure presses coalition 
toward consensualism and therefore larger formation and wider ideological parameter” 
is confirmed for the period before 1969 era (Figure 7.1) while the null hypothesis is 
confirmed for the latter, suggesting that “events’ pressure polarizes coalition toward 
fragmentation and therefore smaller formation and tighter ideological parameter" 
(Figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.1: General Israeli Coalition Formation Model Before 1969
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b. Coalition Duration
The third proposed hypothesis aimed at examining the relationship between 
domestic and external pressures and the durability of coalitions. The hypothesis 
suggested, “increase in events’ pressure yields shorter coalition durations” (Figure 2.4). 
Furthermore, the hypothesis sets the stage for the examination of the aging thesis, which 
claimed that “the impact o f increasing event pressure becomes more significant in 
shortening the duration o f coalitions as they age. ” In the qualitative comparative case 
study the changes in economic pressure during the life of the coalition emerged as a 
dominant variable impacting duration. It was found that economic deterioration during 
the life of the coalition, or increase in economic pressure, shortens the durability of the 
coalition (Table 6.9). Again, this was a further assertion regarding Roberston’s thesis 
about the significance of economic indicators in determining governments’ duration 
(Robertson 1983, 84). Furthermore, it was qualitatively revealed that elevated economic 
pressure contributes to the accumulation of “shocks” that help bring quick endings to 
coalitions. This qualitative conclusion confirmed Diermeier and Stevenson’s as well as 
Browne’s theses that accumulative shocks undermine the duration of the government 
(Browne, 1984, 86, 88; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). Our qualitative study attributes 
to “economic shocks” the most important determinant of coalition dissolution and 
confirms our hypothesis
This finding reasserted the significance of economic pressure having the most 
determinant role in Israeli coalition politics. The confirmation of our hypotheses
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establishes a priority to economic consideration in Israeli coalition formation and 
duration analyses. Economic pressures have determined, to a large extent, the 
dimensional structure of coalition formation. And more significantly, economic 
pressures have determined the prospect of coalitions’ durability (Warwick, 1992).
Another significant domestic pressure variable found in our qualitative analysis to 
have an association with coalition duration was immigration pressure. High immigration 
pressure was another factor, in addition to the economy, which was found responsible for 
short Israeli coalition durations (Table 6.8). This finding was a further assertion of 
economic pressure having a dominant impact on coalition behaviors. While immigration 
pressure is not strictly of an economic nature, it comprises major economic functions. 
Housing, education, job training, integration, settlement, and employment of the new 
immigrants can largely be associated with economic costs; thus adding to economic 
pressure and consequently shorter duration governments.
External pressure was another important dimension of Israeli coalition politics. In 
our qualitative analysis we found association between duration analysis and external 
pressure variables. In accordance with hypothesis 3 the case study revealed that, during a 
government’s term in office, the accumulation of external pressure was a factor 
responsible for additional shocks contributing to early termination (Table 6.9). Most 
successful Israeli governments that endured for extended stays in power functioned under 
situations of declined external pressures, contrary to short duration governments. Further 
assertion of this conclusion was provided by our robust regression where we found that
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increase in foreign assistance helped to reduce external pressure and contribute to longer 
duration coalitions.
Indeed, Israeli foreign policy emerged unique among the nations. The historic 
opposition of the Arab states to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish nation, 
confronted with the opposition of Israel to the creation of an independent Arab 
Palestinian State, was a major source of tension and external pressure exerted on Israeli 
coalition politics. The different positions of Israeli parties in regard to external issues, 
largely those related to peace with the Arabs and particularly the issue of a Palestinian 
State in the Occupied Territories since 1967, constituted major dilemmas in maintaining 
alliances. Our findings suggest that, during coalitions’ terms in office, reduction in 
tensions due to external issues contributed to lasting alliances.
In the final analysis we concluded that our hypothesis was largely confirmed both 
quantitatively and qualitatively in asserting that “increase in events ’ pressure yields 
shorter coalition durations. ” Furthermore, our analysis confirmed the ‘aging thesis’ 
which proposed that “the impact o f increasing event pressure becomes more significant 
in shortening the duration o f coalitions as they age. ” Our qualitative analysis to 
economic shocks revealed confirmation to the ‘aging thesis’ as Roberston proposed. 
Deterioration in economic or external conditions during a government’s time is 
associated with short duration government (Table 6.9). Similarly, our bivariate 
quantitative analysis revealed significant assertion of the association existing between
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external conflict and the duration of the government, suggesting that the termination of 
long-durable (old) government is associated with external conflicts.
In addition to the ‘events’ impact on durational analysis, structural associations 
were also considered in this study. The association of coalition competition with duration 
was proposed in hypothesis 4 which suggested, “increase in coalition competition 
contributes to longer coalition durations. ” The null association was found significant in 
our quantitative analyses. The quantitative robust regression analysis showed that the 
increase in competition was associated with shorter duration governments (confirming 
Grofman, Roozentaal’s (1997) and rejecting Mershon (1996, 2001)). We were not able to 
either assert or reject this proposition in our qualitative analysis.272 We accept the 
quantitative result due to the larger number of coalitions involved in the analysis, which 
our qualitative analysis lacked. Thus, we assert the null hypothesis, which stated that 
“increase in coalition competition contributes to shorter coalition durations. ”273
The relationship linking coalition size and ideological structure with duration was 
proposed in hypotheses 5 and 6 respectively, that “widening ideological parameter 
shortens coalition duration ” and “enlarging the size o f the coalition shortens coalition 
duration. ” In our qualitative study we found that ideological and size formations that 
properly responded to external pressure yielded durable coalitions. In other words, the 
association of durational analysis to the structural formation of the coalition was found
272 In  ou r sam ple of co a litio n s studied we found that in situations of high competition two coalitions were 
of short duration while two were of long duration. In situations of low competition, on the other hand, two 
coalitions were of short duration while the other two where of long duration (see Table 6.8).
273 See previous discussion about the rationality of this null hypothesis which was elaborated in chapter 2.
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relevant when such a formation corresponded to external pressure. Whenever the 
structural formation of the coalition was contradictory to external pressure, as proposed 
in hypothesis 2, coalition duration shortened (Table 6.8). This conclusion asserts 
Warwick’s claim against Browne that the structure, not only the event, is responsible for 
the ability of a government to endure shocks (Warwick, 1994). Yet, this study found 
some structural formations may prove to insulate coalitions from shocking events more 
effectively than others. This study suggested that durational analysis could be relevant to 
coalition formations when coalitions are efficiently structured in reaction to external 
pressure. Thus, we find that our hypothesis is conditionally confirmed and the increase in 
a coalition’s size and ideological parameter can be positively associated with duration 
whenever such an increase corresponds to external pressure.274
In addition to revealing the importance of parliamentary structure, the above 
findings assert the importance of foreign policy issues in determining the prospective 
duration of Israeli alliances. In order to manage their fragilities, alliances need to take a 
critical approach to external issues. Grand alliances help establish long duration 
coalitions when faced by severe external threats, such as war. In contrast, narrowly 
formed alliances were short-lived when confronted with typical external circumstances. 
The presence of coalition competition or its absence may further contribute to duration. 
This is a further illustration that Browne’s thesis needed to consider structural variables 
that may undermine the impact of ‘shocks’ in durational analysis as proposed by
274 Our quan tita tive  analysis does not include a conditional external conflict analysis. Such a statistical 
design goes beyond our empirical design and the limitation imposed by our small number of cases.
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Warwick (1994), Grofman and Roozentaal (1997), Laver and Shepsle (1998, 1999), as 
well as Diermeir and Stevenson (1999).
This study suggested that not all event pressures have equally and consistently 
impacted coalition formations, and not all formations properly responded to pressures 
yielding long duration governments. Perhaps radical historic transformations may have 
altered aspects of coalition behaviors. Following 1969, it can be observed that the Israeli 
coalition system has transformed into a competitive structure, thus changing important 
expectations of coalitions’ formations and duration. The impact of economic pressure on 
formation, for example, was reversed and additional relevant variables emerged. 
Coalitions that formed large as a consequence of economic pressures before 1969, 
formed small in response to lower pressure afterward. This study found that proper 
coalition formations, properly structured in reaction to external pressure, as well as 
consideration of the existing level of parliamentary competition, provided the best 
guarantee of lasting governments. Coalitions that formed large in reaction to mounting 
external pressure during low level of parliamentary competition were among the best- 
survived cabinets. Coalitions formed small while having low levels of external conflict 
and parliamentary competition had a better chance to last in power. Since 1969, and with 
the increasing level of competition, coalitions grew more polarized in their formation and 
their alliances became more sensitive to event pressure (see Duration Model, Figure 7.3).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 7 8
Figure 7.3: Duration Model
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General Theoretical Implication for Israeli Coalition Formation and Duration
Our findings supported the view that claimed Israeli coalition politics prior to 
1969 to have been differently structured than afterwards. The early period of Israel’s 
history reflected national consensus faced by national building tasks. Security, economic 
pressure, and immigration absorptions were among the major challenges that enforced 
political unity among the various sectors of Israeli society (Issac, 1976; Lann, 1996; 
Felber, 1997; Arian, 1998). This was translated in the democratic society through 
parliamentary coalition building politics. Many Israeli governments in the pre-1969 
period were formed larger by size and more receptive to various ideological partnerships, 
amid low level of coalition competition. Coalition behaviors throughout this period
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support Lipjhart’s thesis of consensualism in pluralistic societies (Lijphart, 1977, 
1984).275
In this study we found that these challenges acted as event pressures leading 
governments in pre-1969 to be based on large alliances with wide ideological spectrums. 
Economic pressure emerged as having the most imprints on coalition formations. 
Permanent economic pressures in this period led to the establishment of grand alliances 
(confirming Robertson, 1984). The fate of these alliances, upon formation, was 
determined by economic and external political developments. Economic deterioration 
often meant early coalition breakup and dissolution contrary to situations of economic 
progress. Large coalitions responded more effectively to external pressures and proved 
capable of lasting in power, overcoming internal disputes and divisions; while tight 
coalitions faced with typical circumstances shortly collapsed (confirming Warwick, 
1994). Low coalition competition further contributed to longevity of coalitions through 
this early period (confirming Grofman and Roozendaal, 1997).
The dominance of Mapai throughout the pre-1969 Knesset undermined the ability 
of challenging coalitions to be formed. Mapai’s dominance provided the party with the 
luxury to form larger alliances and share government resources with minor ideologically 
odd parties without fearing a “coalition coup d'etat" (confirming Mershon, 1996, 2001). 
Mapai’s coalition governments often included, in addition to religious blocs, rightist 
parties such as General Zionists, the Liberals, and even Gahal. Mapai’s unchallengeable
275 Lipjhart (1977, 1984) claim ed that pluralistic nations consisting o f  various ethnic groups tend to form 
consensual political ruling alliances contrary to situations in homogeneous countries.
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power contributed further to the formation of lasting and consensual national 
governments that were capable of confronting primarily economic challenges, foreign 
threats, and immigration pressure (rejecting Mershon, 1996, 2001).
Post-1969 achievements were evident in various national spheres, most notably in 
economic development. Post-1969 Israel became industrially oriented, achieving a 
dramatic increase in GNP, exports, growth, and foreign investment. Security threats were 
to a large extent contained by Israel’s military edge and a series of peace agreements. 
Afterl969 Israel became more susceptible to ‘normal’ democratic factional politics 
within an increasingly complex society. This study showed that the decline in economic 
and external stress combined with the increase in competition among rival dominant 
parties were politically reflected in lesser structural need for consensual coalition 
formation (Figure 7.4). The increase of competitiveness among Israel’s dominant parties 
was marked by a substantial decline in the Labor party’s dominance over the Knesset 
(Figure 7.5). Coalition politics in post-1969 Israel were contradictory to Lijphart’s 
views, which emphasized consensualism in pluralistic societies (Lijphart, 1977, 1984). 
Both the decline in economic and external stress and the increase in structural 
competitiveness of the Knesset contributed to the formation of many minimum-winning 
coalitions in this period (Riker, 1963). Grand alliances, in the same period, were formed 
as a consequence of external threat rather than economic pressure. For example, the 
national government that was maintained by Prime Minister Meir following the 1967 
War, Shamir and Peres following the 1982 War, or Sharon following the 2000 Palestinian 
Intefadah.
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Figure 7.4 provides another illustration of the declined emphases of economic 
objectives by Israeli governments. Israeli government policy guidelines expressed the 
various policy objectives of each coalition upon formation. These policies included a 
variety of tasks set forth by each cabinet, ranging from strengthening security, achieving 
peace, fostering immigration, to pursuing particular economic plan (Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed discussion of Governments’ Policy Guidelines). After these guidelines were 
content-coded the percentages of statements stressing economic policies by each 
government were plotted in Figure 7.4. The trend demonstrates that earlier governments 
preoccupied themselves with emphasizing economic policies more than later cabinets. 
Early Israeli governments dedicated 20% to 40% of their policy guidelines to economic 
plans while more recent government guidelines fell below 20%. This Figure provides 
additional indications to support that economic pressure was a more significant factor in 
earlier Israeli coalitions than in later ones.
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Figure 7.4s Economic Policy Priority in Government’s Guidelines (1949-1999)276
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Figure 7.5 provides further demonstration for the combined impact of both 
economic pressure (% of statements emphasized by each government’s policy guidelines) 
and Knesset competitiveness (as indicated in the % of dominant party power index) on 
the structural formation of the government (the number of Knesset seats controlled by a 
coalition’s parties). The Figure reflects a synchronized trend between three variables:
276 From M arch, 1974 until August, 1981 (16th -1 9 th governments) policy priorities focused on issues such 
as peace, government corruption, support o f religious institutions. Econom ic questions were not of 
immediate concern. Overshadowing econom ic concerns were post-1973 peace plans with Egypt and the 
rise o f the Likud to government following the 1977 national election. The 21st government was that o f
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increase in economic pressure and increase in dominant party power index (decrease in 
competitiveness) is reflected in a similar trend in coalition size.
Figure 7.5 s Economic Policy Guidelines, Dominant Party Power Index, and 
Coalition Size by Government (1949-1999)277
120.00
1 1 $ W$
100.00  • ' ' 
i j  v ,80.00  -
'  A  '61001 . / \ j  1 /  :
20.00 
.00
ili!Blll!Ii!IBIIllIsSllIBlllBli^ iMliMI#>
- 20.00  - -  - - - - -  - - -       - - - - - - -
Government
I_________________________ _____________________________
Source: Government Policy Guidelines (1949-1999), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
—♦— % Dominant Party Power Index 
— % Economic Policies 
# of coalition S ea ts
national unity formed in Septem ber 1984 and was primarily occupied with the War in Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Intefadah.
277 From  M arch, 1974 until A ugust, 1981 (16th - 1 9 th governm ents) policy priorities focused on issues such 
as peace, government corruption, support of religious institutions. Economic questions were not of 
immediate concern. Overshadowing economic concerns were post-1973 peace plans with Egypt and the 
rise of the Likud to government following the 1977 national election. The 21st government was that of 
national unity formed in September 1984 and was primarily occupied with the W ar in Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Intefadah.
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Economic performance, this study showed, was one of the primary determinants 
of government duration (Robertson, 1983, 1984). This agrees with our findings above, 
showing that the economy has played a central role in Israeli democratic politics. 
Economic pressure was relevant to structural formation. Furthermore, this study revealed 
that the extent to which economic pressures were resolved determined the capacity of the 
government to last in power. In the pre-1969 period resolution of economic pressure 
increased the durability of governments in power. However, post-1969, additional 
factors relevant to government duration were primarily external and immigration 
pressure, combined with increased competition.
Among the additional factors found relevant to duration analysis, particularly 
after1969, was government foreign policy performance. After 1967 Israel was no longer 
in a position of merely defending its right to exist as a nation, but it had to increasingly 
justify its occupation of newly captured territories populated by a Palestinian majority. 
Despite military supremacy and enhanced national security, the subsequent Israeli 
governments had to shield themselves from international condemnation for “illegal 
occupation” and work more skillfully in the diplomatic arena. In this study we have 
shown the relevancy of increased foreign aid in prolonging the duration of the 
government. We have further demonstrated that governments which existed amid low 
external pressure lasted longer in power (Gov. 7, 13, and 25). The 25th government of 
Prime Minister Rabin was a case in point. The government was able to survive various 
no-confidence votes while not commanding a majority of seats in the Knesset. Yet, its 
various achievements in reducing external pressure, particularly signing the peace
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8 5
agreements with both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, helped prolong its longevity 
with the support of external votes.278
Figure 7.6: Foreign Policy Priority in Government’s Guidelines (1949-1999)279
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Figure 7.6 demonstrates a steady increase in Israeli governments’ emphasis on 
foreign policy issues. Foreign policies were emphasized by later Israeli governments in 
reaction to growing issues in this domain.
278 Two sources of outside support helped the  government defeat no-confidence votes. The Arab MKs 
voted with the government w h ile  Shas’ MKs refrained from voting with the opposition.
21916th L abor-led  government was that of P.M. Golda Meir of 1974. It emerged after the October, 1973 
w ar and w as overwhelmingly concerned with the question of peace in the Middle East. It was also among 
the shortest lived governments of Israel, lasting only 90 days.
19th government was a Likud-led government overwhelmingly concerned with religious affairs.
2 1 st and 22nd governments w ere  national unity governments arising after 1982 w ar in Lebanon and 
continuing though the Palestinian Intefadah.
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In addition to resolution of external pressure, the duration of Israeli governments 
emerged as a function of structural formation. This study demonstrated that governments 
rationally formed in reaction to external pressure lasted longer in power. In other words, 
coalitions formed on a larger basis when external pressure was high or on a smaller basis 
when external pressure was low were the ‘rational’ and durable governments. 
Competition also emerged as relevant to duration. The increase in coalition competition 
after 1969 has exerted additional pressure, undermining the durability of the government.
Israel is a country of immigrants. Massive immigration to Israel exerted great 
pressure on the country’s institutions, particularly in the early period of nationhood. 
Housing, welfare, jobs, education, religion and cultural integration for the new 
immigrants were among the few imperative tasks faced by governments. After 1969, 
government immigration policy became more controversial, fueling religious, ethnic, and 
settlement disputes. These represented additional pressure on governments leading them 
to terminate relatively quickly whenever immigration pressure was high.
Our above discussion demonstrates that event and structure variables are relevant 
to both the formation and the duration of governments. In the case of Israel, coalition 
competitiveness (structure), economic and immigration pressures (internal events), and 
foreign policy pressure (external events) are found to be the primary determinants of 
coalition systematic formation. Furthermore, government duration was also found to be 
determined by structured formations and event variables. In eight Israeli governments we 
found that increases in internal and external pressures, along with ‘irrational’ structural
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formations responding to external pressure, undermined the duration of the government. 
The relative increase in competition was also found among the structural variables that 
have undermined the durability of the government.
Figure 7.7 combines both foreign and economic policies emphasized by the 
various Israeli coalitions within their respective policy guidelines. The trend shows a 
decline in economic emphasis in favor of external policy. This suggests that pressure 
exerted on Israeli coalition politics has been of increasingly external orientation. Thus, if 
trends continue along the same path, we should expect future Israeli coalitions to take 
foreign policy, an arising determinant of coalition unity and stability, as a more essential 
factor in coalition building.
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Figure 7.7: Foreign and Economic Policy Priorities in Government’s Guidelines
(1949-1999)
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Significance of Findings to Coalitions’ Formations and Duration Theories
The study finds that there are no contradictions between policy-based and 
structural or size-based research. Coalitions’ ideological parameters increase with 
coalition size. More participants in the coalitions mean more ideological concessions. 
This suggests that minimum winning coalitions are among the most ideologically tight 
structures, contrary to grand coalitions. Parties strive for minimum formations 
(confirming Riker, 1962) but are often confronted with events’ pressures to stretch 
beyond the boundaries of “efficiency” (confirming Robertson, 1986 Lipjhart, 1977, 
1984). These pressures shape formations and consequently determine coalition duration. 
The first important aspect of coalition formations is the parliamentary structural context.
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This structural component is best captured by the degree of competitiveness within the 
system. A competitive system, with many potential winning coalitions, acts just like a 
competitive economic system in producing “efficient” formations or enterprises 
(confirming Mershon; 1996, 2001). Whenever competitiveness is reduced, other variables 
become relevant in determining formations. Most significant to formation analysis are 
the economic and security well-being of the country. Severe economic and external 
pressure on the country forces greater formative accommodation (confirming Robertson, 
1986). When confronted with severe economic pressures, coalitions often formed large 
as to maintain national unity in confronting domestic threats (confirming Lipjhart; 1977, 
1984 and rejecting Riker, 1962). Yet, increasing coalition competition fuels rivalry 
between dominant parties and coalitions grow less tolerant to event pressures, thus 
forming among a smaller number of partners (confirming Mershon; 1996, 2001 and 
Riker, 1962 and rejecting Robertson, 1986 and Lipjhart; 1977,1984).
Following formation, maintaining a coalition, i.e., prolonging its life, becomes the 
second significant aspect of coalition politics. Reduced event pressures help the 
government repels reasons for early termination and prolong its stay in power. Most 
importantly in this regard are the changes in economic and external pressures as well as 
immigration pressure, their elevation providing mounting reasons for early termination 
(confirming Browne, 1984, 1986, 1988). The second aspect of duration is competition. 
The durability of a coalition is enhanced whenever the chances of a competing coalition 
to control a winning majority in the Knesset are reduced (confirming Grofman and 
Roozentaal ,1997 and rejecting Mershon, 1996, 2001). The third aspect of duration is the
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structural formation of a government that responded to external pressure. Larger 
formation responding to external pressure prolongs government duration. Also, small 
formation responding to low external pressure has a similar impact (confirming Warwick, 
1994).
Thus, the theoretical contribution of this study is to provide new avenues in which 
both structural and event pressures are combined in analyzing coalition formation and 
duration behaviors. This has been achieved by taking the coalition as the unit of analysis 
while making the distinction between important historic eras to which our model can be 
separately applied. Our study demonstrates that the application of theoretical models 
must carefully consider national historic transformations. Coalition formation theories 
may provide contradictory results when applied to countries undergoing varying levels of 
economic and global transformation. As the case of Israeli coalitions demonstrated, 
nations undergoing early nation building prioritize consensus and unity in alliance 
formations in order to confront common tasks. However, the situation is often changed 
after the same nation matures economically and internationally and begins to globalize. 
Post-nationalism boosts political fragmentation and competition, and undermines, as a 
consequence, consensual coalition behaviors. The immediate consequence is greater 
ethnic and ideological polarization that can potentially undermine the stability (duration) 
of national alliances.
Our theoretical finding synthesizes both the Rational-Efficient model, initially 
advanced by Riker (1962), later elaborated and revised by Dodd (1976, 84), Strom
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(1984), Laver and Shepsle (1990, 96), and the Ideological-Interest model, suggested by 
Lipset and Rokhan, (1967), Axlerod (1970), de Swaan (1973); Lipjhart (1977), Warwick 
(1979), Baron (1993) and Dunleavy (2001). Evidence of Lipjhart’s “consensual theory” 
in pluralist societies is demonstrated in the cases of Israeli governments being established 
in reaction to economic and external pressures, particularly before 1969. Evidence 
suggests that ideological cleavages are overcome during early periods of nation building. 
Riker’s view about minimum winning coalition formation, on the other hand, is found to 
be plausible in post-national periods where political circumstances approach ‘normalcy’ 
and/or ‘complexity’, i.e., society is no longer confronted with threats to its fundamental 
foundations. This situation became evident in Israeli polity after 1969, where political 
parties further factionalized into a multi-polar Knesset.
The differences in Israeli coalition behaviors through two distinct periods of time, 
before and after 1969, invite additional considerations and conditions to political 
analysis. Lipset and Rokhan’s “freezing hypothesis”, that established the 20th century 
ideological struggle to have been shaped by the same tenets of the industrial and national 
revolution of the 19th century, must be viewed in a different light. Our analysis of Israeli 
politics, which distinguishes between two political periods, before and after 1969, 
demonstrates rapid national development indicated by a shift in the priorities of coalition 
building. Economic progress, and perhaps globalization, appears to have liberated 
national politics, particularly that of multi-ethnic and pluralistic societies, from the 
tradition of national consensualism toward greater ethno-political fragmentations, and 
therefore, political competition. Morgan Pederson was correct to characterize modem
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political alignments as being in a state of ideological detachment and electoral volatility 
(Pederson, 1990), yet, examining the impact of globalization on national politics can 
perhaps further enrich the explanation of the realignment phenomenon.
The liberation of politics from the strict tasks of nation building toward a process 
of global integration seems to constitute the essence of a new coalition synthesis. While 
this study did not undertake fully the examination of the global transformation impact on 
national politics, it provided greater support for such a paradigmatic perception. The 
decline in ideological commitment in favor of greater ethno-political fragmentation 
constitutes an important aspect of this process (contradicting Lipjhart, 1977, 1984). Such 
a process, this study demonstrates, is manifested in shifting pressures and increasing 
fragmentation among parties making coalition building hardly consensual and, thus, 
giving greater thrust to the formation of minimum winning coalitions (reasserting Riker, 
1962).
The conclusions established in this study are constrained by the small size of 
examined coalitions. Quantitative examination included only 28 cases while qualitative 
case study focused on only eight governments. Other limitations to our proposition stem 
from the country we studied whose unique political and cultural attributes may have 
undermined our theoretical assertions in regard to other countries. Despite the reliability 
limitation imposed on our theoretical assertions, the generalization made in this study 
provides partial support to various theoretical traditions and provides ground for the 
examination of a synthetically oriented theory. Thus, we consider the generalization
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made to constitute a base that can stimulate research that takes into consideration our 
results, which we view as necessary for the advancement of a comprehensive coalition 
theory.
The Transformation of Politics from Nationalism toward Globalism
Franklin and Mackie question: “what it is about these countries that make them 
different?” (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688). The answer to this question, they suggest, 
“might provide us with powerful additional variables with which to attack the problem of 
predicting coalition formations.” (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688). The answer to such 
a question must be examined in light of the impact of global transformations on countries 
like Israel, a subject that can be further elaborated by future research. As we have 
established in this study, study of a country needs to look at the time period that signals a 
shift from national to global politics. Toward such a thesis we must look at countries’ 
ethnic fabrics and evaluate their internal tendencies toward global integration and 
national fragmentation, as well as their coalition and parliamentary political formations.
The question can be further extended as to whether we can establish an 
association between coalition duration and global integration. Browne, Frenderis, and 
Gleiber’s studies (1984, 1986,1988) provided extensive emphasis on environmental 
developments as primary factors determining the lifespans of coalitions. Events, they 
claimed, place accumulative pressure on coalition partners to split. Unforeseen wars, 
flow of refugees, economic crises, scandals, etc... are events that invite increasing 
differences and divisions within ruling alliances. This theme seems to suggest that global
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events invite greater challenges to traditional alliances and their durability. Globalization 
entails far-reaching events with dramatic impacts that include cultural, political, 
economic, and environmental transformations. Should we then expect that alliances 
formed in modem times will be of shorter duration (less stable) as a consequence of 
dramatic global transformation shocks?
Shorter government durations and increased instabilities could perhaps be 
rational conclusions to the rapid global transformations that are storming nations. 
However, our study suggests that the structural situation might often counteract the 
impact of events on coalition duration. This confirms Warwick’s views that structural 
variables hold important determinant power when events are controlled (Warwick, 1992, 
p. 875). In our study we have found evidence to support Warwick’s thesis that properly 
structured coalitions- in reaction to external pressures events -  are more resistant to 
environmental pressure, and therefore, are often more durable.
Coalition formation and duration, this study established, is a permanent process 
conditioned by institutional limitations as well as environmental political developments. 
Considerations of the time period as well as the country and its social fabric are serious 
factors that need to be integrated within the analysis of coalition theories. The world is 
rapidly changing toward global integration with radical consequences on national 
politics. It is no longer valid to examine coalition politics today by the same standards 
that governed countries in previous decades and it is difficult to impose the previous 
standards on modem coalition behaviors. The solution to this dilemma may lay in
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categorizing democratic systems according to their respective levels of national 
development or global integration, i.e., by the extent to which countries have achieved 
social cohesiveness and economic development within the international arena. Leaders 
and policy makers can then foresee the shape and the prospect of durable coalitions. A 
comparative analysis of several countries may prove useful in this regard. Applying our 
model to future research might be achieved by grouping proportional representative 
democratic countries according to their respective level of existing fragmentation and 
ethnic plurality, economic development, and security pressure. Each country will, thus, 
be included in two samples where each is distinguished by its level of national 
transformation. Turkey, Pakistan, India, Italy, South Africa as well as many South 
American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, are suitable candidates for such a 
comparative examination. These countries have encountered dramatic national 
transformations as evident in economic growth while their coalition politics have 
confronted mounting global transformation pressure. Prospective research can determine 
the historic periods in which global impact has marked the political transformation in 
these countries. All coalition governments will then be grouped into two samples of pre 
vs. post global transformation sets. Examination of their formation and duration can then 
be separately examined and compared in light of the hypotheses proposed in this study.
Lipjhart was right to suggest that pluralistic societies tend to produce consensual 
political formations. However, in this study we found Lijphart’s thesis to be conditioned 
by the time framework and the global circumstances nations encounter. Lipjhart’s views 
can be asserted during periods of national revival, where multi-ethnic cleavages in
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pluralist societies unite in the process of State building. However, we must recognize 
that globalization has greatly undermined the national paradigm in favor of an ethnic 
synthesis (Gurr, 1994, 1997, 2000). Globalization today is reinventing nationalism in 
favor of world integration and altering ethnic identities and ideological politics toward 
greater fragmentation. The most fundamental imprint of globalization on national 
politics can be seen through the “liberation” of the “ethnic interest” from geopolitical 
limitations, or from the border space of the Nation State. Never before have we seen 
pluralistic nations, subjugated to the force of globalization, so divided and polarized 
(Crawford, 1998). The Kurds in Iraq, as well as the Tajiks in Afghanistan, appear to have 
a more in common interest with the Americans than with their fellow national ethnics. If 
we were to examine political loyalty of the other contemporary Iraqi ethnicities of 
Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaledeans, Arab-Christians we will hardly find a common 
momentum for traditional national unity. What politically matters for ethnicities today is 
having a State capable of nurturing their respective ‘ethnic interests’ rather than having 
the contrary. With globalization, ethnic groups appear to be growing less trustful of the 
national ‘melting pot’ paradigm, and emerging more assertive of their distinct political- 
ethnic identities. Thus, while consensual politics may be needed for governing, such a 
requirement continues to be undermined and reinvented by the process of globalization, 
where ethnic groups are increasingly finding supports and alliances being extended 
beyond their national ethnic counterparts. The post-national state’s role appears to 
emerge as less concerned with regulating and unifying national economy and culture, but 
more concerned with the management and distribution of resources among the various 
ethnicities.280
280 The role o f post-civil war governments in Lebanon, for example, was predominantly submerged in the
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The impact of globalization on Israel is apparent in the increasing rise of ethnic 
politics and the undermining of national or ideological currents. The increasing influence 
of groups such as Shas, Israel Ba’aliah, and the Arab parties along with the growing 
tendency of larger parties to adopt ethnic perspectives (Ashkenazim vs. Sephardim) are 
evidence of such a pattern.281 The most important consequence of globalization is the 
deterioration of national unity in favor of greater political fragmentation and competing 
‘identities’ (Crawford, 1998). Such a situation has been responsible, as this study has 
demonstrated, for contemporary coalition competition and less consensual Israeli politics. 
As we move to the 21st Century, global and domestic events continue to reshape modem 
Israeli politics. It is evident that the new century of globalization will exert greater 
pressure on Israel’s pluralist society and its structure of government, and determine the 
prospect and shape of its post-modem national unity.
process o f distributing national resources among the various ethnic and religious sects. The predominant 
religious Lebanese sects (Maronites, Sunnis, and Shia’ah) divide government’s power and national 
resources through an ongoing political struggle.
281 In the 2003 Israeli election, Shinui emerged as a large party with 15 seats in the Knesset. Shinui is 
widely viewed as a secular-Ashkenazi party in opposition to Shas, a religious-Sephardic party.
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APPENDIX A
IAN’S BUDGE’S DEFINITIONS OF POLICY DOMAINS AND SUBDOMAINS282
Domain 1 External Relations
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive
Favorable mentions o f other countries where these are either specially dependent 
on or are especially involved with the relevant country. For example, former 
colonies; in the West German case, East Germany; in the Swedish case, the rest o f  
Scandinavia; the need for cooperation with and aid to such countries; their 
Importance to the economy and defense programs o f the relevant country.
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 
As 101, but negative.
103 Decolonization
Favorable mentions o f decolonization, need for relevant country to leave colo­
nies; greater self government, and independence; need to train natives for this; 
need to give special aid to make up for colonial past. This also includes negative 
references to Soviet Imperialism in Eastern Europe, especially in the United 
States.
104 Military and Security: Positive
Need for strong military presence overseas, for re-armament and self-defense, need 
to keep to military treaty obligations, need to secure adequate manpower in 
military.
105 Demilitarization 
As 104, but negative.
106 Peace
Declaration o f  belief in Peace and peaceful means o f  solving crises; need for 
international disarmament and desirability o f  relevant country joining in nego­
tiations with hostile countries.
107 lintemationalism: Positive
Support for UN. need for international cooperation, need for aid to developing 
countries, need for world planning o f resources, need for international courts 
support for any international aim or world state,
282 Based on the work o f  Budge, Ian and Hans Keman "Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and 
Government Functioning in Twenty States" Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
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108 Jewish Community: Positive283
Favorable mentions o f  Jewish Community in general and in Diaspora in particular.
109 Internationalism: Negative 
As 107, but negative
110 Internationalism Negative EEC and Europe 
As 108, but negative.
Domain 2 Freedom and Democracy
201 Freedom and Domestic Human Rights
Favorable mentions o f  importance o f  personal freedom, civil rights; freedom o f  
choice in education; freedom from bureaucratic control, freedom o f speech; 
freedom from coercion in industrial and political sphere; individualism.
202 Democracy
Favorable mention o f  democracy as method or goal in national and other 
organizations; support for worker participation; for involvement o f  all citizens in 
decision making, as well as generalized support for symbols o f democracy.
203 Constitutionalism: Positive
Support for specified aspects o f a formal constitution, use o f  constitutionalism as ,w 
argument for policy as well as generalized approval for 'constitutional' way o f doing 
things.
204 Constitutionalism: Negative 
As 203, but negative.
Domain 3 Government 
301 Decentralization: Positive
Support for devolution, regional administration o f  politics or economy, support for 
keeping up local and regional customs and symbols, deference to local expertise in 
planning, etc.
283 We replaced Budge’s sub-domain “favorable mention of European community” with what we thought a category 
related greater to Israel’s case as “favorable mention of Jewish community”.
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302 D ecentralization: Negative 
As 301, but negative.
303 Governm ent Efficiency
Need for efficiency in governm ent (e.g. merit system in civil service), economy in 
government, cutting dow n civil service; improving governmental procedures; 
general appeal to make process o f  governm ent and adm inistration cheaper and 
more effective.
304 Governm ent Corruption
N eed to eliminate corruption in government, and associated abuse, e.g. regulation 
of campaign expenses; need to check pandering to selfish interests.
305 Government Effectiveness and Authority
This includes references to government stability, especially in Italy.
Domain 4 Economy
401 Enterprise
Favorable mention o f private property rights; personal enterprise and initiative; 
need for the economy o f unhampered individual enterprises; favorable mention o f  
free enterprise capitalism; superiority o f  individual enterprise overstate, and over 
state buying or management systems.
402 Incentives
Need for financial and other incentives and for opportunities for the young, etc; 
encouragement to small businesses and one-man shops; need for wage and tax 
policies designed to induce enterprise; Home ownership.
403 Regulation o f Capitalism
Need for regulations designed to make private enterprise work better; actions 
against monopolies and trusts and in defense o f consumer and small businessmen; 
anti-profiteering
404 Economic Planing
Favorable mention of central planning o f  consultative or indicative nature; need 
for this and for government department to create national plan; need to plan 
imports and exports.
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405 Coorporatism (Applicable to the Netherlands and Canada only)
Favorable m entions of the need for the involvement o f employers and Trades 
Union organizations in overall econom ic planning and direction through the 
medium oftri-partite' bodies such as the SER in the Netherlands.
406 Protectionism: Positive
Favorable m ention o f extension or maintenance o f tariffs, to protect internal 
markets; or other domestic economic protectionism.
407 Protectionism: Negative 
As 406, but negative.
408 Economic Goals
Central statements o f  intent to pursue any economic goals that are policy 
non-specific.
409 Keynesian Demand Management
Adjusting government expenditure to prevailing levels o f employment and 
inflation.
410 Productivity
Need to encourage or facilitate greater production, need to take measures to aid 
this, appeal for greater production, and importance o f productivity to the economy; 
increase foreign trade; special aid to specific sectors o f the economy; growth; active 
manpower policy; aid to agriculture, tourism and industry.
411 Technology and Infrastructure
Importance o f  modernizing industrial administration, importance o f science and 
technological developments in industry; need for training and government spon­
sored research; need for overhaul o f  capital equipm ent, and methods o f communi­
cations and transport (including Merchant Marine); development o f  Nuclear 
Energy.
412 Controlled Economy
General need for direct government control o f economy; control over prices, wages, 
rents, etc. This covers neither Nationalization nor Indicative planning.
413 Nationalization
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Government ownership and control, partial or complete, including government
ownership o f land.
414 Economic Orthodoxy and Efficiency
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. balanced budget, retrenchment in 
crisis, low taxation, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions 
such as the Stock Market and banking system; support for strong currency 
internationally.
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life
501 Environmental Protection
Preservation of countryside, forests, etc; general preservation o f natural resources 
against selfish interests; proper use o f national parks; soil banks, etc.
502 Art, Span Leisure, and Media
Favorable mention o f leisure activities, need to spend money on museums, art 
galleries, etc; need to encourage worthwhile leisure activities, and to provide 
cultural and leisure facilities: to encourage development o f the media etc.
503 Social Justice
Need for fair treatment o f all men; for special protection for exploited; fair treatment 
in tax system; need for equality o f  opportunity; need for fair distribution o f  
resources and removal o f  class barriers; end o f discrimination.
504 Social Services Expansion: Positive
Favorable mention o f  need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare 
scheme; support for free basic social services such as public health, or housing. This 
excludes education
505 Social Services Expansion: Negative 
As 304. but negative.
506 Education Pro-Expansion
The need to expand and/or im prove education provision at all levels. But not 
Technical training which is coded under 411.
507 Education Anti-Expansion
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As 30 l i ,  but negative.
Domain 6 Fabric of Society
601 Defense o f  National Way o f Life: Positive
Favorable mentions o f importance o f defense against subversion, necessary 
suspension o f  some freedoms in order to defend this; support o f  national ideas, 
traditions and institutions.
602 Defense o f National Way o f Life: Negative 
As 601, but negative.
603 Traditional Morality: Positive
Favorable mention o f e.g. prohibition, censorship, suppression o f immorality and 
unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability o f family.
604 Traditional morality: Negative 
As 603, but negative.
605 Law and Order
Enforcement o f all laws; actions against organized crime; putting down urban 
violence; support and resources for police; tougher attitudes in courts, etc.
606 National Effort o f Social Harmony
Appeal for national effort and solidarity; need for nation to see itself as united; 
appeal for public spiritedness; decrying anti-social attitudes in a time o f  crisis 
support for public interest; national interest; bipartisanship.
607 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization
Preservation o f autonomy o f religious, ethnic, linguistic heritages within the 
country. Preservation and/or expansion o f  schools with a specific religious 
orientation.
608
As 607, but negative.
609 Immigration and Settlement: Positive284
284 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
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Fostering im m igration and settlements, support immigrants settle the land of Israel.
610  Support o f  Religious Laws: Positive285
Support o f religious institutions and establishments by the governm ent politically and financially, given the 
religious authorities greater role in public life.
611 Support o f  Religious Laws: Negative286 
As 610 but negative.
612 Jerusalem 287
Insistence that Jerusalem will remain the eternal capital o f  Israel. Facilitating Jerusalem for all sorts of 
religious worship.
Domain 7 Social Groups
701 Labor Groups
Favorable references to Labor, working class, unemployed, poor; support for 
Labor Unions, free collective bargaining, good treatment o f  manual and other 
employees.
702 Labor Groups: Negative 
As 701, but negative.
703 Agriculture and Farmers
Support for agriculture; farmers; any policy aimed specifically at benefiting these.
704 Other Economic Groups
Favorable references to any Econom ically-defined group not covered by 701 or 
703. For example, employers, self-em ployed, middle-class and professional groups 
in general.
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups
Favorable references to underprivileged minorities which are defined neither in 
economic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, homosexuals, etc.
285 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
286 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
287 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
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706 Non-econom ic Demographic Groups
Favorable m entions o f or need for, assistance to W om en, O ld People, Young 
People, linguistic groups and national minorities; special interest groups o f all 
kinds.
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APPENDIX B
BANZHAF POWER INDEX
The standardized Banzhaf index, normalized Banzhaf index or just Banzhaf index was 
introduced two decades after Shapley-Shubik index by lawyer John F. Banzhaf in 1965 
(Banzhaf 1965). The index calculates voter I 's  swings like the Shapley-Shubik index. 
While the latter one analyzes all possible voter permutations the former index considers 
each distinct coalition only once thus concentrating on voter combinations. The 
standardized Banzhaf index value for voter i  is obtained by dividing the sum of i's  
swings (regarding all possible 2® combinations) by the sum of all voters' all swings 
hence giving I's  proportion of all swings. Formally voter f 's  standardized Banzhaf index 
is calculated as
Jp{S) -v (8 \ { i } ) ]
~  £ |eAr E s c m  I® (^5-* (* \ (iBJ *
The standardized Banzhaf index can be interpreted to give an answer to the question: 
what is voter i 's relative share among all pivotal positions (swings)?
Example:
Consider a three voter weighted voting game where voter a has 50 votes, b 49 votes and c
[51; 50,49, Ij
one vote with a quota of 51, i.e. . In order to find the pivotal positions for
each voter we have to analyse all the possible voter combinations. There are always 2® 
(n  being the number of voters) of them, so in this case we have 2*2*2=8 possible 
combinations which are
Combination Weight Status Critical voters
a 50 losing -
ab 99 i . . ij winning • a,b
ac 51 i winning i a,c
abc 100 , winning i a
b 49 1 losing j -
be 50 losing -
c 1 losing j -
0 0 los ng -
First the winning coalitions which meet the vote threshold have to be found: these are 
ab,ac and abc. The critical voters (swings) are found within the winning coalitions by 
withdrawing a voter and checking whether the remaining coalition is winning. Clearly in 
coalition ab both voters are critical, thus both have a swing. In the grand coalition abc
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only a is critical since b or c could be removed (not both at the same time of course) and 
the coalition would still remain winning. There are altogether five swings, a has three of
a = |,&= | , c =  |
them, b and c one swing. Thus, the Banzhaf index scores are
References:
Banzhaf, John. F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Does not Work: A Mathematical Analysis." 
Rutgers Law Review 35: pp. 317-343.
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APPENDIX C 
DATA STRUCTURE
There are three structures to the data. The first entails the data collected based on 
governments being the unit of analysis. This primarily includes data gathered about each 
of the twenty eight governments — their duration in power, size, ideology, etc. The 
second set of data is based on fifteen Knesset general election results. From those fifteen 
Knesset elections we establish and calculate the dominant party power index. The 
dominant party’s power index remains the same throughout the Knesset’s terms. This 
power index, which is a measure of the ability of the dominant party to form alliances, 
remains the same regardless of cabinet changes during the same Knesset. The third 
dataset consists of annual figures relating to external and domestic political indicators 
from 1949 to 1999.
We collapse the data based on the government being the unit of analysis, since it 
is the ruling coalition is the objective of this study. This was done as follow: First, we 
entered the size, ideology, and duration data simply in accordance with the original 
formulation of the government. Second, we entered the power index of the dominant 
party data based on party’s relative position in the Knesset. Whenever more than one 
government was established within the same Knesset we duplicated the same dominant 
party’s power index for the different governments unless a different dominant party led 
the new government.
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The third annual dataset was then integrated into the government data in three 
data blocks. The first block consists of the annual data figures for the year before 
government formation if the government’s formation occurred in at least mid-year; 
otherwise the data are entered for the year of formation. This is done to examine prior 
events’ impact on coalition formation in term of both size and ideological parameters. 
The second block of data is entered for the first year after formation provided that the 
government has been formed prior to mid-year; otherwise the same year is considered. 
This is to establish the impact of first year events as well as dominant party power index, 
coalition’s size and ideology of government on its stability or durability. The third block 
of data is entered for the last year of government or the year before termination; the same 
year is considered when coalition ends after mid-year. This is established in order to 
determine whether a pattern exist that impact government’s termination (Table 3.17).
Data Structure
Annual Data Selection
The year before 
formation
First year after 
formation
The year before 
termination
Month of Government 
1 st to 5th 
6th to 12th
Last Year 
Same Year
Same Year 
Following Year
Last Year 
Same Year
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This doctoral dissertation identifies key aspects that have contributed to the 
formation and duration of Israeli coalition governments. Most importantly, it 
differentiates between two historical periods that have shaped Israeli coalition politics. 
Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the election of the 7th Israeli Knesset in 1969, 
Israeli political parties formed consensual and inclusive coalitions in response to 
economic, immigration, and external pressures. Low levels of party competition and the 
dominance of Mapai in the Israeli Knessets further contributed to the formation of large 
alliances. Post-1969, following the gradual decline of Labor’s electoral dominance, 
Israeli parties became further polarized and more competitive. External, economic, and
immigration pressures, in addition to increased party competition, undermined
consensual coalition formations. These factors were also relevant to the durability of 
alliances. Deteriorating economic, immigration, and external conditions as well as 
increased party competition have contributed to the shortfall of coalitions.
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